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INTRODUCTION
Innovative medical technology has made it possible to test
whether you are at increased risk for certain types of cancer. The
mere processing of a vial of blood can reveal whether you have a ge-
netic predisposition to develop breast, ovarian, or prostate cancer, or
other life-threatening conditions.1 The Human Genome Project, an
international endeavor seeking to map our genetic structures, has fa-
cilitated this increasing ability to test for genetic flaws.2 It is expected
that as the human genetic map is filled in, and as flaws in our funda-
mental building blocks are identified, there will be a concomitant
1. MichaelJ. Malinowski & RobinJ.R. Blatt, Commercialization of Genetic Testing Services:
The FDA, Market Forces, and Biological Tarot Cards, 71 TUL. L. REv. 1211, 1224-25 (1997); see
also infra Part I. Some of these conditions are "those for which a genetic mutation may be
neither causally necessary nor sufficient for the occurrence of the disease." Rather, they
are illnesses "where the presence of particular environmental conditions or family histories
is an essential part of the causal nexus that links a specific genetic mutation and a disease."
Robert Wachbroit, The Question Not Asked: The Challenge of Pleiotropic Genetic Tests, 8 KEN-
NEDY INST. ETmics J. 131, 132 (1998). At the same time, scientists also are finding that a
single-gene mutation may be "involved in multiple, apparently unrelated diseases," such as
coronary heart disease and Alzheimer's disease. Id.
2. See Genome Project Chief Calls for Privacy, Non-Discrimination Laws, Health Care Daily
Rep. (BNA), at D-10 (July 23, 1997) [hereinafter Genome Project Chief] (describing the pro-
ject's effort "to produce detailed maps of the 23 pairs of human chromosomes and se-
quence the 3 billion nucleotide bases that comprise the human genome" by the year
2005). Francis Collins, Director of the Human Genome Project, announced at the 126th
American Public Health Association Annual Meeting in November 1998 that the project is
ahead of schedule and expects to be finished by 2003. Francis Collins, Remarks at the
126th American Public Health Association Annual Meeting (Nov. 17, 1998). Some com-
mentators suggest that because "[g ] enetics research is almost always research about groups
of people, smaller than nation-states and larger than individuals[,] . .. the group, when-
ever possible, should have some say in the research." Henry T. Greely, The Control of Genetic
Research: Involving the "Groups Between, "33 Hous. L. REv. 1397, 1430 (1997). But see Eric T.
Juengst, Groups as Gatekeepers to Genomic Research: Conceptually Confusing Morally Hazardous,
and Practically Useless, 8 KENNEDY INST. ETHicsJ. 183, 183 (1998) (asserting that it is neither
possible nor desirable to obtain groups' permission, so that "it may fall to individuals to
protect the interests of the groups they care about, and to scientists to warn their subjects
of the need to do so").
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drive to test for these genetic differences outside of the research set-
ting.3 Indeed, genetic tests already are being commercially marketed,
particularly for genetic flaws linked to breast, ovarian, and prostate
cancers.4 This marketing is occurring despite a dearth of guidance
regarding the meaning of these tests, the situations in which they
should be offered, the nature or availability of potential treatment,
and the type of consent that should be obtained prior to their
administration.5
As such tests begin to migrate from the research laboratory to
your doctor's office,6 we must confront these and other compelling
legal and ethical dilemmas.7 Among the first issues to require our
3. See Scott Burris & Lawrence 0. Gostin, Genetic Screening from a Public Health Perspec-
tive: Some Lessons from the HIV Experience, in GENETIC SECRETS: PROTECTING PRIVACY AND
CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE GENETIC ERA 137, 137 (Mark A. Rothstein ed., 1997) [hereinafter
GENETIC SECRETS] (stating that the "medical and biotechnology industries have been quick
to find diagnostic and therapeutic uses for [genetic screening] in the care of individual
patients"); Georgia L. Wiesner, Clinical Implications of BRCA1 Genetic Testing for Ashkenazi-
Jewish Women, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 3, 3 (1997) (noting that "widespread [genetic] testing and
screening is now possible for all women regardless of their previous risk profile for devel-
oping breast cancer"); Benjamin S. Wilfond & Kathleen Nolan, National Policy Development
for the Clinical Application of Genetic Diagnostic Technologies: Lessons from Cystic Fibrosis, 270
JAMA 2948, 2948 (1993) (asserting that commercial interests, clinicians' desires to allay
legal liability, and demands of patients to obtain genetic information are likely to drive the
use of all technically feasible tests).
4. See Wiesner, supra note 3, at 3 (noting that the Genetics and In-Vitro Fertilization
Institute of Fairfax, Virginia, "is currently marketing [a breast cancer] test to general physi-
cians and oncologists for patients outside of scientific research protocols"); see also Mali-
nowski & Blatt, supra note 1, at 1212-15 (noting that genetic research companies are
actively marketing genetic tests for breast and ovarian cancer, along with other diseases).
5. See EUGENE B. BRODY, BIOMEDICAL TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 136 (1993)
(discussing a European report that identified potential sources of misuse of genetic testing
procedures, including inadequate methodology, insufficient numbers of properly trained
test providers, lack of understanding of genetics and genetic testing, and difficult use, in-
terpretation, and follow-up of tests for common diseases); Wendy C. McKinnon et al., Pre-
disposition Genetic Testing for Late-Onset Disorders in Adults: A Position Paper of the National
Society of Genetic Counselors, 278JAMA 1217, 1219 (1997) (noting that "there is a dearth of
data regarding appropriate medical management for gene mutation carriers and the psy-
chological aspects of testing"); Mendel E. Singer & Randall D. Cebul, BRCAI: To Test or
Not to Test, That Is the Question, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 163, 175 (1997) (discussing issues sur-
rounding the BRCA1 genetic test, including the lack of data establishing the accuracy of
the test, the probability of a positive test, and the emotional effect of the test results).
6. See Malinowski & Blatt, supra note 1, at 1214-17 (noting that a few companies are
already marketing genetic tests).
7. See id. at 1219 (explaining that the dangers inherent in genetic testing include
overuse of testing, misinterpretation by patients and doctors, and misuse by employers and
insurance companies); see also Andrea Farkas Patenaude, The Genetic Testing of Children for
Cancer Susceptibility: Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues, 14 BERAV. SC. & L. 393, 406 (1996)
("Few things are clear yet about the impact of genetic testing, except for the significance
and variety of the issues it raises."). Note that some genetic testing already occurs in rou-
tine ways, e.g., testing of newborns for phenylketonuria, galactosemia, and congenital hy-
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attention are whether such testing can be conducted without our con-
sent; and, if not, what concerns must be addressed to ensure that our
consent is informed?
Current informed consent doctrine generally does not apply to
the drawing of blood and its analysis; instead, it is raised most fre-
quently in the context of seriously invasive procedures that pose medi-
cal risks, such as surgery, laparoscopy, and angioplasty.8 The
significant exception to this is the blood test used to diagnose HIV
infection. In most states, statutes require HIV pre-test counseling and
consent by the patient;9 often, this consent must be in writing.10 In
this context, disclosure focuses on the social risks related to HIV/
AIDS, rather than any minuscule medical risk that may accompany the
drawing of blood.
The environment surrounding genetic testing for predisposition
to cancerous conditions today is remarkably similar to that enveloping
HIV-antibody testing in its early years: both cancer and HIV are stig-
matizing and place one at risk for significant discrimination;11 both
conditions have the potential to be life-threatening; positive test re-
sults for both conditions are likely to have significant psychological
ramifications; in both situations, the test was developed prior to the
discovery of any effective treatment;12 and these powerful tests are be-
pothyroidism. SeeJohn M. Naber & David R Johnson, Mandatory HIV Testing Issues in State
Newborn Screening Programs, 7 J.L. & HErALTH 55, 57 (1992-93). Such testing is accepted
largely because there is little to no stigma associated with these conditions and because
there are readily available treatments or cures. See Lori B. Andrews, Prenatal Screening and
the Culture of Motherhood, 47 HASTNGS L.J. 967, 972 (1996) (noting that some states man-
date testing for the purpose of "detect[ing] certain diseases early enough for the infant to
be treated in a timely fashion"). Genetic testing is also frequently associated with amni-
ocentesis and related issues of reproductive choice. See Barbara Bowles Biesecker, Privacy
in Genetic Counseling, in GENETIC SECRETS, supra note 3, at 108, 110 (discussing counseling
procedures for a pregnant woman wishing to receive amniocentesis).
Although the observations made and conclusions reached in this Article may inform
discussions regarding routine genetic testing for non-life-threatening conditions currently
in place, as well as genetic counseling during pregnancy, this Article is primarily concerned
with the growing availability of tests that can detect genetic flaws that reveal a predisposi-
tion to cancer or other life-threatening conditions and for which there may be limited, or
no, treatment. See infta Part I.
8. See infra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 52, 242-247 and accompanying text. Some commentators prefer the
term "health care consumer" to "patient." See, e.g., Malinowski & Blatt, supra note 1, at
1286. Although use of this phrase creates a stronger image of the person seeking medical
care, this Article uses the more traditional term.
10. See infra notes 242-247 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 33, 50, 96, 99-101, 108-111, 322 and accompanying text.
12. For example, there is still no cure or vaccine for HIV, but the test for HIV was
approved by the FDA in 1985. See infra note 232 and accompanying text.
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ing marketed for general use prior to the appropriate education of
health care providers or their patients."8
This Article seeks to establish the contours of informed consent
in this new arena of genetic testing for life-threatening conditions by
setting forth the basic elements of what must be discussed with a pa-
tient to ensure that her consent to testing is, indeed, informed. Spe-
cifically, this Article proposes a set of basic statutory requirements for
pre-test genetic counseling and suggests that these requirements can
be adapted, in significant part, from the essential principles of HIV-
related counseling.' 4 These basic elements are shaped, in part, by les-
sons learned from a critical assessment of current informed consent
legal doctrine and by precautions to guard against the significant pres-
sures posed by managed care reimbursement programs. This pro-
posed regimen of genetic counseling represents a conscious approach
to ensuring that each time a person consents to or refuses such test-
ing, the decision is one that is voluntary and informed.
Part I of the Article begins with a discussion of how blood tests
generally are conducted and describes the presently available technol-
ogy to detect flaws in genetic characteristics and reports on predic-
tions of advancements in this area. It continues with an exploration of
the ways in which genetic testing for life-threatening conditions is dif-
ferent from other kinds of blood testing. Part II contains both a re-
view of the existing legal doctrine of informed consent, based in
constitutional theory, statutes, and common law, and a critique of this
doctrine based on pragmatic applications of these laws and on critical
legal theories. Part III examines the development of statutory pre-test
counseling in the context of the HIV/AIDS epidemic and assesses its
strengths, weaknesses, and relevance to genetic pre-test counseling.
Part IV presents a model for genetic pre-test counseling that is drawn
from the HJV/AIDS statutory format, the critique of current informed
consent doctrine, and a review of existing genetic testing statutes.
The Article concludes with a recommendation to adopt the model
statute introduced in Part IV to remedy the identified weaknesses in
13. See supra note 5, infra note 27 and accompanying text.
14. This Article does not suggest that legislation is always the best way to confront pub-
lic policy concerns raised by innovative scientific technology. See generally ROGER B. DWOR-
KIN, LIMITS: THE ROLE OF THE LAW IN BIoETHIcAL DECISION MAKING (1996) (arguing for
the limits of law generally, and legislation specifically, in the realm of bioethics). For rea-
sons that Dworkin acknowledges, however, such as the slow pace of change in the develop-
ment of common law, id. at 9-10, and the ability of legislation to be "forward looking," id. at
12, this Article argues that the minimal legal response capable of dealing with the social
issues presented by this technology is the enactment of carefully crafted legislation. None-
theless, dangers that may ensue from this approach also are discussed. See infra Part IV.B.5.
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existing informed consent doctrine, particularly its failure to incorpo-
rate disclosure and discussion of social risks attendant to genetic
testing.
I. THE INFLUENCE OF CHANGING MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY- THE
IMPACT OF THE ABILITY TO TEST FOR GENETIC PREDISPOSITION
TO LIFE-THREATENING ILLNESS
A. An Overview: Past, Present, and Future Concerns Associated with
Diagnostic Blood Tests
Many of us resist going to see a physician. Many of us also have a
hard time adhering to a doctor's medical advice once we have left his
office. It is easy to "forget" to lose the extra ten pounds, to start exer-
cising, to stop smoking, maybe even to complete the course of
medicine we were given. 5
Yet, when we are present at the doctor's office, the clinic, or the
hospital, we tend to be quite conciliatory.16 Often towards the end of
an examination, the doctor will suggest drawing some blood 'just to
make sure everything is ok" or "because it's been awhile since we've
checked things out." Perhaps he has a hunch that something is not
quite right, or perhaps he just wants to fulfill his obligation to conduct
a thorough examination.
Although no one enjoys having her blood drawn, it is a relatively
noninvasive and quickly accomplished procedure. In reality, it is rare
that we object.1 7 We express our consent by rolling up a sleeve and
presenting an arm. The assistant draws our blood and sends it to the
lab; usually, we get a phone call from the doctor's office about a week
later saying everything checked out just fine; or, perhaps the news is
not so good.18
15. SeeJAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCrOR AND PATIENT xiv (1984) (noting that
studies on patient compliance have consistently supported the depressing conclusion that
a great many patients do not comply with their doctors' prescriptions").
16. Cf id. (stating that "[a] t least since Hippocratic days, patients have been asked to
trust their physicians without question").
17. See id. at 82-83 (describing physicians' offices as "surrender-prone medical
settings").
18. It is, of course, much more difficult to communicate about test results, and other
medical matters, with those persons who cannot afford homes or telephones. See Helen
Rodriguez-Trias & Carola Marte, Challenges and Possibilities: Women, HIV, and the Health Care
System in the 1990s, in WOMEN RESISTING AIDS: FEMINIST STRATEGIES OF EMPOWERMENT 301,
304 (Beth E. Schneider & Nancy E. Stoler eds., 1995) (contending that "[p]oor people,
persons from ethnic or racial minorities, persons with disabilities, those living in rural or
isolated areas, persons who are homeless are among the many who are excluded from the
benefits of our highly stratified [health care] system").
1999]
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It is questionable, however, whether this consent is truly in-
formed.' 9 In contrast to bygone times, when physicians relied primar-
ily on physical examinations to diagnose our ailments,2" scientists have
significantly expanded the tools available to understand the function-
ing, and malfunctioning, of the human body: from x-rays, to CT
scans, to blood tests that can determine not only our blood count
and our cholesterol, but also whether we are at increased risk for
other conditions for which there is still no cure.2 1 These new
diagnostic techniques often pose little medical risk to the patient;
they do, however, present a host of social risks related to access
to health care, 22 stigma,23 psychological well-being,24 and potential
19. See KATZ, supra note 15, at xiv (noting that informed consent imposes "the dual
obligations to inform patients and to obtain their consent").
20. See Albert R. Jonsen, The Impact of Mapping the Human Genome on the Patient-Physician
Relationship, in THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT AND THE FuTuRE OF HEALTH CARE 1, 4-7
(Thomas H. Murray et al. eds., 1996) (illustrating the manner in which physicians' identifi-
cation of medical conditions has evolved since the nineteenth century, from diagnosing
almost exclusively from the patient's described symptoms, to relying largely on results of
blood tests and new diagnostic techniques); cf Morgan v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617, 622 (Pa.
1997) (Nigro, J., dissenting) (arguing that the current battery theory of informed consent
requires consent for "technological advances that are invasive but no longer require a sur-
gical cut").
21. See Malinowski & Blatt, supra note 1, at 1225 (noting that "the discovery of genetic
alterations linked to many health conditions comes well before those discoveries can be
turned into therapies"); see generally Deborah Schrag et al., Decision Analysis-Effects of Pro-
phylactic Mastectomy and Oophorectomy on Life Expectancy Among Women with BRCA1 or BRCA2
Mutations, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1465, 1465 (1997) (noting that women in the general
population have about a 12% risk of developing breast cancer and a 1.5% risk of develop-
ing ovarian cancer during their lifetimes); Jeffrey P. Struewing et al., The Risk of Cancer
Associated with Specific Mutations of BRCA1 and BRCA2 Among Ashkenazi Jews, 336 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1401, 1401 (1997) (noting that the presence of the BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutations in
women with family histories of cancer indicate a 76% to 87% risk of breast cancer, and a
32% to 87% risk of ovarian cancer during their lifetimes); infra Part I.B.
22. See infra notes 32-34 and accompanying text.
23. See Timothy F. Murphy, The Genome Project and the Meaning ofJustice, inJusTicE AND
THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 1, 7 (Timothy F. Murphy & Marc A. Lapp6 eds., 1994) (ask-
ing whether "the genome project [will] mark difference as an undesirable trait and justify
its eradication?"); Report of the Pennsylvania Bar Association Interdisciplinary Committee
on Medical and Health Related Issues, The New Biotechnology-Does Patient Protection Require
A Legislative Response To Genetic Testing?, 65 PA. BAR Ass'N Q. 86, 87 (1994) [hereinafter
Report] (describing the risk of stigmatization as particularly pertinent "because of the pub-
lic's perception that DNA and genes constitute the essence of a person[,] ... whereas non-
genetic medical information is perceived as describing what has happened to a person"
and noting that someone with a trait for Huntington's disease may be perceived as 'defec-
tive,' whereas someone who suffered health consequences from an accident would not be);
see also infra notes 96-97 and accompanying text.
24. Lori B. Andrews, Public Choices and Private Choices-Legal Regulation of Genetic Testing,
inJUSTICE AND THE HuMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 23, at 46, 55 ("[Genetic screening]
can lead to psychological trauma. Some people have committed suicide when they learned
they were affected by Huntington's disease."). Even negative test results may cause psycho-
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discrimination, particularly with regard to employment and
insurance.
25
With the advent of this new medical technology, the physician's
duty to "do no harm"26 is an increasingly ambiguous one. For exam-
ple, suppose your doctor thinks that it is in the best interests of each
of her female patients with a family history of breast, ovarian, or pros-
tate cancer to know whether she is carrying a gene that increases the
likelihood that she will develop breast cancer. Your doctor may think
that this is a legitimate and important part of preventive medicine.27
You, on the other hand, are not so sure you want to know about any
additional risk factor. These days everything you do and everything
you eat seems to put you at increased risk for something bad. Maybe
you are also concerned about having the test done: What would it
really mean? How would the knowledge affect you? What treatment
is available? Who guarantees that your insurance company or your
employer will not be told your results-or that you won't lose your
logical harm in the form of "survivor's guilt" wherein people wonder why they do not have
the gene in question, but other family members do. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 977.
25. See infra notes 28-29, 33 and accompanying text.
26. See HIPPOCRATES, The Oath, in I THE GENUINE WoRcs OF HIPPOCRATES 779, 780(Classics of Medicine Library ed. 1985) (Francis Adams trans., 1849) ("I will follow that
system of regimen which, according to my ability and judgment, I consider for the benefit
of my patients, and abstain from whatever is deleterious and mischievous."); Robert M.
Veatch, A Theory of Medical Ethics, in LAw, SCIENCE & MEDICINE 230, 231 (Judith Areen et al.
eds., 2d ed. 1996) (identifying the core of the Hippocratic tradition and of professional
physician ethics as the requirement to protect a patient from harm).
27. See Lori B. Andrews, Past as Prologue: Sobering Thoughts on Genetic Enthusiasm, 27
SETON HALL L. REv. 893, 901 (1997) ("[B]elief in genetics is so strong that some physicians
coerce people to learn their genetic status and take action upon it. In some instances,
physicians surreptitiously test pregnant women's blood for carrier status for genetic dis-
ease. In other instances, physicians mislead pregnant women into undergoing genetic test-
ing." (citations omitted)); Andrews, supra note 7, at 991 (reporting that some physicians
wish to "test fetuses for the breast cancer gene"); Malinowski & Blatt, supra note 1, at 1219
(explaining that physicians increasingly are making genetic testing technology available to
their patients, even as they are insufficiently trained in its function, interpretation, and
implementation); cf Ingfei Chen, Who Should Be Tested?, 11 HiPpocRATEs 1 10 (1997) (vis-
ited Sept. 18, 1998) <http://www.medscape.com/time/hippocrates/1997/vll.n12/
h1112.02. chen.html> (noting that " [w]omen who seek to have their genes scanned often
have the rosy view that they can easily change the future health of their daughters and
granddaughters"). This approach, however, is contrary to the positions adopted by leading
genetic and oncologic organizations, such as the American Society of Clinical Oncology,
American Society of Human Genetics, and the National Advisory Council for Human Gen-
ome Research to the National Institutes of Health. See Karen H. Rothenberg, Breast Cancer,
the Genetic "Quick-Fix," and the Jewish Community, 7 HEALTH MATRIX 97, 123 n.146 (1997)
(indicating that many medical groups have concerns that doctors are currently unable to
communicate properly the benefits and drawbacks of genetic testing and may misuse or
misread results); Wiesner, supra note 3, at 28 (noting that restraint should be used in pro-
viding genetic testing until standards are in place to provide informed consent and
counseling).
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coverage 28 or yourjob?29 What would you tell your family-especially
siblings or children who may share the same genetic flaw?
There are, indeed, widely varying reasons for wanting or refusing
to have such powerful diagnostic tests performed.3 ' However, follow-
ing the adage, "if you build it, they will come," insurance companies,
health care institutions, and individuals at-risk already are developing
a market for genetic testing;31 there is little doubt that insurance com-
panies and employers will want to know our test results.3 2 In turn, this
knowledge is likely to facilitate discrimination against those with test
results indicating the presence of a genetic flaw.3 3 Such possible mus-
28. Loss of coverage may be especially worrisome if you are contemplating a change in
jobs and expecting to be in need of a new health insurance policy. While in many circum-
stances the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 prevents insurers
from denying coverage solely on the basis of genetic information when a person moves
from one job to another, it does not ban them from charging a higher-and perhaps
prohibitively expensive-premium. See 29 U.S.C. § 1181(b) (1) (B) (Supp. 1996) (clarifying
that "[g]enetic information" without an actual diagnosis of the condition shall not be
treated as a pre-existing condition under 29 U.S.C. § 1181(a)(1) (Supp. 1996)).
29. See Rothenberg, supra note 27, at 109-13 (discussing the inadequacies of state legis-
lation to protect individuals from discrimination based on genetic makeup and noting that
federal genetic-specific health insurance proposals have not passed). Although federal
and state laws prohibit employment discrimination on the basis of disability, it is unclear
how these laws will be applied if an individual suffers discrimination based on genetic test
results. See Barbara Bowles Biesecker, Future Directions in Genetic Counseling: Practical and
Ethical Considerations, 8 KENNEDY INST. ETHics J. 145, 150 (1998) (noting that "[flear of
genetic discrimination directly affects the decisions genetic counseling clients make about
predictive gene testing"). But see Wachbroit, supra note 1, at 141 (objecting to the notion
that a person should avoid genetic testing because there is a "risk of discrimination and
stigmatization" and stating that " [i]f a patient becomes uninsurable when a genetic condi-
tion is discovered, the proper target for criticism is the insurance industry, not the discov-
ery," and making similar arguments regarding employment discrimination).
30. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
31. See Malinowski & Blatt, supra note 1, at 1212-17 (noting that companies are already
marketing genetic testing services, some of which can test for several gene alterations in
the same test, and can sell for as much as $2400); Wiesner, supra note 3, at 3 (noting the
growing commercial availability for genetic testing, outside of scientific research protocols,
through general physicians and oncologists); Wilfond & Nolan, supra note 3, at 2948 ("It
may also seem inevitable that virtually every test that is technically feasible will be routinely
used. Commercial interests may promote testing; clinicians may use tests to allay fears of
legal liability; and patients themselves may demand testing to obtain genetic
information.").
32. See Genome Project Chief supra note 2, at D-10 (reporting on congressional testimony
by the Health Insurance Association of America's Chief Operating Officer that access to
genetic test information is necessary to identify those likely to develop serious illness or
disease).
33. See Chen, supra note 27, 1 32 (discussing a recent survey of 332 people with a
variety of genetic disorders and noting that more than 20% believed they or a relative had
been denied health or life insurance because of the flawed DNA and that 13% believed
they had lost or been denied a job because of their status); Rothenberg, supra note 27, at
108 (noting that the availability of genetic information to third parties causes "fear that...
354
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ings are hardly the result of idle speculation. Some of these events
already have started to occur. 4
Moreover, these concerns arise against a troubling historical
backdrop. The eugenics movement, so often linked with Nazi Ger-
many,"5 also has roots in the United States. 6 Indeed, "[r]estrictive
immigration laws, forced sterilization, and prohibitions on interracial
marriage were in part a legacy of mixing genetics, race, and class"37 in
the United States and elsewhere.38 While this domestic eugenics
movement most often is associated with socially regressive policies of
the early twentieth century, African Americans, Latinas, and low-in-
come people were subjected to mandatory race-based experimenta-
tion39 and sterilization4 ° through the 1960s and 1970s.41 As such,
individuals and their families may face discrimination"); Wiesner, supra note 3, at 28-29
(explaining that "studies are essential to explore the issues surrounding a patient's desire
to know their genetic diagnosis when coupled with potential employment and insurance
discrimination"); see also Direct Mail Campaign from Lois Waldman, Director, Commission
for Women's Equality, American Jewish Congress (soliciting funds because genetic testing
"may be used by insurance companies or... employer[s] to discriminate..." and noting
that "[b]y submitting to genetic testing, [one] could join 'an insurance underclass' subject
to job discrimination[,] .. . excessive health and life insurance premiums ... or denial of
insurance coverage altogether" and enclosing newspaper clipping by Susan Ferraro, Balk-
ing at Breast Cancer Test, DAILY NEWS (Jan. 1998) (on file with author)); infra Part I.B.
34. See Chen, supra note 27, 1 32 (detailing a study revealing discrimination exper-
ienced by persons with genetic disorders); UCSF Cancer Center to Offer Genetic Testing For
Breast Cancer Genes (visited Jan. 30, 1998) <http://www.pslgroup.com/dg/124b2.htm>
[hereinafter UCSF Cancer Center] ("A recent study published in the journal Science showed
that 47 percent of people questioned on health insurance applications about genetic dis-
eases were subsequently rejected for coverage.").
35. See Arthur L. Caplan, Handle with Care: Race, Class, and Genetics, injusTicE AND THE
HUMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note 23, at 30, 30-31.
36. See id. at 31 (recounting the forced sterilization programs sponsored by the United
States government designed to "prevent[ ) the spread of 'bad' genes to future genera-
tions"); see also Andrews, supra note 27, at 918 ("It is useful to realize that the turn-of-the-
century purveyors of genetic ideas did not consider themselves evil. They saw themselves
on a laudable quest for human betterment."); Daniel J. Kevles, Eugenics and the Human
Genome Project: Is the Past Prologue?, inJus-icE AND THE HuMAN GENOME PROJECT, supra note
23, at 14, 18 ("[Eugenic sterilization] laws were declared constitutional in the 1927 U.S.
Supreme Court decision of Buck v. Bell, [279 U.S. 200 (1927),] in which Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes delivered the opinion that three generations of imbeciles were
enough."); cf James E. Bowman, Genetics and African Americans, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 919,
936 (1997) (observing that "do-gooders and well-meaning people may be more difficult to
challenge than organizations and individuals with blatant eugenic objectives").
37. Caplan, supra note 35, at 31; see also Andrews, supra note 27, at 907 (noting that
"African-American citizens were thought to be so inferior that interracial marriage was
prohibited to prevent the birth of defective offspring").
38. Caplan, supra note 35, at 30-31; see also Kevles, supra note 36, at 18 (stating that
more than 20 states had enacted eugenic sterilization laws by the late 1920s).
39. SeeVernellia R. Randall, Slavery, Segregation and Racism, 15 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv.
191, 198 (1996) (recounting the infamous Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, in which scien-
tists observed Black men with the disease to learn its natural history, rather than treating
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commentators describe a "collective Black consciousness which still in-
fluence [s] African Americans' reaction to the health care system.1"42
What does this mean for the future of patient autonomy and pa-
tient participation in health care decision making? Who should de-
cide whether a certain test is performed? What information do you
need before agreeing to be tested for a significant genetic trait?
43
It is most useful to begin thinking about these questions by exam-
ining current legal doctrine concerning medical decision making, un-
them with antibiotics); id. at 199 (discussing widespread "collect[ion of] blood samples
from seven thousand Black youths" under the guise of testing for anemia, but instead
"looking for signs that the children were genetically predisposed to criminal activity"); id.
at 200 (chronicling abuses in the prison system, which houses a disproportionate number
of African Americans, and the military, in which Blacks are overrepresented, and noting
that "soldiers cannot refuse to participate in the government's medical experiments").
40. Id. at 203 (discussing the behavior of some doctors in the 1970s who would only
deliver babies or perform abortions on pregnant African American women if the women
consented to sterilization and noting that "[o]ther women were threatened with the with-
drawal of their welfare benefits if they did not agree to sterilization"). Randall links
mandatory and routine sickle cell screening in the 1970s, which led to "widespread dis-
crimination against African Americans" in employment and insurance, to the history of
misguided medical policies directed at Blacks. Id. at 201; see also Andrews, supra note 24, at
52 (identifying two waves of genetic screening in the United States so far: mandatory steril-
ization laws linked to eugenic policies and testing for sickle cell anemia); Lisa C. Ikemoto,
The Racialization of Genomic Knowledge, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 937, 943-44 (1997) (arguing
that "the genetic presumption has already given rise to definitions of disease and defect
that police normalcy along racially subordinating lines" and discussing the legal treatment
of the sickle cell trait in these terms).
41. It would be inappropriate to conceive of a monolithic African American commu-
nity, Latino community, or any other population group-just as it would be inappropriate
to envision a monolithic white community. The challenge is "to begin to know the numer-
ous communities" within our overall diversity. Cf Randall, supra note 39, at 235.
42. Randall, supra note 39, at 200.
43. Perhaps this new wave of development in "medical science" will prompt further
development of informed consent doctrine. See KATZ, supra note 15, at xvi (noting that
"[w] ithout the emergence of medical science, the legal doctrine of informed consent prob-
ably could not have been promulgated"). A report by a Pennsylvania Bar Association Com-
mittee anticipates some of these new issues:
The stability of DNA also raises special privacy concerns in that DNA may be
tested for years after a sample has been taken. The biological information avail-
able in a person's DNA expands dramatically and continuously as new technolo-
gies for testing are developed. Future examination of the DNA sample therefore
... might be used in ways that are adverse to the subject in ways unforeseeable at
the time permission to test was granted and therefore not implicit in the consent
initially given.
Report, supra note 23, at 87; see also infta Part IV. But see Biesecker, supra note 29, at 152
(predicting that "an increase in the treatability of disease" likely will lead to genetic tests
becoming "more routine," "less . . . associated with significant psychosocial issues," and
further will encourage providers "to be directive in recommending that testing be
performed").
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derstood most commonly as the doctrine of informed consent.44 As
noted earlier, 45 a review of recent case law and pertinent statutes
reveals that this doctrine continues to exist almost exclusively in the
realm of significantly invasive procedures. 6 Few informed consent
cases raise concerns about unwanted blood tests or other minimally
invasive diagnostic techniques.
The one area, however, where there has been concern, manifest
through litigation and legislation, about diagnostic blood testing with-
out informed consent, is in the realm of HIV disease. 7 The prece-
dent of H1V/AIDS48  provides quite the object lesson in the
importance of considering carefully the power of a medically signifi-
cant diagnostic test,41 particularly one involving ostensibly minimal
bodily invasion.5" In the mid-1980s, once a test for the presence of
44. See generally RUTH R. FADEN & TOM L. BEAUCHAMP, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF IN-
FORMED CONSENT vii (1986) (attempting "to provide a satisfactory answer to the question
'What is informed consent?'"); KATZ, supra note 15, at 48 (discussing the "history of the
doctrine of informed consent").
45. See supra text accompanying note 8.
46. See infra Part II.B.
47. See, e.g., Leckelt v. Board of Comm'rs of Hosp. Dist. No. 1, 909 F.2d 820, 833 (5th
Cir. 1990) (holding that a nurse who refused to submit HIV test results was not "otherwise
qualified" and that therefore her dismissal was not discriminatory and did not violate the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, a state civil rights statute, constitutional equal protection, or
privacy rights); Hill v. Evans, No. Civ. A. 91-A-626-N, 1993 WL 595676, at *5 (M.D. Ala. Oct.
7, 1993) (holding that an Alabama statute which "allows a doctor to have a patient tested
for HIV infection simply because the doctor considers the patient to be at high risk for the
infection" is unconstitutional); Doe v. Ohio State Univ. Hosps. & Clinics, 663 N.E.2d 1369,
1376 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995) (affirmingjudgment for hospital where plaintiff was tested for
HIV without giving consent because physician did not knowingly submit blood sample for
HIV test).
48. As new treatments have been developed to counter both HIV infection and its
manifestations (e.g., multiple bouts of bacterial pneumonia, gynecologic infections resis-
tant to treatment, wasting), health experts have adopted the phrase "HIV disease" or
"HIV/AIDS" to refer to the range of symptoms that a person living with HIV may experi-
ence. See LAWRENCE 0. GoSTIN & ZrrA LAZZARINI, HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBIC HEALTH IN
THE AIDS PANDEMIC vii (1997) (utilizing the phrase HIV/AIDS); Helena Brett-Smith &
Gerald H. Friedland, Transmission and Treatment, in AIDS LAw TODAY- A NEW GUIDE FOR
THE PUBLIC 18, 30 (Scott Burnis et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter AIDS LAW TODAY] (same).
49. This Article uses the term "diagnostic blood test" to refer to the technology that
now is capable of testing for genetic sequences revealing predispositions to cancer and
other life-threatening conditions.
50. See generally MARK S. SENAI, HIV, AIDS AND THE LAW: A GUIDE TO OUR RIGHTS AND
CHALLENGES 167 (1996) (characterizing the HIV-antibody test as the "means by which one
becomes aware of one's status and gains medical treatment... [but] also [as] the means by
which discrimination and maltreatment by others occur[ ]"); Nan D. Hunter, Complications
of Gender: Women and HIVDisease, in AIDS AGENDA: EMERGING ISSUES IN CviL RIGHTS 5, 21
(Nan D. Hunter & William B. Rubenstein eds., 1992) (describing HIV testing as a "physical
intrusion").
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HIV infection became widely available,51 numerous states passed laws
requiring that patients provide their informed consent prior to the
administration of the test.52
Although a limited number of jurisdictions have started to grap-
ple with the issue of consent to genetic testing,53 there is little indica-
tion of a legislative consensus regarding the approach that will be
adopted by our state legislatures and courts.5 4 It is essential that the
doctrine of informed consent remains current with our changing
medical technology.
The need for establishing such parameters is especially important
as physicians55 begin to adjust to the new technology. When any new
51. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Report of the Workgroup on Blood and Blood
Products, 103 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 58, 58 (Supp.) (1988) (noting that a FDA-approved test
for HIV antibodies was widely used to screen donated blood by 1985).
52. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125107(d) (West Supp. 1998) (providing
that a "pregnant woman [must] voluntarily consent[ ] to [HIV] testing"); CAL. INS. CODE
§ 799.03(a) (West Supp. 1998) (mandating that "[a]n insurer that requests an applicant to
take an HIV-related test shall obtain the applicant's written informed consent"); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 381.004(3) (a) (West 1998) (stating that "no person . . . shall perform a test
designed to identify [HI without first obtaining the informed consent of the person
upon whom the test is being performed"); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 305/4-4 (West 1997)
(stating that "no person may order an HIV test without first receiving the written informed
consent of the subject of the test"); N.Y. INS. LAw § 2611 (a) (McKinney Supp. 1998) (stat-
ing that "[n]o insurer or its designee shall request or require an individual proposed for
insurance coverage to be the subject of an HIV related test without receiving the written
informed consent of such individual"); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 81.105(a)
(West 1992) (mandating that "a person may not perform a test designed to identify HIV
... without first obtaining the informed consent of the person to be tested"). Some, but
not all, statutes require the informed consent to be in writing. See, e.g., 410 ILL. CoMP.
STAT. ANN. 305/4-4 (stating that " [n] o person may order an HIV test without first receiving
the written informed consent of the subject of the test or the subject's legally authorized
representative"); N.Y. INS. LAw § 2611 (b) (6) (requiring that "[w] ritten informed consent
to an HIV related test shall consist of a written authorization that... includes... the
signature of the applicant"); TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE AN. § 81.105(b) (explaining
that "[c]onsent need not be written if there is documentation in the medical record that
the test has been explained and the consent has been obtained").
53. See infra notes 289, 322 and accompanying text.
54. See generally infra Part IV.B.
55. This Article intentionally focuses on the physician-patient relationship and the re-
sponsibility of doctors to provide proper counseling to their patients regarding genetic
testing. Although nurses or trained genetic counselors often perform health care related
counseling, ultimately it is the responsibility of the physician in charge of a particular of-
fice, clinic, or hospital to ensure that the patient receives proper counseling. See Biesecker,
supra note 29, at 145-46 (discussing the training, stature, and role of genetic counselors).
While genetic counselors traditionally have worked in the prenatal and neonatal settings,
increasingly they are filling a need in the numerous research environments that are explor-
ing the nature and incidence of genetic flaws linked to cancer and other life-threatening
conditions. Telephone Interview with Regina Zimmerman, Registry Director, Metropoli-
tan New York Registry of Breast and Ovarian Cancer Families (Mar. 18, 1998). In fact,
schools increasingly are offering degrees in genetic counseling in an attempt to remedy
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medical procedure is developed, there is an inherent lag between the
availability of the test and the education of physicians regarding its
use, recommended application, and understanding of test results.56
Experience has shown that this lag may be significant and that pa-
tients suffer from this delay when they are not provided with a thor-
ough explanation of what the test might reveal, what the results mean,
and what their treatment options are, if any.5 7 These problems al-
ready have arisen in the context of genetic testing.58
Physicians also are grappling with the impact of new methods of
reimbursement for the provision of medical care and services. The
growing presence of managed care in health care reimbursement sys-
tems is exerting remarkable financial pressures on the manner in
which physicians organize their offices and provide health care serv-
ices.59 While some of these pressures result in a "trimming" of the
proverbial "fat" off of the provision of medical care, they also have had
the current shortage. Id.; cf JEROO S. KOTVAL, NEW YORK STATE LEGISLATIVE COMMISSION
ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, DNA BASED TESTS: POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR NEw YORK
STATE 16 (1994) (citing a 1990 New York survey estimating that the current workload "war-
ranted 50% more genetic counselors than were available"). However, "widespread genetic
testing is unlikely to be provided by genetic counselors alone." Biesecker, supra note 29, at
151. Regardless, the recommendations proposed herein also would apply to all medical
personnel who engage, or ought to engage, in patient counseling. See infra Part IV.
56. See Dorothy C. Wertz, Society and the Not-So-New Genetics: What Are We Afraid oJfi Some
Future Predictions from a Social Scientist, 13 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'v 299, 306 (1997)
(explaining that due to a lack of sufficient genetic counselors and geneticists, patients may
depend on the advice of primary care physicians, who have gaps in their knowledge about
genetic disorders); Susan Gilbert, Doctors Often Misread Results of Genetic Tests, Study Finds,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1997, at C8 (reporting the results of a study finding that nearly one-
third of the physicians who referred patients for genetic testing for colon cancer misinter-
preted the results).
57. See Malinowski & Blatt, supra note 1, at 1245-46 (discussing the fact that, because
health care providers currently lack adequate genetic education and depend on developers
and manufacturers for information about genetic tests, neither providers nor consumers
reasonably can evaluate the technology).
58. See Chen, supra note 27, 15 (reporting on a recent study of physicians who admin-
istered the commercially available test for a gene linked to colon cancer, and noting that,
"in more than 80 percent of the cases, doctors either failed to provide or arrange for
thorough counseling for the patient or forgot to get written informed consent," and that
"in nearly a third of the cases, the physicians mistakenly read inconclusive findings as nega-
tive results").
59. See EzekialJ. Emanuel & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Preserving the Physician-Patient Rela-
tionship in the Era of Managed Care, 273 JAMA 323, 325 (1995) (stating that, because
"[i] nsurance companies and managed care plans may discourage utilization of or exclude
coverage for certain physicians, procedures, and treatments, or may prohibit patients from
going to specialty hospitals for treatment," such practices "may serve to overrule informed
patient and physician choices"); Mark A. Hall, A Theory of Economic Informed Consent 31 GA.
L. REv. 511, 514 (1997) (explaining that affordable insurance "does not allow [patients] to
demand all the care that is of any conceivable benefit regardless of cost," so that a "com-
promise" must be reached between health care cost and "patient welfare").
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adverse effects.6" Complaints abound, for example, that women are
not provided with sufficient recuperation time in the hospital follow-
ing either childbirth or mastectomy.
6 1
A more hidden effect, and one with perhaps even greater long-
term impact on both individuals and institutions, is the implicit or
explicit pressure on health care providers to minimize the time they
spend on such nondiagnostic activities as counseling or patient sup-
port.6 2 For example, an insurance program may provide reimburse-
ment for the taking and processing of a diagnostic blood test, but not
provide reimbursement (or, only minimal reimbursement) for coun-
seling the patient regarding the risks and benefits of performing that
test.63 Similarly, an insurance program that requires a physician to see
a certain number of patients to achieve a particular level of compensa-
tion, or to participate in the program, is implicitly pressuring that pro-
60. See Elaine Lu, Comment, The Potential Effect of Managed Competition in Health Care on
Provider Liability and Patient Autonomy, 30 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 519, 532 (1993) (contending
that "[a] lthough the general perception is that much of the medical care that is currently
rendered is unnecessary, and even harmful, it is simply too optimistic and naive to believe
that managed care will be able to trim all the fat out of the current system without sacrific-
ing some quality" (footnote omitted)).
61. See generally 26 U.S.C.A. § 9811 (a) (1) (A) (West Supp. 1998) (providing that health
care plans cannot restrict benefits for inpatient hospital care to a time period of less than
48 hours following a normal vaginal delivery and of less than 96 hours following a delivery
by cesarean section); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1367.62(a)(1) (West Supp. 1998)
(same); Scott MacStravic, Managing Utilization: The Old Way and the New Way, HEALTH CARE
STRAxEGIC MGMT., Oct. 1996, at 1, 22 (stating that "the resulting scandals around 'drive-
through deliveries' . . . resulted in many states passing legislation requiring minimum
stays"). See also Nancy Henderson, How One Physician Can Make a Difference: Kristen Zarfos'
Campaign Against Drive-Through Mastectomy, MEDICAL ECON., July 28, 1997, at 64, 64 ("In
1991, only 1.6 percent of mastectomies performed in the U.S. were done on an outpatient
basis, but by 1995 this figure had increased almost five-fold, to 7.6 percent.").
62. See Emanuel & Dubler, supra note 59, at 328 (voicing concerns that "[p] roductivity
requirements may translate into pressure on physicians to see more patients in shorter
time periods, reducing the time to discuss patient values, alternative treatments, or the
impact of a therapy on the patient's overall life"); cf Francis S. Collins, Preparing Health
Professionals for the Genetic Revolution, 278 JAMA 1285, 1286 (1997) (explaining that "time
constraints in managed care [dictate that patient] partnerships with members of a health
care team such as physician assistants, nurses, psychologists, and social workers will be
essential").
63. See Collins, supra note 62, at 1286 (proposing that managed care should provide for
adequate patient counseling regarding testing issues through "health care team [s]" due to
time constraints imposed on physicians by reimbursement plans); see also Biesecker, supra
note 29, at 146 (describing genetic counseling as "both an education and a short-term
psychotherapeutic process that assists clients in accepting and adjusting to a genetic condi-
tion or risk they or family members face"). But see Wachbroit, supra note 1, at 139, 142
(stating that "[tihe need for genetic counseling is not based on the special severity of the
harms associated with genetic information; it is based on a reaction to the history of eugen-
ics," and further asserting that we sometimes have "the obligation ... to know our genetic
condition," even if there are limited medical benefits).
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vider to limit contact with each patient.64 The financial incentives and
pressures to expedite patient care are significant and increasing,65
and have the power to affect profoundly the nature and structure of
the doctor-patient relationship.66
Unless mandated by statute, existing legal doctrine does not gen-
erally apply to diagnostic testing;67 and, unless regulated by statute,
most insurance programs exercise significant autonomy over their re-
imbursement policies. Together, these facts work to undermine the
traditionally accepted goal of facilitating patient self-determination in
the health care setting.68
While the establishment of a structure to guide doctor-patient
communication regarding genetic testing and treatment, such as the
64. See Emanuel & Dubler, supra note 59, at 325-28 (noting that many insurance plans
or managed care providers require physicians to shorten patient visits and limit time for
patient-physician discussions on alternative treatments or the impact of treatment on the
patient's life).
65. Id. at 326 (observing that, due to "bureaucratic demands for preprocedure permis-
sion, postprocedure justification, multiple reimbursement forms, and other administrative
requirements [that] take up significant physician time," doctors "may be forced to see
more patients and shorten each visit").
66. One commentator notes that:
[The] lack of access [to health care] coupled with other issues affecting African
Americans-racism, homelessness, violence, drugs, etc.-means that they will
come into managed care products with poorer health status and needing more,
not less, health care services. In a system focused on decreasing utilization, it
seems difficult to imagine that African Americans will receive "more" health care
services, while others receive "less." If managed care products do not provide
culturally relevant care, then African Americans may have technical access to
health care, but not quality health care.
Randall, supra note 39, at 218-19 (footnote omitted).
67. See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing the recognition of bodily integrity and the right to
decisional privacy by the Supreme Court, but noting that the Court has not addressed
informed consent issues in the context of minimally invasive, diagnostically significant pro-
cedures, such as genetic testing); infra Part II.B.2 (exploring application of informed con-
sent statutes and case law to diagnostic blood tests); cf. Andrews, supra note 7, at 1001
(reporting that the federal government treats genetic tests differently from other blood
tests in that they are not exempt from full Institutional Review Board review on the basis
that they "present greater than minimal risks due to psychological risks and social risks
including 'stigmatization, discrimination, labelling, and potential loss of or difficulty in
obtaining employment or insurance'" (citation omitted)).
68. See Tom L. BEAucaAmp &JAMES F. CHiItREss, PRINCIPLEs OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 126
(4th ed. 1994) (noting that "the right to self-determination ... supports various autonomy
rights, including those of confidentiality and privacy"); cf BRODY, supra note 5, at 62 (argu-
ing that the sensitive and drastic decisions created by new biomedical technology should
be left primarily to "[t]he interaction of the individual patient and family[ ] with the re-
sponsible, socially sanctioned caretaker, [and] the physician who has worked intimately
with the case"); KATZ, supra note 15, at 112 ("If physicians were to pay greater attention to
conversation-to patients' capacities to reflect about choices-it could change their tradi-
tional attitudes towards patients' capacities to make their own decisions and, in turn, could
radically transform the current state of physician-patient decision making.").
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one described in this Article, does not necessarily guarantee that these
discussions either will occur or that they will be meaningful, this Arti-
cle argues that the creation of this structure would be an important
step towards ensuring that patients will participate more fully in their
care and treatment, that they will be in a position to provide consent
that is truly informed, and that legal doctrine will not be outpaced by
medical advancements and eliminated by financial pressures.
B. What Is "Exceptional" About Genetic Testing?
As researchers with the Human Genome Project (HGP) identify
how mutations in genetic sequences may be linked with particular dis-
eases, 69 genetic tests will be developed that increasingly will be accessi-
ble to the general public.70 Existing tests can detect not only the
presence of genetic or hereditary conditions (e.g., Huntington's dis-
ease), but also genetic predispositions to illness (e.g., cancers of the
breast, ovary and colon).7 Scientists are hopeful that they will be able
to develop therapies or treatments to prevent or cure genetic disease
69. See Adrienne Asch & Gail Geller, Feminism, Bioethics, and Genetics, in FEMINISM &
BIOETHICS: BEYOND REPRODUCTION 318, 323 (Susan M. Wolf ed., 1996) (hereinafter FEMI-
NISM & BIOETHICS] (citing a 1988 report of the National Research Council Committee on
Mapping and Sequencing the Human Genome which asserts that "[e] ncoded [in the DNA
sequence] are the mutations and variations that cause or increase susceptibility to many
diseases responsible for much human suffering").
70. See Malinowski & Blatt, supra note 1, at 1224 ("Biotech companies are using such
discoveries [of the link between a gene or biological marker and a physical or mental
condition] to develop and commercialize predictive screening tests for an abundance of
health conditions in addition to breast and ovarian cancer."). Commenced in 1990, the
Human Genome Project was designed to identify and determine the "linkages between
genes and health conditions," id. at 1218, and currently is succeeding in doing so on a
weekly, if not daily, basis, id. at 1224.
71. While some genetic mutations determine that a person will develop a particular
disease-such as Huntington's Disease, cystic fibrosis, and hemophilia-other mutations
detect only a susceptibility to diseases-such as breast cancer, colon cancer, and bipolar-
affective disorder. In the latter case, a person may not develop the disease without the
presence of additional influences (e.g., exposure to harmful chemicals, dietary habits,
smoking, and other environmental factors). See CARSON STRONG, ETHICS IN REPRODUCTIVE
AND PERINATAL MEDICINE 136 (1997) ("The term susceptibility is used because these diseases
are considered to be multifactorial; the fact that an individual has an associated gene (or
genes) does not necessarily mean that the disease will occur.... ."); see also Ruth Hubbard
& R-C. Lewontin, Pitfalls of Genetic Testing, 334 NEW ENG.J. MED. 1192, 1193 (1996) (noting
that the "breast-cancer genes BRCA1 and BRCA2 . . . [have] been linked to increased
susceptibility to breast or ovarian cancer"); Yoshio Miki et al., A Strong Candidate for the
Breast and Ovarian Cancer Susceptibility Gene BRCA1, 226 SCIENCE 66, 66 (1994) (stating that
"[m] utation of one gene, BRCA1, is thought to account for approximately 45% of families
with significantly high breast cancer incidence and at least 80% of families with increased
incidence of both early-onset breast cancer and ovarian cancer").
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through ongoing research.72 Unfortunately, these advances are far
from being fully realized.73
Although scientific breakthroughs make testing a viable option
for some individuals at risk for genetically linked disease, the indeter-
minate nature of test results7 4 combined with various concerns-
about lack of disease-appropriate treatment, or access thereto;75 po-
tential psychological harm to the person being tested;76 ramifications
for other family members;77 possible breaches of privacy;78 and the
risk of discrimination based on positive results7 -must be considered
72. Gene Therapy: When, and for What?, LANCET, Mar. 25, 1995, at 739, 740 (noting that
progress in gene therapy is being made toward interference with tumor development,
treatment of AIDS, and management of chronic diseases of the nervous system). But see
Andrews, supra note 27, at 901 (reporting that, as of 1995, there was "'little or no evidence
of therapeutic benefit [of gene therapy] in patients, or even animal models'" and that a
"federally-appointed committee investigating gene therapy condemned most of the efforts
as 'pure hype'" (first alteration in original) (citation omitted) (quoting Laurie Garrett, The
Dots Are Almost onnected. ... Then What?, L.A. TiMEs, Mag., Mar. 3, 1996, at 22)).
73. See Murphy, supra note 23, at 6 ("It is likely that there will be considerable lag time
between the identification of genetic dysfunctions and interventions that can successfully
alter them. It is also unclear at the present time whether widespread use of genetic charac-
terizations (and possible treatments) will significantly improve the health of a nation's
population.").
74. See Biesecker, supra note 29, at 150 ("Predisposition test results can provide more
accurate genetic risk assessment but are generally imprecise in estimating penetrance (the
likelihood that the disease will develop)."); Malinowski & Blatt, supra note 1, at 1243 (ex-
plaining that the "predictive capability of many genetic tests remains scientifically
undefined").
75. See Malinowski & Blatt, supra note 1, at 1244 (noting that, even if genetic conditions
can be diagnosed accurately, "often there is no available treatment, or treatment exists but
is price-prohibitive" (footnote omitted)).
76. See id at 1249 (stating that patients who have undergone genetic testing for Hunt-
ington's disease "have experienced detrimental psychological reactions to the results even
when they are negative," and that those who have tested positive have a 35% higher suicide
rate than the general population).
77. See Patenaude, supra note 7, at 404 ("Genetic information is unlike other medical
information in that the utility of the information is not limited to the individual who
presents as the identified patient. Rather, the information has direct relevance for both
prior and future generations, as well as potential implications for siblings of the patient.").
78. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 988-89 (reporting on survey results revealing that 24%
of U.S. geneticists "would share the patient's genetic information with employers without
the patient's consent"; and that 58% "said that they would disclose the risk of Huntington's
disease to a relative without the patient's permission," even though the disease is untreat-
able and "less than 15% of individuals at risk" for it decide to be tested to see if they have it
(emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
79. See Malinowski & Blatt, supra note 1, at 1249 (noting that "genetic information
already is disrupting the lives of individuals and their families by subjecting them to dis-
crimination from employers and insurers"); see also Andrews, supra note 7, at 985-87 (not-
ing that "[a]mong people in families with a known genetic condition, 31% have been
denied health insurance coverage of some service or treatment because of their genetic
status, whether or not they were sick" and that "[iln the early 1970s, employers discrimi-
nated against African American employees and job applicants who were carriers of sickle
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by clinicians who plan to offer genetic testing. 0 Indeed, the ability to
conduct such a test, particularly when viewed in conjunction with the
repercussions of being tested, highlight the importance of the pre-test
counseling process and a genuine expression of informed consent.
81
An understanding of the BRCA1 and BRCA2 genes illustrates the
importance of assuring that an individual's decision to test for genetic
mutations that indicate an increased risk for life-threatening illness is
fully informed. 2 Discovered in 1994 and 1995 respectively, the BRCA
mutations signal an increased risk for both breast and ovarian cancer
in their female carriers.8" Out of women in the general population,
one in eight or nine who live to the age of eighty-five will develop
breast cancer.8 4 Women who carry the BRCA1 or BRCA2 gene, how-
cell anemia, even though carrier status had no relation to the individual's health or ability
to perform the job").
80. See Chen, supra note 27, 6 (cautioning that "the uncertainties of treatment and
the lack of legal protections in place against insurance and employment discrimination"
warrant a slow pace in genetic testing); Malinowski & Blatt, supra note 1, at 1243-54 (dis-
cussing the many factors and concerns which ought to be taken into account when consid-
ering genetic testing); Murphy, supra note 23, at 8 (questioning whether the genome
project, and its attendant testing capabilities, will enlarge the "differences . . . between
people that are used as pretexts for their subjugation and vilification"); Rothenberg, supra
note 27, at 106-10 (expressing concern about the discrimination to which the use of ge-
netic testing results might give rise).
81. SeeJudy E. Garber & Deborah Schrag, Testing for Inherited Cancer Susceptibility, 275
JAMA 1928, 1928 (1996) (explaining that "comprehensive education and counseling to
promote informed decision making must be provided before blood is ever drawn, with a
separate visit for results disclosure"); see also Rothenberg, supra note 27, at 106 (noting that
"the emphasis [in genetic testing counseling] is on disclosure of the psychological and
societal risks for the individual and family receiving the information," not on the proce-
dure itself); cf Andrews, supra note 27, at 904 ("Currently, . . . informed consent is often
compromised in the clinical setting, with people being tested without their knowledge or
consent or receiving inadequate information about the nature or purpose of genetic test-
ing or the use to which the results can be put."). Andrews further notes that "[t]he prac-
tice of unconsented-to testing is likely to grow" with the development of "multiplex tests"
through which "fifty or one hundred different genes can be assessed at the same time." Id.
at 905.
82. The availability of tests to detect BRCA genes have received significant attention
from the mainstream, as well as scientific, media. They are characteristic of tests for other
genetic flaws which reveal a greater likelihood of an individual's developing a specific life-
threatening condition for which there is little to no effective treatment or cure, and which
do not identify whether that person will, indeed, acquire the disease. Most people have an
average of 8-12 or more flawed genes, most of which are largely innocuous or which may
indicate a predisposition for certain treatable conditions. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 986.
This Article is primarily concerned with consent-to-testing issues that arise with the ability
to conduct genetic tests for life-threatening conditions.
83. See Wylie Burke et al., Recommendations for Follow-up Care of Individuals with an Inher-
ited Predisposition to Cancer, 277 JAMA 997, 998 (1997) (noting that "[m]utations in 2 re-
cently identified genes, BRCA1 and BRCA2, confer an inherited predisposition to breast
and ovarian cancer[,]" and that "the lifetime risk of cancer in mutation carriers is high").
84. See Chen, supra note 27, 18.
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ever, have a 56% to 87% lifetime risk of developing breast cancer.85
While only 5% to 10% of all breast cancer cases run in families, BRCA
mutations account for about 80% of all inherited breast tumors.8 6
Women who carry BRCA1 have a 40% to 60% lifetime risk of ova-
rian cancer; women who carry BRCA2 have a 10% to 20% lifetime
risk;8 7 and women without the mutations have about a 1.5% risk. 8
BRCA1 also has been linked to a small risk of colon cancer in both
genders and prostate cancer in men; BRCA2 has been linked to a 6%
chance of breast cancer in men.89
Because the predictive value of a BRCA test for a given woman is
not known, medical experts continue to recommend that such testing
be restricted to women at high risk and in the context of research
protocols.9" These recommendations, however, are not being heeded
by all concerned. Tests for the BRCA genes already are commercially
available and multiple companies are likely to seek to market these
and other genetic tests.9"
85. See id. 7. Chen notes, however, that breast cancer gene tests deal only in
probabilities, and that such tests "can tell whether a woman is susceptible to developing the
disease, [but] not whether she will get it." Id.; see also Struewing et al., supra note 21, at
1401 (affirming that women with the BRCA1 or BRCA2 mutation have an increased risk of
breast or ovarian cancer).
86. Chen, supra note 27, 1 18.
87. See id. Chen also emphasizes that available risk statistics come from "surveys of very
high-risk women in families with a pattern of breast cancer." Id. 1 23.
88. Schrag et al., supra note 21, at 1465.
89. Chen, supra note 27, 1 23; see Burke et al., supra note 83, at 998 (noting that one
pedigree [of BRCA2] was reported which had multiple cases of male breast cancer and no
female breast cancer"); cf Patenaude, supra note 7, at 403 (noting that women with female
ancestors who had breast or ovarian cancer "are less shocked to think they may carry a
BRCA1 mutation than women who inherited an altered BRCA1 gene from their fathers,
even though the risks faced by both groups are the same").
90. See Wiesner, supra note 3, at 4 ("Several national groups have strongly recom-
mended a cautious approach to incorporating genetic testing into medical practice, and
have published guidelines for BRCA1 testing which propose that it be limited to high-risk
women under scientific protocols." (footnote omitted)); see also Bernadine Healy, BRCA
Genes-Bookmaking, Fortunetelling and Medical Care, 336 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1448, 1449
(1997) (stating that "[i]t is too early to use BRCA gene testing in every-day clinical prac-
tice"). Dr. Healy is the former director of the National Institutes of Health.
Those considered to be at elevated risk include women with three close relatives who
have had breast or ovarian cancer; those who themselves, or whose relatives, have been
diagnosed with cancer before the age of 45; those with tumors found in both breasts, and
women of Ashkenazi descent with less striking family history of either cancer. See Wiesner,
supra note 3, at 4 (noting that Ashkenazi-Jewish women exhibit a "high frequency" of a
particular type of gene mutation related to breast cancer).
91. Malinowski & Blatt, supra note 1, at 1212-16 (noting that OncorMed, Genetics &
IVF Institute, and Myriad are marketing BRCA gene tests and that other laboratories are
introducing their own genetic tests); see also Andrews, supra note 27, at 917 (reporting on
the efforts of biotechnology companies and physicians to "heavily market genetic services
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Once testing positive for either BRCA1 or BRCA2, women face
uncertainty regarding possible preventive measures.9 2 While prophy-
lactic steps include modifications in lifestyle to avoid environmental
cancer-inducing factors, such as dietary changes, and continual sur-
veillance for signs of cancer, some BRCA carriers opt to have their
breasts or ovaries removed before any sign of disease develops.9
Although this approach significantly increases the odds of averting
breast or ovarian cancer, it does not guarantee prevention.94 Under-
standably, for many women, these radical procedures may not be
acceptable.95
and products" and noting that the "supposedly neutral scientists developing them often
share a cut of the profits"). Because of this, Andrews warns, "This commercialized setting
makes it more likely that tests will be implemented prematurely, that they will be per-
formed without appropriate concern for informed consent, and that the poor and disad-
vantaged will be least likely to share in any benefits." Id.
92. See Chen, supra note 27, 10 (agreeing that "the BRCA tests [are] a therapeutic
illusion that suggest[ ] there's a way of warding off breast cancer when in fact no foolproof
remedy exists"); Jerome Groopman, Decoding Destiny, NEw YORKER, Feb. 9, 1998, at 42, 44
(describing a physician counseling a BRCA1 carrier about preventing breast or ovarian
cancer as being "faced [with presenting] two unsatisfactory choices: one conservative, wait-
ing under surveillance, and one radical, undergoing surgery, with no real middle
ground"); see also Marlene Cimons, Should She Take Tamoxifen , L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1999, at
Al, available in LEXIS, News Library, Latimes File (noting that although tamoxifen has
been shown to decrease the incidence of breast cancer by 50%, associated risks include
birth defects, uterine cancer, and blood clots); Fox Market Wire, Fighting Cancer-How
Treatment Targets Genes (visited May 18, 1998) <http://www.foxmarketwire.com/wires/
0518/Lap_0518_13.sml> (reporting on positive results achieved, in part, with the drug
Herceptin to treat women whose breast cancer is linked to multiple copies of the HER-2
gene).
93. See Schrag et al., supra note 21, at 1469 (noting that currently women and their
physicians often consider mastectomy and oophorectomy as the most effective of the op-
tions available to prevent cancer); see also Wiesner, supra note 3, at 10 (discussing a
woman's decision to have a prophylactic removal of her ovaries in light of the cluster of
cancer in her family); Groopman, supra note 92, at 44 (noting that the only options are
medical surveillance or a complete mastectomy and oophorectomy).
94. See Chen, supra note 27, 11 (discussing a Mayo Clinic study in which 950 healthy
but high-risk women had double mastectomies, diminishing their risk of breast cancer by
an estimated 91%, and noting that risks continue to exist 
" [b]ecause surgeons can't cut out
all of the suspect tissue;" and further noting that 2% to 11% of women undergoing
oophorectomies to reduce their risk "still go on to develop the disease"); see also Lynn C.
Hartmann et al., Efficacy of Bilateral Prophylactic Mastectomy in Women with a Family History of
Breast Cancer, 340 NEw ENG. J. MED. 77, 82-83 (1999) (reporting a reduction in the inci-
dence of breast cancer of at least 90% for women undergoing prophylactic mastectomy);
Singer & Cebul, supra note 5, at 179 (explaining that prophylactic mastectomy is the only
established potentially preventative option available, but that breast cancer can still de-
velop in remaining cells after the procedure).
95. See Andrews, supra note 24, at 55 ("A person may choose to refuse a medical inter-
vention to avoid potential psychological harm, not just potential physical harm."); Andrea
Eisen et al., Prophylactic Mastectomy-The Price of Fear, 340 NEW ENG.J. MED. 137, 138 (1999)
(noting that notwithstanding the success of prophylactic mastectomy in preventing breast
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Receipt of a positive test result also may cause a woman to inter-
nalize society's messages regarding the stigma of cancer, and of illness
more generally.96 The social construction of illness can cause ex-
traordinary pain in and of itself.97 People with cancer and people
with genetic traits for serious illness report that they face significant
societal stigma, ranging from neighbors and coworkers acting differ-
ently towards them to the denial of employment or insurance.9s
Among the more difficult issues posed by such testing is the ex-
tent of information that a patient chooses to share with her family.99
Indeed, positive and negative tests may be fraught with meaning, par-
ticularly in families in which there is a history of breast cancer.100 A
cancer, many women who likely would not get breast cancer or who would survive with less-
invasive measures opt to undergo the "disfiguring and potentially psychologically damag-
ing operation" out of fear); Groopman, supra note 92, at 45 (noting that these prophylactic
procedures may represent not only the loss of breasts and ovaries, but also of self-image
and libido).
96. Health care providers report that upon giving a patient a diagnosis for a chronic or
life-threatening condition, they often see the patient adopt a more negative self-image by
identifying herself as a person with a "dis-ease." See SHERMAN ELIAS & GEORGE J. ANNAS,
REPRODUCrIVE GENETICS AND THE LAw 47 (1987) (asserting that "[g]enetic disorders are
often viewed with disdain in a sociocultural sense because parents transmit them to their
children," and that "[t]he individual affected by a genetic disorder may also stigmatize
himself or herself as inadequate or unworthy because the effect of the condition is extrapo-
lated to the whole person"); see also supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text; cf Jonsen,
supra note 20, at 9-10 ("[I] t remains true that the convergence of many factors needed to
trigger the disease may not come about and may be avoided by behaviors, but still, the
chanciness and luck of the draw that accompany present-day risk assessment will be re-
placed by the clear mark of the susceptibility in one's very identity.").
97. See SusAN SONTAG, ILLNESS AS METAPHOR 7-9 (1978) (discussing the demoralization
that occurs when diagnosed with cancer because of the stigma and discrimination associ-
ated with the disease); Charles E. Rosenberg, Disease and Social Order in America: Perceptions
and Expectations, 64 MILBANK Q., Supp. I, 34, 34-35 (1986) ("[D]isease does not exist as a
social phenomenon until it is somehow perceived as existing.... Meaning is not necessary
but negotiated, the argument follows; disease is constructed not discovered.").
98. See supra notes 28-29, 33-34, infra notes 322-323 and accompanying text.
99. See Biesecker, supra note 29, at 152-53 ("As genes are identified that lead to treat-
able conditions such as diabetes and hypertension, counselors, nurses, and physicians will
find it increasingly difficult to honor the rare client's request not to notify family members.
Genetic counselors may come to consider families, rather than individuals, as their cli-
ents."); Patenaude, supra note 7, at 403-04 (discussing familial issues that are likely to arise
in the context of genetic counseling and testing); Rothenberg, supra note 27, at 119 (exam-
ining the ways in which the context of genetics affects the individual's decision whether to
share test results with family members); supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
100. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 978 (observing that obtaining genetic information
may lead one to avoid family events in order not to face a family member with whom they
do not wish to share results, or that a bond created between siblings who perceive them-
selves to be at risk for a genetic flaw may change significantly if they learn that only one of
them has the gene); Rothenberg, supra note 27, at 119 (asking "[i]s the patient, in fact, the
individual, or the family unit?" and discussing the intergenerational implications for
testing).
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woman who learns that she is carrying a gene for breast cancer may
think differently about a number of compelling questions."' 1 What
should she tell her siblings, who also may have the flawed gene?
10 2
What information should she provide to her partner?11 3 What impact
will it have on her decision about bearing children? A daughter who
has the gene has an increased risk for breast cancer; a son with the
gene is at increased risk for prostate cancer. 104 If she already has chil-
dren, what information should she provide to them?"0 5 At what
age? 0 6 These are excruciating questions, with no easy answers.10 7
Indeed, because flaws in the BRCA genes indicate that an individ-
ual has an increased risk of becoming ill sometime during her life,
insurance companies and employers alike would value the ability to
obtain this information.'0 8 Once privy to it, they are likely to use it in
101. See Chen, supra note 27, 2 (citing a case in which a woman who tested positive for
the breast cancer gene opted for a double mastectomy despite being in good health);
Patenaude, supra note 7, at 403 (arguing that genetic counseling must take into account
"'the psychological and family processes that govern our family relationships and repro-
duction"' (quoting M. Richards, Family Kinship, and Genetics, in THE TROUBLED HELIX: SO-
CIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE NEW HuMAN GENETICS 249, 270 (T.
Martineau & M. Richards eds., 1996))).
102. See Patenaude, supra note 7, at 403 (noting that "people find it hard to believe that,
'chance has no memory,'" and commenting that whether one sibling does (or does not)
test positive for a genetic attribute has no impact on whether the other sibling might in fact
also have the gene in question).
103. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 979-80 (discussing studies that indicate that genetic
knowledge affects decisions to marry, as well as the frequency and satisfaction of sexual
relationships); see also Andrews, supra note 27, at 911 (reporting about a rabbi who has
advocated that "'women with the defective BRCA1 have a duty to inform their prospective
mates of that fact'" (citation omitted)).
104. Caryn Lerman et al., BRCA1 Testing in Families with Hereditary Breast-Ovarian Cancer:
A Prospective Study of Patient Decision Making and Outcomes, 275 JAMA 1885, 1885 (1996).
105. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 982-83 (noting that the genetic knowledge a women
learns about herself or her child can affect the parent-child relationship).
106. See Patenaude, supra note 7, at 405 (asking "what [do] children have a right to
know about their genetic heritage when they come of age and assume management of
their own medical care[?]").
107. See Wiesner, supra note 3, at 5-8 (relating the story of a woman who had a high
incidence of cancer in her family, decided to undergo genetic testing, tested positive for
the BRCA gene, and then faced the dilemma of how to deal with her 14-year-old daugh-
ter's risk); see also Patenaude, supra note 7, at 405 (discussing ethical conflicts faced by
physicians who have a duty of confidentiality to their patients and who may feel a duty to
warn other members of the patient's family).
108. See BRODY, supra note 5, at 137 (warning that "[n]ew genetic screening technologies
can give insurance companies even more data for stratifying the risk in the pool of poten-
tially insurable people" so as to exclude them); Rothenberg, supra note 27, at 114 (noting
that employment opportunities and health insurance coverage are intertwined because
"[t]he employer has a business interest in having a healthy work force to limit health insur-
ance claims").
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a discriminatory manner."0 9 Firm protections against such use have
not yet been put in place.'11 A decision to test, yielding a genetic
marker for cancer, could leave a woman in the sadly ironic position of
needing health insurance more than ever before, and not being able
to obtain it."'
These dilemmas are extraordinary. Indeed, if nothing else, they
point out the need for a new legal doctrine of informed consent to
provide a framework for patients to consider carefully, with their phy-
sicians, a decision to undergo genetic testing.
II. INFORMED CONSENT: LEGAL AND ETHIcAL UNDERPINNINGS
A. A Starting Point
The formal doctrine of informed consent is influenced by numer-
ous disciplines, particularly law, ethics, and public policy.112 This Part
begins with an overview of constitutional, statutory, and common law
sources of the legal doctrine of informed consent. It continues with a
critical analysis of this doctrine, informed particularly by gender, race,
and economic viewpoints. This analysis challenges some of the basic
assumptions of traditional informed consent theory and provides in-
sight into areas in which reform might be needed, especially with re-
gard to genetic testing.
109. See BRODY, supra note 5, at 137 (noting that insurers are likely to misuse genetic
information by overestimating individual risk); see also Eric Mills Holmes, Solving the Insur-
ance/Genetic Fair/Unfair Discrimination Dilemma in Light of the Human Genome Project, 85 Ky.
L.J. 503, 558-67 (1997) (discussing ways in which genetic testing information is subject to
abuse by insurers who are likely to decrease the accessibility and affordability of health-
related insurance coverage).
110. See Rothenberg, supra note 27, at 115 (noting that "there is no federal law that
specifically addresses genetic privacy and confidentiality," but only "a patchwork of legisla-
tive sources" that insufficiently deals with these concerns); Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic
Secrets: A Policy Framework, in GENETIC SECRETS, supra note 3, at 451, 476 (noting that "state
employment discrimination laws are woefully inadequate" to address the potential for "ge-
netic discrimination in employment").
111. See Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, The Double-Edged Helix: Advances in Genetic Testing
Reveal Yet Another Reason We Need National Health Insurance, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 1997, at
36, 36 ("[E]xtraordinary medical benefits [from genetic research] are clouded by the fact
that gene research now offers insurance companies new ways to trim their expenses by
denying coverage to those most in need of insurance.").
112. See Linda F. Smith, Medical Paradigms for Counseling: Giving Clients Bad News, 4
CLINICAL L. REv. 391, 395 (1998) (explaining that a patient's right to medical information
"come [s] from three interrelated sources: the expectations of society in general, the rec-
ognition of truth-telling as part of the code of ethics of the medical profession, and case
precedence in law" (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting ROBERT BUCKMAN, How
TO BREAK BAD NEWS: A GUIDE FOR HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS 11 (1992))); see also KArz,
supra note 15, at xix ("The problems of informed consent.. . require an exploration of the
historical evolution of medicine and the medical profession, law, the psychology of physi-
cians and patients, and the state of the art and science of medicine.").
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B. Doctrinal Development of Informed Consent Theory
1. Constitutional Theory: Bodily Integrity and Medical Decision Mak-
ing.-The Supreme Court has recognized the existence of a right to
informed consent,113 but it has yet to define its parameters clearly.
The roots of informed consent doctrine lie in privacy theory,'14 in
three pertinent areas: the right to informational privacy,' the right
to bodily integrity," 6 and the right to informed decision making." 7
This Article is concerned with the guidance that the Court might pro-
vide regarding the latter two rights.
The origins of a right to bodily integrity can be traced to the early
part of this century. An individual's liberty to refuse medical treat-
ment, although not framed in these terms, first was recognized by the
Court in Jacobson v. Massachusetts,"' when the Court recognized that
there exists a "sphere within which the individual may assert the
supremacy of his own will and rightfully dispute the authority of any
human government ... to interfere with the exercise of that will.""' 9
Initially, the Court focused on the potential conflict between a
state's interest in exercising its police power and the interest of the
113. See Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990) (recognizing
that "informed consent is generally required for medical treatment").
114. The Court has recognized the right of privacy within a number of contexts. SeeRoe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) ("This right of privacy... is broad enough to encompass
a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."); Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-84 (1965) (recognizing the right of a married couple to use contra-
ception without interference from the state); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316
U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (recognizing the right to procreate); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (recognizing the right to "direct the ... education of children");
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing the right "to marry, establish a
home and bring up children"). These privacy rights have been drawn from the First,
Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (citing pri-
vacy cases involving these Amendments).
115. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (stating that privacy interests in-
clude avoiding disclosure of personal matters).
116. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2267 (1997) (acknowledging
the right to bodily integrity as a liberty specifically protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment); Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952) (holding
that the forced extraction of a suspect's stomach contents amounted to "[i]llegally break-
ing into [his] privacy" in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
117. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269 (recognizing that "informed consent is generally re-
quired for medical treatment"); cf Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
872 (1992) (deciding that a state may enact rules to ensure that a woman's choice to termi-
nate her pregnancy is thoughtful and informed).
118. 197 U.S. 11, 25-29, 39 (1905) (upholding a state law requiring individuals to submit
to a smallpox vaccination on the ground that this intrusion was a reasonable exercise of
the police power to protect the public health).
119. Id. at 29.
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individual in determining what happens to her body.' 2° It was in this
context, almost fifty years after Jacobson, that the Court explicitly rec-
ognized a right to bodily integrity founded in the Due Process
Clause. 12
1
It was not, however, until 1990 that the Court first addressed the
tension that might arise between the state's interest in preserving life
and an individual's interest in preserving bodily integrity in the con-
text of medical care. 12 2 At that time, and in subsequent cases, the
Court recognized a "'liberty interest in refusing medical treat-
ment, '123 but has resisted the conclusion that "any and all important,
intimate, and personal decisions are so protected."1 24
Most recently, in Washington v. Glucksberg,125 the Court drew this
line by rejecting the claim that a constitutional right to physician-as-
sisted suicide exists.126 Still, the Court reaffirmed that the Due Pro-
cess Clause "provides heightened protection against government
120. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 544 (1942) (Stone,
C.J., concurring) (agreeing that a state law requiring the sterilization of habitual criminals,
except white collar criminals, should be invalidated, but on the ground that "such an inva-
sion of personal liberty" violates due process, in contrast to the majority's reliance on equal
protection grounds).
121. Rochin, 342 U.S. at 172-73 (declaring that forcible administration of an emetic used
to extract morphine capsules from a suspect's stomach violated the Due Process Clause).
In this opinion, Justice Frankfurter reasoned that "[d]ue process of law is a summarized
constitutional guarantee of respect for those personal immunities which, as Mr. Justice
Cardozo twice wrote for the Court, are 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as fundamental,' or are 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.'"
Id. at 169 (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934); Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)); cf. Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 221-22 (1990) (recog-
nizing that an inmate "possesses a significant liberty interest in avoiding the unwanted
administration of antipsychotic drugs under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment"). The Harper Court nevertheless upheld a prison policy permitting adminis-
tration of the drugs without the inmate's consent in light of the state's obligation to "com-
bat[] the danger posed by a person to both himself and others" in the prison
environment. Id. at 225.
122. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 278-80 (recognizing a general liberty interest in refusing
medical treatment, but balancing this interest against a state's interest in preserving
human life). In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor emphasized that "the liberty interest
in refusing medical treatment flows from decisions involving the State's invasions into the
body." Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
123. Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2269 (1997) (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S.
at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). The Court also recognized "the long legal tradition
protecting the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment." Id. at 2270.
124. Id. at 2271 (citing San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35
(1973)).
125. 117 S. Ct. 2258 (1997).
126. Id. at 2275; see also Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Ct. 2293, 2302 (1997) (holding that New
York's ban on assisted suicide does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment).
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interference with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests," in-
cluding the right to "bodily integrity."127
Although the nexus between one's right to bodily integrity and
one's right to make important personal decisions, particularly with re-
gard to medical treatment, is quite close, the line of cases related to
the latter is comparatively recent. The decisional right grew out of the
right to privacy acknowledged in Griswold v. Connecticut 28 and its prog-
eny.129 Admittedly, this right has had a somewhat tortured history in
the relatively short time since its recognition.
The Court's rulings in the area of decisional privacy are over-
whelmingly concerned with the kind of information a woman should
receive-or should not receive-prior to consenting to, or refusing,
an abortion. The politically fraught nature of this subject matter
makes it difficult to draw lessons from these rulings and apply them to
cases that involve medical decision making outside of the reproduc-
tive rights arena.
For example, the Court initially acknowledged that informed
consent was critical to making important medical decisions, including
the decision whether to have an abortion.130 Although the Court
nominally has continued to support this approach, it has done so
127. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267 (citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952)). In
his concurrence, Justice Souter reiterated that "'every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body' in relation to
his medical needs." Id. at 2288 (Souter,J., concurring) (quoting Schloendorffv. Society of
N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)). He further elucidated the importance of this
liberty interest in the context of medical care by observing that "the good physician is not
just a mechanic of the human body whose services have no bearing on a person's moral
choices, but one who does more than treat symptoms, one who ministers to the patient."
Id. at 2288 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 482 (1965)).
128. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
129. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-600 (1977) (explicitly recognizing "the inter-
est in independence in making certain kinds of important decisions"). Whalen was con-
cerned primarily with the confidentiality of personal (medical) information and
recognized "the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." Id. at 599;
see also Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. at 2267 (recognizing the right to bodily integrity as a liberty
specially protected by the Due Process Clause); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod.
Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 419 (1983) (acknowledging that the right of privacy encom-
passes the decision whether to terminate pregnancy), overruled on other grounds ty Planned
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 *(1992) (plurality opinion); Roe, 410 U.S.
at 153 (same).
130. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 66-67 (1976). The
Court upheld a state regulation requiring a woman's written consent before performing an
abortion on the ground that:
The decision to abort, indeed, is an important, and often a stressful one, and it is
desirable and imperative that it be made with full knowledge of its nature and
consequences. The woman is the one primarily concerned, and her awareness of
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while upholding regulations that require physicians to provide preg-
nant women with information designed to dissuade them from choos-
ing abortion, 131 and regulations that restrict the information that
publicly funded providers could give to their patients regarding the
availability of abortion services.' 32
In these abortion cases, the Court perceived the "doctor-patient
relation[ship]" as separate from "the right to make family decisions
and the right to physical autonomy." 133 By contrast, Justice Blackmun
perceived an essential link between the provision of information by a
physician and a patient's ability to make important medical decisions.
In his dissent in Rust, he specifically noted the importance of protect-
the decision and its significance may be assured, constitutionally, by the State to
the extent of requiring her prior written consent.
Id. at 67. Note, however, that reproductive rights advocates objected to this requirement
for written consent as a deterrent to a woman's exercise of her right to make independent
medical decisions. Seven years later, the Court reiterated that it envisioned that a physi-
cian would provide a woman with information about the abortion procedure and its conse-
quences, so that she could make an informed decision regarding whether to have an
abortion. See City of Akron, 462 U.S. at 442-44 (recognizing the validity of an informed
consent requirement, but invalidating the one at issue because it was intended to persuade
women to forego abortion), overruled by Casey, 505 U.S. at 882 (plurality opinion) (uphold-
ing informed consent requirements designed to influence a woman to continue a
pregnancy).
131. Casey, 505 U.S. at 881-87 (plurality opinion). This information included extensive
and detailed information regarding the abortion procedure, the relative health risks of
abortion and of childbirth, and the probable gestational age of the fetus. Id. at 881. Rea-
soning that such detailed information would ensure that a woman's decision to terminate
her pregnancy be mature and informed, a plurality found that even when the information
expresses a state's preference for childbirth over abortion, the regulations imposed no
undue burden on a woman's liberty interest in making a decision regarding abortion. Id.
at 883; see infra note 141. The plurality reached this result despite the Court's reiteration
"that the Constitution places limits on a State's right to interfere with a person's most basic
decisions about family and parenthood." Casey, 505 U.S. at 849 (citations omitted).
132. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 193-94 (1991). The Court defined the provision of
abortion-related information as an abortion service, and held that, under the Due Process
Clause, the government has no constitutional duty to subsidize this service, and may en-
courage childbirth instead. Id. at 201. The Court reassured itself that the restrictions im-
posed by the regulations were not absolute because "a doctor's ability to provide, and a
woman's right to receive, information concerning abortion and abortion-related services
outside the context of the Title X [government-funded] project remains unfettered." Id. at
203. But see id. at 217 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (asserting that the regulations "obliterated
the freedom to choose as surely as if it had banned abortions outright," especially with
regard to poor women with limited access to medical care).
133. Casey, 505 U.S. at 884 (plurality opinion). In this case, the Court addressed the
regulations' potential interference with the physician-patient relationship by noting that
they allow a physician to decide against providing the required information "'if he or she
can demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she reasonably believed
that furnishing the information would have resulted in a severely adverse effect on the
physical or mental health of the patient.'" Id. at 883-84 (quoting 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3205
(1990)).
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ing physician-patient dialogue and trust by observing that "[o] ne seeks
a physician's aid not only for medication or diagnosis, but also for
guidance, professional judgment, and vital emotional support;" ' 4 in-
deed, "each of us attaches profound importance and authority to the
words of advice spoken by the physician.' 35 With this understanding,
although protection of the doctor-patient relationship may not inher-
ently rise to the level of a fundamental right, it may serve as a vehicle
for ensuring, or enhancing, a patient's right to privacy and autonomy.
As indicated by the discussion above, the Court primarily has ad-
dressed medical decision making in the reproduction context; yet in
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health,"3 6 and elsewhere, the
Court has recognized that a competent person may possess a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in the right to refuse medical
treatment.
1 3 7
However, because the Court has not fully addressed the extent of
information, or the degree of bodily integrity, that must be afforded
to a patient in the less politicized, nonabortion context, it remains to
us to intuit whatever guidance the Court ultimately may provide. At a
minimum, there is a liberty interest' in informed medical decision
134. Rust, 500 U.S. at 218 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
135. Id.
136. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
137. Id. at 278; see also Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2269 (1997) ("[W]e
assumed that the Constitution granted competent persons a 'constitutionally protected
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.'" (quoting Crzan, 497 U.S. at 279)).
Despite this assumption, the Cruzan Court denied the petitioner-family members' request
to terminate the patient's artificial hydration and nutrition for lack of clear and convincing
evidence that she would have desired this action. Crzan, 497 U.S. at 280. In her concur-
rence, Justice O'Connor wrote:
As the Court notes, the liberty interest in refusing medical treatment flows from
decisions involving the State's invasions into the body. Because our notions of
liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical freedom and self-deter-
mination, the Court has often deemed state incursions into the body repugnant
to the interests protected by the Due Process Clause.
Id. at 287 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted) (citing Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
138. Originally, the Court recognized the right to bodily integrity, and then the right to
decisional privacy, as falling within the small range of "personal rights that can be deemed
'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' [that] are included in [a]
guarantee of personal privacy." See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (recognizing
that the right of privacy encompasses a woman's right to have an abortion) (citing Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)); see also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453-55
(1972) (striking down, on principles of privacy and equal protection, a Massachusetts crim-
inal statute barring the distribution of contraceptives to married people except by physi-
cians and pharmacists); United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62, 78 (1971) (noting that "the
right of privacy" applies to intimate family decision making); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (holding that a law prohibiting the use of contraceptives violated the
right to privacy).
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making 3 9 and the right to bodily integrity;14 ° it is not clear whether,
in other settings, these rights will be recognized as fundamental."'
There is no doubt, however, that the Court has recognized that the
right to bodily integrity and the right to decisional privacy are of suffi-
cient importance to deserve constitutional protection.
It is not likely that the Court will have the opportunity to address
these issues in the context of minimally invasive, yet diagnostically sig-
nificant tests any time soon. The precipitating events that brought
Casey, Rust, and other cases to the Court were the decisions by legisla-
tures to mandate the type of information a patient was to receive, or
not receive.' 4 2 Although legislative bodies have mandated pre-test or
pre-procedure counseling in some limited (non-abortion) settings,
such as HIV or hysterectomy,"' such counseling has been seen as an
More recently, however, at least in the context of abortion, the Court has character-
ized these previously identified fundamental rights as "liberty interests." See, e.g., Casey, 505
U.S. at 869 (plurality opinion) (noting that "it is a constitutional liberty of the woman to
have some freedom to terminate her pregnancy"); Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs.,
492 U.S. 490, 520 (1989) (plurality opinion) (characterizing abortion as a "liberty interest
protected by the Due Process Clause").
139. See supra notes 114-117, 130-131.
140. See supra note 127; cf. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1376 (N.D. Ill.) (hold-
ing that restrictions on a couple's decision to use genetic tests on a fetus are unconstitu-
tional unless they further a compelling state interest in the least restrictive manner
possible), affd, 914 F.2d 260 (7th Cir. 1990).
141. While any restriction of a fundamental right is subject to strict scrutiny review, a
restriction on a liberty interest is permissible if it does not unduly burden the exercise of
the interest. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 874 (plurality opinion) ("Only where state regulation
imposes an undue burden on a woman's ability to make this decision [about abortion]
does the power of the State reach into the heart of the liberty protected by the Due Process
Clause."); Webster, 492 U.S. at 520 (plurality opinion) (arguing that a restriction on abor-
tion that is "reasonably designed" to ensure that it is not performed when the fetus is viable
is valid because the end is "legitimate"). If the right to informed medical decision making
and the right to bodily integrity are "fundamental," then they provide greater protection to
the individual because the state could not intrude on them "without substantial justifica-
tion." Griswo0d, 381 U.S. at 502-03 (citation omitted). Should these rights be found to be
"liberty interests," in order for a restriction to be upheld, a state need only show that a
restraint upon an interest does not pose an "undue burden" to those seeking to realize iL
142. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S. at 881 (plurality opinion) (challenging a Pennsylvania stat-
ute requiring abortion providers to provide a woman with printed materials describing the
fetus, available medical assistance for childbirth, access to child support from the father,
and a list of adoption agencies); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192 (1991) (challenging
regulations prohibiting providers receiving Title X funds from all discussion of abortion
with patients, but compelling provision of information promoting continuation of preg-
nancy to term).
143. See N.Y. PuB. HTH.m LAw §§ 2496-2498 (McKinney 1993) (directing the creation
of a comprehensive written summary explaining, among other things, the "common diag-
noses for which hysterectomy is a common treatment," the "alternative treatments to hys-
terectomy for such diagnoses," and the "common physiological changes, side effects, risks
and benefits" resulting from each treatment, and mandating that the written summary
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
important shield to protect against efforts to mandate HIV testing
144
and as a necessary response to a history in which coerced sterilizations
were performed.1 45 Indeed, existing legislative protocols in these ar-
eas serve to assist patients in making informed, voluntary decisions
regarding testing and treatment.
1 4 6
As one might expect, most of these counseling requirements have
been established with the support and guidance of public health orga-
nizations and those most likely to receive this counseling. Therefore,
even though subjects such as AIDS and sterilization can evoke signifi-
cant emotion and political activity,1 47 the community-based support
for these forms of mandated medical counseling indicates that these
provisions are not likely to be the subject of constitutional legal
challenge. 48
shall be provided "by a physician to each person under such physician's care, when a hys-
terectomy is under consideration for that person"). Section 2781 provides:
Informed consent to an HIV related test shall consist of... (a) an explanation of
the test, including its purpose, the meaning of its results, and the benefits of early
diagnosis and medical intervention . . . ; and (b) an explanation of the proce-
dures to be followed, including that the test is voluntary, that consent may be
withdrawn at any time, and a statement advising the subject that anonymous test-
ing is available; and (c) an explanation of the confidentiality protections afforded
confidential HIV related information . . . including the circumstances under
which and classes of persons to whom disclosure of such information may be
required, authorized or permitted ....
Id. § 2781.
144. Cf Lawrence 0. Gostin & David W. Webber, HIV Infection and AIDS in the Public
Health and Health Care Systems: The Role of Law and Litigation, 279 JAMA 1108, 1109 (1998)
(noting that "counseling and consent are thought to be important to enhance patient
autonomy").
145. See Lori L. Heise, Reproductive Freedom and Violence Against Women: Where Are the Inter-
sections t in APPLICATIONS OF FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY TO WOMEN'S LivEs: SEX, VIOLENCE,
WOR, AND REPRODUCTION 1032, 1035 (D. Kelly Weisberg ed., 1996) [hereinafter FEMINIST
LEGAL THEORY] ("In the United States .... instances of involuntary sterilization of poor,
minority, and mentally retarded young women during the early 1970s led to the enactment
of more stringent sterilization regulations in 1978."); Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive
Laws, Women of Color, and LowlIncome Women, in FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY, supra, at 1007,
1014 ("Complete information is crucial to voluntary choice, yet many women elect steriliza-
tion under the mistaken belief that the procedure is reversible. Medical personnel often
encourage that belief by referring to the procedure as 'tying the tubes'; many women as-
sume that what can be tied, can be untied later.").
146. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 1690(a) (West 1990) ("Prior to the performance
of a hysterectomy, physicians and surgeons shall obtain verbal and written informed con-
sent."); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2498 (McKinney 1993) (requiring a written summary of
hysterectomy information to be provided to patients); see also infra note 242 and accompa-
nying text.
147. See Rachel Lurie, Translating Issues into Actions: Introduction, in WOMEN, AIDS &
ACrvisM 211, 211-12 (Cynthia Chris & Monica Pearl eds., 1990) (discussing activist strate-
gies against AIDS in the context of "social injustices").
148. As medical organizations often resist the imposition of legislative mandates regard-
ing counseling, it remains to be seen whether these organizations would file suit to chal-
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2. The Development of a Common Law and Statutory Legal Theory of
Informed Consent. -Traditional informed consent doctrine derives
from tort law, specifically, the common law prohibition on battery. 149
Early court decisions that allowed recovery for a claimant asserting
that a doctor performed procedures to which the patient had not con-
sented were treated as disputes involving "unauthorized touching."1' 0
The focus in these cases, however, was on the complete absence of
consent, rather than on whether sufficient information had been con-
veyed to the patient to enable voluntary decision making.15'
Gradually, as medical procedures grew more complicated and as
courts struggled to develop a mechanism to compensate patients
whose consent had been lacking, but not wholly absent,"' a legal the-
ory of "informed consent" grew to be expressed as a separate tort,
grounded in negligence and influenced by contract theory. 53 Today,
many states recognize two separate, though related, causes of action:
the intentional tort of battery, defined as a touching for which there
has been no consent; and a cause of action in negligence, defined as a
touching for which the patient did not give informed consent.154
lenge their applicability. One might expect, however, that the significant likelihood of
negative media reports might discourage such litigation.
149. See Pratt v. Davis, 79 N.E. 562, 564 (Ill. 1906) (affirming a judgment for trespass
against a physician who performed a hysterectomy without consent); Mohr v. Williams, 104
N.W. 12, 16 (Minn. 1905) (holding a physician liable for assault for operating on a pa-
tient's left ear without permission); Schloendorff v. Society of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93
(N.Y. 1914) (noting that "a surgeon who performs an operation without his patient's con-
sent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages"), overruled in part ly Bing v.
Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957); Rolater v. Strain, 137 P. 96, 98 (Okla. 1913) (holding
that an operation beyond the scope of consent constituted an assault); FADEN &
BFAucHA-Mp, supra note 44, at 120 (describing these four battery decisions as "almost uni-
versally credited with formulating the basic features of informed consent in American
law").
150. Mohr, 104 N.W. at 16 (using the phrase "unauthorized touching" to describe the
tort of battery); see also FADEN & BEAUCHA P, supra note 44, at 26-27.
151. See Mohr, 104 N.W. at 15 ("If the operation was performed without plaintiffs con-
sent, and the circumstances were not such as to justify its performance without, it was...
unlawful."); see also FADEN & BEAucH Mp, supra note 44, at 26-27.
152. See KAz, supra note 15, at 73 (noting that courts have been reluctant to explore the
extent to which partial disclosure or partial consent may vitiate a patient's claim for lack of
consent).
153. See FADEN & BEAucHAmp, supra note 44, at 125-40 (discussing the evolution of the
duty to obtain consent, rooted in a battery theory, to the duty to disclose risks, which
incorporated elements of negligence and which arose from the quasi-contractual physi-
cian-patient relationship); Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, 103 YALE L. J. 899,
902 (1994) (" [1] nformed consent does not simply pursue the contract law goals of individ-
ual autonomy, efficiency, and anti-statism; it also advances two related ideas, fault and duty,
that pervade and moralize tort law.").
154. See, e.g., Doe v. Noe, 690 N.E.2d 1012, 1021 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997) (distinguishing
"between a total lack of consent for the contested act (battery) and the lack of informed
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Although requirements vary somewhat from state to state, 155 an
informed consent claim generally consists of the following elements:
(1) a physician's duty to disclose material risks; (2) the failure to dis-
close or inadequate disclosure of those risks; (3) as a direct and proxi-
mate result of the failure to disclose, the patient consented to
treatment to which she otherwise would not have consented; and (4)
the patient was injured by the proposed treatment. 156
consent (negligence)"); Lounsbury v. Capel, 836 P.2d 188, 193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)
(same). Challenging the doctrinal shift from battery to negligence, Katz notes that
"[e]xpansion of the requisites for valid consent within the ambit of battery would have
reduced the need for medical testimony in deciding consent controversies, and thus would
have limited the impact on the legal process of physicians' beliefs about what patients are
entitled to know." KArz, supra note 15, at 69. Some states no longer recognize a battery
cause of action in this setting. See, e.g., Vargas v. Rosal-Arcillas, 438 N.Y.S.2d 986, 987-88
(Sup. Ct. 1981) (asserting that, because battery involves the intentional infliction of harm,
"for most purposes of analysis, operating on a patient without the patient's informed con-
sent is to be considered simply as a type or form of medical malpractice"). But see Morgan
v. MacPhail, 704 A.2d 617, 620 (Pa. 1997) (concluding that the doctrine of informed con-
sent derives solely from the intentional tort theory of battery and therefore is available only
regarding surgical procedures, not the administration of medication).
155. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d(1) (McKinney 1993) (defining lack of
informed consent as the failure "to disclose to the patient such alternatives [to the treat-
ment] and the reasonably foreseeable risks and benefits involved as a reasonable... practi-
tioner under similar circumstances would have disclosed, in a manner permitting the
patient to make a knowledgeable evaluation"; Daum v. Spinecare Med. Group, Inc., 61 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 260, 268 (Ct. App. 1997) (setting forth a two part test for determining whether
consent was informed: whether the physician disclosed (1) the risk of death, serious harm,
or complications, and (2) additional information that a skilled practitioner would provide
under similar circumstances); Ditto v. McCurdy, 947 P.2d 952, 958-59 (Haw. 1997) (refus-
ing to require a physician to disclose his qualifications or lack thereof to the patient, and
leaving it to the state's board of medical examiners to establish standards of informed
consent pursuant to statutory authority); Guidry v. Neu, 708 So. 2d 740, 743-44 (La. Ct.
App. 1997) (defining the elements of lack of informed consent as a causal connection
between the physician's failure to disclose the existence of a material risk that he had a
duty to disclose, and the actual risk sustained by the patient); Noe, 690 N.E.2d at 1021
(noting that a cause of action premised on informed consent requires that, as a result of
the physician's breach of a duty to disclose material risks, the patient consented to treat-
ment that she otherwise would not have consented to and that resulted in harm).
156. The shift from battery to negligence results in an emphasis upon the elements of
causation and actual (not merely dignitary) harm. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2805-d(3)
(requiring the plaintiff to show that a reasonably prudent patient in her position would not
have undergone the treatment if she had been fully informed); Posta v. Chung-Loy, 703
A.2d 368, 378-79 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (stating that the plaintiff failed to prove
the element of causation because a reasonably prudent patient in his position would have
undergone the surgeries at issue even after being informed of the risk), cert. denied, 713
A.2d 500 (N.J. 1998); Noe, 690 N.E.2d at 1021 (setting forth proximate cause and injury as
elements of an action based on lack of informed consent); FADEN & BEAucHAMP, supra note
44, at 29 (noting the shift from an action in battery to one in negligence where the plaintiff
then had to show harm actually done); KATZ, supra note 15, at 69 ("[Nlegligence law gen-
erally does not redress dignitary injuries in the absence of physical injury. It leaves little
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Traditionally, a reasonable physician standard has guided the de-
termination of what information is material and therefore should
have been disclosed to a patient. 157 Pursuant to this approach, which
still exists in many jurisdictions, if a patient asserts that she was not
provided with sufficient or accurate information concerning the risks
and benefits of a procedure, the patient will succeed in her cause of
action only if the undisclosed risk caused her harm, and disclosure of
the risk is required by "the recognized standard of acceptable profes-
sional practice in the profession and in the specialty."' 58 This ap-
proach is firmly rooted in the belief that physicians have specific,
expert knowledge regarding not only the provision of medical treat-
ment, but also the extent of information that ought to be shared with
their patients. 159
Not surprisingly, although this standard persists in a number of
jurisdictions, 6 ° there has been a perceptible movement towards the
room for the idea that lack of disclosure should be a legally cognizable injury in and of
itself.").
157. See Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106 (Kan. 1960) (limiting the duty to dis-
close to risks "which a reasonable medical practitioner would make under the same or
similar circumstances"); Marchione v. State, 598 N.Y.S.2d 592, 593 (App. Div. 1993) (not-
ing that the duty of care is satisfied when "a physician discloses all the facts that a reason-
able physician under similar circumstances would have disclosed"); see also KATZ, supra note
15, at 69 ("The choice of negligence theory allowed judges to defer gracefully to medical
judgment, permitting physicians to continue to exercise the wisdom of their profession
and making them liable only for failure to disclose what a typical, and hence, reasonable
doctor would have revealed under the circumstances").
158. Sanders v. Whitfield, No. 01-A-01-9707CV-00357, 1997 WL 778988, at *2 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Dec. 19, 1997) (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-118) (1980)); see Weber v. McCoy,
950 P.2d 548, 551 (Wyo. 1997) (noting that a plaintiff must establish "'(1) the accepted
standard of medical care or practice, (2) that the doctor's conduct departed from the
standard, and (3) that his conduct was the legal cause of the injuries suffered'" (quoting
Harris v. Grizzle, 625 P.2d 747, 751 (Wyo. 1981))); see also FADEN & BE ucHAmp, supra note
44, at 31 ("All the courts adopting the professional practice rule require expert testimony
from members of relevant professional groups to determine whether a physician has vio-
lated a duty to disclose the risk in question."); Schuck, supra note 153, at 916 ("In slightly
over half the states, the legal standard for disclosure to patients is that which a 'reasonable
medical practitioner' would provide.").
159. See FADEN & Br.Aucs Amp, supra note 44, at 30 (noting that, pursuant to the profes-
sional practice standard, "[d]isclosure, like treatment, is... ajob belonging to physicians
by virtue of their professional expertise, role, and commitment"). The "reasonable physi-
cian" standard also is the measure applied in medical malpractice actions generally. See id.
at 29-31 (noting that lack of informed consent is treated as a type of medical malpractice,
and that the requirement of expert testimony from medical professionals can be hindered
by "professional solidarity").
160. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. Ha.m LAw § 2805-d(1) (using a "reasonable practitioner" stan-
dard). New York, however, mitigates the severity of this standard by requiring that the
required information be disclosed "in a manner permitting the patient to make a knowl-
edgeable evaluation." Id.; see also Sanders, 1997 WL 778988, at *2 (invoking "the recognized
standard of accepted professional practice in the profession and in the specialty" (citing
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adoption of a "reasonable patient" standard.161 Under this approach,
if a "reasonable patient, in what the physician knows or should know
to be the patient's position, would be 'likely to attach significance to
the risk or cluster of risks' in deciding whether to forego the proposed
therapy or to submit to it,"162 those risks should be disclosed. 163 How-
ever, because this is a claim sounding in negligence, the patient must
suffer harm from the undisclosed risk to prevail.'
Even under the reasonable patient standard, there is a large,
amorphous middle-between the perspective of the individual claim-
ant and the objectively assessed reasonable person in the claimant's
position-that is the subject of judicial and jury-based decision mak-
ing.' 65 Neither courts nor legislatures have provided sufficient gui-
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-26-118)); Weber, 950 P.2d at 552 (setting forth the traditional, rea-
sonable practitioner view).
161. FADEN & Bruct.AdMp, supra note 44, at 132-33 (discussing the reasonable person
standard and noting that it constitutes "an important minority trend in American courts"
(emphasis omitted)).
162. Largey v. Rothman, 540 A.2d 504, 508 (N.J. 1988) (per curiam) (quoting Canter-
bury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972)).
163. See, e.g., OR. REv. STAT. § 677.097 (Supp. 1998) (requiring a physician to respond to
a patient's questions in detail, including alternatives, "unless to do so would be materially
detrimental to the patient"); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1301.811-A(b) (West Supp. 1998)
("Consent is informed if the patient has been given a description of a procedure... and the
risks and alternatives that a reasonably prudent patient would require to make an informed decision
as to that procedure.") (emphasis added); Canterbuy, 464 F.2d at 785 (rejecting the profes-
sional practice standard and requiring the duty to disclose to be measured by a reasonable
lay person standard); Carr v. Strode, 904 P.2d 489, 499 (Haw. 1995) (adopting "the patient-
oriented standard applicable to a physician's duty to disclose risk information prior to
treatment"); Caputa v. Antiles, 686 A.2d 356, 361 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (noting
that, under the prudent patient standard, "a physician must disclose all information mate-
rial to a reasonably prudent patient's treatment decision").
164. See Guidry v. Neu, 708 So. 2d 740, 743 (La. Ct. App. 1997) (discussing lack of in-
formed consent where a physician allegedly failed to disclose the risk of endophthalmitis
prior to eye surgery, and plaintiff subsequently suffered a loss of vision); Posta v. Chung-
Loy, 703 A.2d 368, 372 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (discussing plaintiffs claim that he
would not have undergone abdominal surgery had he been informed of the possibility of a
hernia, which he in fact suffered), cert. denied, 713 A.2d 500 (N.J. 1998); see also Faya v.
Almarez, 329 Md. 435, 447-48, 620 A.2d 327, 333 (1993) (holding that patients bringing
negligence claims against a surgeon who failed to reveal that he had AIDS at the time of
the operations may recover damages for emotional distress to the extent that this injury
can be objectively demonstrated for the period between learning of the doctor's illness and
receiving HIV-negative results).
165. In disability law, courts attempt to assess the elements of "significant risk" as deter-
mined by Congress and the Supreme Court. Compare Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) (1994) (prohibiting discrimination against any "otherwise qualified individual" in
programs or activities receiving federal financial assistance) with School Bd. v. Arline, 480
U.S. 273, 287 n.16 (1987) (noting that, under the Rehabilitation Act, a person who poses a
significant risk not capable of being ameliorated through reasonable accommodation is
not otherwise qualified); see also Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3)
(1994) (defining a direct threat as one posing a "significant risk" to the health and safety of
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dance to interpret adequately this large middle area.' 66 The next Part
provides a critical analysis of the theory and practice of informed con-
sent. As such, it helps serve as a foundation for the proposals set forth
in Part IV, developing a new model for informed consent in the con-
text of genetic testing.
C. Does Informed Consent Doctrine Work?
1. An Analysis of Informed Consent Doctrine in Practice.--Current
informed consent doctrine has been criticized as inadequate to pro-
tect the needs, and the rights, of most patients. In the words of Jay
Katz, "The legal vision of informed consent, based on self-determination,
is still largely a mirage."' 67
In practice, courts tend to focus more on the formalities of
whether consent was obtained than on whether a patient's consent
truly was based on an appropriate disclosure and discussion of mate-
rial risks and benefits." 6 Although most patients challenge a health
care provider's failure to disclose risks and benefits attendant to a
medical procedure by bringing a claim in negligence for "lack of in-
formed consent,"169 it sometimes seems that we have not ventured very
others); ; 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630.2(r) App. (enumerating four factors necessary to assess a direct
threat: the duration of the risk, the nature and severity of the potential harm, the likeli-
hood the potential harm will occur, and the imminence of the potential harm). In the
context of informed consent, however, neither the courts nor legislatures have developed
such a standard of "significant risk," or a means of assessing it.
166. Louisiana has rejected both the reasonable physician and the reasonable patient
approaches, and instead provides a list of risks of which patients must be informed. See .,
REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.40 (West 1992) (rejecting both the reasonable physician and
reasonable patient standards and instead requiring that patients be informed of "the na-
ture and purpose of the procedure . . . together with the known risks, if any, of death,
brain damage, quadriplegia, paraplegia, the loss or loss of function of any organ or limb,
[and] of disfiguring scars," and that their questions be answered "in a satisfactory manner,"
and that their consent be in writing).
167. KATZ, supra note 15, at 84; see also supra notes 36-42 and accompanying text (re-
counting the medical profession's failure to seek (informed) consent from African Ameri-
cans and low-income women in some contexts, including mandated sterilization, blood
tests (including sickle cell), and the Tuskegee Experiment).
168. For example, in most jurisdictions, the existence of a written consent form triggers
a presumption that the patient's consent was "informed." See, e.g., Hondroulis v. Schuh-
macher, 553 So. 2d 398, 405 (La. 1988) (holding that a signed consent form, prepared
according to statute, established a rebuttable presumption of informed consent). But see
Hartman v. D'Ambrosia, 665 So. 2d 1206, 1209-11 (La. Ct. App. 1995) (finding a lack of
informed consent because, although the patient had signed a written consent for bunion
surgery, a reasonable person in her position might have refused surgery if given more
information).
169. See supra notes 152-154 and accompanying text.
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far from the days when patients brought most claims as intentional
torts, sounding in battery, for "lack of consent."1 7
Some commentators assert that the inherent lack of positional
equality171 between physician and patient undermines any attempt by
the physician to obtain the patient's true consent. 172 These writers
note that physicians traditionally have exercised a great deal of au-
thority based on their extensive education and training. 171 In addi-
tion, the demographic distinctions between physicians, who tend to
be white, although less often male than in the past, and patients, who
represent all races and both genders, 174 have influenced the tradi-
tional modalities of physician-patient interaction.
75
These observations regarding the power relations between pro-
vider and patient only bolster the need for a thorough critique of in-
formed consent theory. Indeed, to end the review of informed
consent doctrine at this point would merely be an accommodation of
170. See supra notes 149-154 and accompanying text; see also KATz, supra note 15, at 68
(discussing factors influencing the transition from battery to negligence, and noting both
the misunderstanding that battery required an element of malicious intent or intent to
inflict actual damage, and the reluctance of courts to find liability when touching that falls
within the standards of care occurs without full disclosure of material risks). The doctrine
of informed consent is, in fact, relatively new, dating only from the late 1950s. Id. at 59.
171. BRODY, supra note 5, at 59 (arguing that biotechnological advances are reinforcing
the power and "sacrosanct status" of physicians in society); Mary B. Mahowald, On Treat-
ment of Myopia: Feminist Standpoint Theory and Bioethics, in FEMINISM & BIOETHICS, supra note
69, at 95, 103 (discussing the "dominant and dominating role of the paternalistic physician
... within the health care hierarchy"); see also supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text
(discussing historical expressions of disempowerment of racial minorities and women in
medical settings).
172. See Gail Geller et al., Genetic Testing for Susceptibility to Adult-Onset Cancer: The Process
and Content of Informed Consent, 277JAMA 1467, 1468 (1997) (discussing as one obstacle to
informed consent "the imbalance of power inherent in the relationship between partici-
pants [in medical research] and medical professionals").
173. See KATZ, supra note 15, at 1 ("Disclosure in medicine has served the function of
getting patients to 'consent' to what physicians wanted them to agree to in the first
place."); Mahowald, supra note 171, at 102 ("[Patients] are often considered only as the
assumed object of beneficence, or in the context of [doctors] permitting them to exercise
autonomy."). This disparity may be manifest in doctors implicitly or explicitly asking to be
called, and our addressing them as, "Dr.," while they, in turn, more often address us by our
first name.
174. Mahowald, supra note 171, at 103 (noting that "the majority of patients are women
and the majority of physicians are still men" (citing CHARLoTTE F. MULLER, HEALTH CARE
AND GENDER 7-10 (1992))).
175. See infra notes 186-187, 192-194, 211-228 and accompanying text (discussing cul-
tural and socioeconomic factors that can complicate the process of obtaining informed
consent); see also Andrews, supra note 7, at 990 (discussing studies that reveal that the gen-
der of the physician or genetic counselor "can... influence the amount of pressure" put
on patients to consent to testing, with female counselors being "more sensitive to personal
autonomy issues and more concerned with the overall effect that testing may have on the
family unit as a whole" (citations omitted)).
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existing disparities. A critical assessment may be able to identify
mechanisms to help reduce, if not eliminate, these power differen-
tials; 176 at a minimum, new mechanisms may help us to establish
guidelines to ensure that when consent is given, it is, indeed,
informed.
An individual's medical decision making is dependent upon
whether she trusts her health care provider.'77 Indeed, trust is per-
haps the most amorphous 1 78 and most important element in the con-
scious and unconscious medical decision-making process. 179  The
medical-legal principle of "informed consent" has the potential to fos-
ter the highly personal expression of "trust" between physician and
patient, but only insofar as it serves to minimize the common power
imbalance between the two. A number of factors may inhibit the de-
velopment of trust, and hence the process of getting, or giving, in-
formed consent in a medical setting.
At its most basic, establishing a relationship of trust between doc-
tor and patient requires the provider to reveal both the risks and ben-
efits of a particular test or procedure, and to respond to the patient's
concerns-from those that are eminently practical to those that are
solely emotional. The patient must be provided sufficient time and
opportunity to express concerns and to ask questions. 8 ° An array of
personal, economic, and social factors may influence the nature of
information one needs in order to consent to a given medical proce-
dure. In addition, the physician must be willing to credit the patient
176. Mahowald, supra note 171, at 104 (advocating that the physician-patient relation-
ship be one of "mutuality," in which "physicians and patients alike have rights and respon-
sibilities vis-i-vis each other").
177. Cf. KArz, supra note 15, at xiv (arguing that the requirement of informed consent
indicates that "trust in the professional is no longer viewed as sufficient protection of the
integrity of the physician-patient relationship").
178. See id. at xv ("Although... mutual trust is difficult to embrace and to sustain, it is
important to strive for it.").
179. Cf id. at 229 ("Both [patient and physician] must be trusted, but... they can only
be trusted if they first learn to trust each other.").
180. See generally id. at 82-83 (arguing that, in addition to disclosure of risks by physi-
cians, informed consent requires a dialogue with physicians in which patients "are viewed
as participants in medical decisions affecting their lives"); Smith, supra note 112, at 412-13(describing a six-step protocol to deliver bad news in the medical setting: (1) "get[ ] the
physical context right," meaning a private setting in which the patient is encouraged to
relate how she is feeling; (2) "obtain from the patient an impression of what . . . she
already knows"; (3) learn from the patient how much she wants to understand about her
medical condition; (4) if the patient wishes to be fully informed, begin the "information
sharing" stage by including information about the diagnosis, treatment plan, and progno-
sis; (5) "give a narrative of events ... to help the patient understand what has been hap-
pening"; and (6) "clarify and reinforce information by repeating important points and
asking the patient to review what he has understood") (citing BucKmAN, supra note 112)).
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"with knowledge about his own condition that textbooks, articles, or
even experience with other patients cannot provide."18 '
As discussed earlier, managed care organizations create disincen-
tives for this type of communication to occur, as evidenced by their
decisions regarding reimbursement and patient load.
182 These enti-
ties generally value informed consent much differently than would a
patient faced with making a decision whether to undergo a significant
medical procedure or a powerful diagnostic test.183 This is especially
troubling because studies about patients' adherence to medical advice
show that "nonadherence [is] more common when patients [do] not
receive feedback from the physician or explanations of the cause of
the illness."'" 4
While spending time with patients may facilitate the exchange of
information, time alone is not necessarily the solution if the medical
counseling is "filled with medical jargon unintelligible to the pa-
tients." '185 Even good faith attempts to communicate can be signifi-
candy complicated when language and cultural differences separate a
patient and a physician. It frequently is difficult enough to discuss
sensitive medical issues when the parties speak a common language.
Introducing a translator, assuming one is available, will not necessarily
facilitate more than rudimentary communication. 18
6 Differences in
cultural expectations of what type of interaction is expected in a medi-
cal setting also can lead to profound miscommunication.1
7
At times, there may even be a difference between what a provider
interprets as consent and what the patient experiences as expressions
181. Mahowald, supra note 171, at 108. Mahowald describes a physician who successfully
negotiates this relationship as one who can self-consciously put aside "her own nearsighted-
ness" and arrogance in favor of "the privileged status of patients' experience and knowl-
edge of their own illness." Id.
182. See supra notes 59-66 and accompanying text.
183. See Lu, supra note 60, at 542 (noting "the physician's incentive not to disclose costly
diagnostic or therapeutic options" in the managed care context).
184. Smith, supra note 112, at 393 (noting that "patient satisfaction was directly related
to the amount of information they received, and most patients wanted more informa-
tion"); see also KATZ, supra note 15, at 78 ("Safeguarding self-determination requires assess-
ing whether patients' informational needs have been satisfied by asking them whether they
understand what has been explained to them.").
185. Smith, supra note 112, at 393.
186. See Elysa Gordon, Multiculturalism in Medical Decisionmaking: The Notion of Informed
Waiver, 23 FoRDHAm URB. L.J. 1321, 1325 (1996) (noting that "educational and language
barriers may inhibit active participation in medical decisionmaking").
187. See id. at 1343 (noting that "Western culture's bias towards individualism implies a
preference for active participation in medical decisionmaking[,]" whereas members of
non-Western cultures "may feel more comfortable deferring to a physician's authority").
[VOL. 58:346
GENETIC TESTING AND INFORMED CONSENT
of doubt, concern, or passive acceptance. 8s Naturally, this miscom-
munication is more likely to occur when only the verbal assent of the
patient is required prior to the performance of a test or procedure.
Still, it is not unheard of in the context of a requirement of written
consent. For example, it is not unusual for health care providers, or
their assistants, to seek a patient's written consent immediately prior
to the performance of a procedure, when a patient is not in the physi-
cal or emotional condition to consider rationally whether consenting
to the proposed procedure is advisable.189 Although the patient is
likely to sign the form, one must question the nature and quality of
her consent. 190
The goal of ensuring that a patient's consent is voluntary and in-
formed is complicated by the reality that the nature and type of infor-
mation that one person needs in order to give consent may vary
significantly from what another might need; indeed, even "a given pa-
tient's desires may change over the course of treatment." '9
A patient who distrusts the health care system-because of per-
sonal, familial, or historical reasons-may need a greater degree of
information before she can give "informed consent.' 92 A patient
who is made to feel alienated from the health care system, perhaps
because of gender, race, or class, also may have a need for more thor-
ough, or different, education and counseling prior to giving, or with-
188. See Wilkerson v. Mid-America Cardiology, 908 S.W.2d 691, 693-95, 700 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1995) (noting the factual ambiguity as to whether a patient expressly or impliedly
consented to angioplasty).
189. See id. at 694 (noting that the patient had been informed that his questions regard-
ing angioplasty would be answered at the catheterization lab, the site of the procedure).
190. See Burris & Gostin, supra note 3, at 140 ("Merely signing a form does not assure
genuine informed consent.").
191. Smith, supra note 112, at 394.
192. See Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of the Womb, 43 DuE L.J. 492, 515 (1998)
("African-American women, along with Latina (especially Puerto Rican) and Native Ameri-
can women, were subjected to forced sterilization in appalling numbers up through the
1970s, a practice that continues in 'milder' forms today." (citations omitted)); Randall,
supra note 39, at 191 (observing that "[m]any people are surprised at the level of distrust of
the health care system held by African Americans[,]" but describing such fear and distrust
as a "natural and logical response to the history of experimentation and abuse"); Lynda
Richardson, Experiment Leaves Legacy of Distrust of New AIDS Drugs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 21, 1997,
at Al (noting African American distrust of the health care system in light of the Tuskegee
Experiment, wherein Black men with syphilis were not given available antibiotic treatment,
but instead were "observed" to learn more about the natural history of the disease); Helen
Rodriguez-Trias, PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS TO THE 121sT MEETING, AMERICAN PUBLIC HAL.m
ASSOCIATION (Oct. 25, 1993) (noting that the relatively recent experience of many Latina
women with coerced and forced sterilization engenders distrust of health care institu-
tions); see also supra notes 37-42, 145, and infra notes 193-194, 199-207.
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holding, "informed consent" to a procedure. 193 Yet, at the same time,
those most likely to distrust or feel alienated from the health care sys-
tem often are those with the least access and least choice in health
care providers or health care institutions. 94
For example, Medicaid managed care programs may impose sub-
stantial limits on patient choice, and public clinics rarely can assure a
given patient that she will-or will not-be seen by a particular doc-
tor. 195 Under these circumstances, there is little room for a patient to
question her physician about her treatment or to raise concerns about
the care she is receiving, especially if she is concerned that her physi-
cian will provide her with a lesser level of care if she does raise ques-
tions. This stands in stark contrast to the individual with private
health insurance who can far more readily change health care provid-
ers if she is not given sufficient explanation of a proposed course of
treatment, or if she feels put off by her doctor's manner, or if she is
concerned that he is not adequately trained in a certain specialty or
technique.19 6
2. A Critical Theory Analysis: Current Informed Consent Doctrine and
Its Application to Genetic Testing.-The foregoing discussion explores a
range of problems that patients may experience with current in-
193. See lkemoto, supra note 40, at 937 (observing that genetic data is never neutral, but
instead is "knowledge that has social content"); Dorothy E. Roberts, The Nature of Blacks'
Skepticism About Genetic Testing, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 971, 974 (1997) (noting that as a
result of a long history of "medical abuses, many Blacks harbor a well-founded distrust of
technological interference with their bodies and genetic material at the hands of white
physicians"); cf Susan M. Wolf, Introduction: Gender and Feminism in Bioethics, in FEMINISM &
BIOETHICS, supra note 69, at 3, 17-18 (discussing the "significance of being identified with a
certain group" in the context of health care); see also supra notes 186-187, infta notes 213-
228, and accompanying text.
194. See Randall, supra note 39, at 206 ("To African Americans, the continued disparity
between the health status of African Americans and European Americans is significant
evidence that the health care system is not to be trusted."); Roberts, supra note 193, at 975
(noting that "an African American perspective of bioethical matters 'will be inclined to
distrust the "ethics of trust" that some physicians espouse' because of medicine's insensitiv-
ity to African American needs" (citation omitted)); cf. Ehrenreich, supra note 192, at 520
(stating that physicians are more likely to suspect minority and poor mothers of abusing
drugs and being more litigious than white mothers).
195. See Rodriguez-Trias & Marte, supra note 18, at 304 (noting that low-income women
in large cities suffer from unequal access to medical services due to their reliance on public
hospitals and Medicaid clinics); cf Regular Doctor, Not Coverage, is More Significant, AM. POL.
NETWORK-HEALTH LINE, Mar. 14, 1998, at 13, 13 (reporting on a study that concludes that
"having a regular physician is a stronger predictor than having insurance coverage of
whether a person has adequate access to health care").
196. See generally Emanuel & Dubler, supra note 59, at 325 ("Without health insurance or
significant financial resources, the uninsured do not have any meaningful choice of health
care setting or of a primary care physician.").
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formed consent practices. There are, however, additional concerns
that are best understood through a critical lens,' 9 7 particularly as in-
formed by the viewpoints of feminist critical theory and critical race
theory, which acknowledge the role of poverty, race, and class in the
development and application of law. x"'
Historical experience with eugenics199 and ongoing occurrences
of racial disparities in the delivery of health care2 0 0 mean that it is
197. Commentators also have criticized informed consent doctrine from the perspec-
tives of economic efficiency, tort theory, and constitutional theory. See, e.g., FADEN &
BE.ucHamp, supra note 44, at 23-43 (examining the tort and constitutional components of
the informed consent doctrine); Hall, supra note 59, at 511-12 (asserting that the theory of
.economic informed consent" requires managed care organizations to inform customers
of cost containment rules and incentives imposed upon physicians); Schuck, supra note
153, at 907-13 (describing the central principles of informed consent in tort law generally);
Valerie J. Pacer, Note, Salvaging the Undue Burden Standard-Is it a Lost Cause? The Undue
Burden Standard and Fundamental Rights Analysis, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 295, 320-22 (1995) (pro-
posing a modified undue burden standard to assess the constitutionality of an informed
consent requirement).
198. Each of these critical perspectives supports the importance of incorporating the
voice of the person affected by the legal or public policy issue at hand in its development.
See Wolf, supra note 193, at 25 ("There has been great concern with patients' and research
subjects' rights, but those people tend to be the objects of concern rather than full mem-
bers of the ethical conversation."). Viewed through this lens, individual narrative is not
only shaped by experience living under the law, but also should shape laws. See Dorothy E.
Roberts, The Priority Paradigm: Private Choices and the Limits of Equality, 57 U. Prrr. L. REV.
363, 399-404 (1996) (advancing the concept that equality and liberty must be understood
in light of preexistent discriminatory structures harmful to blacks); Patricia J. Williams,
Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Deconstructed Rights, 22 HRv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
401, 410 (1987) (asserting that racial minorities should use the rhetoric of rights to
destabilize establishment values, and making use of personal narrative to illustrate perspec-
tival differences in rights valuation). AlthoughJay Katz does not identify his work as incor-
porating critical legal theory, perhaps because it was written 15 years ago, his bold critiques
of existent informed consent theory and practice resonate with these concepts. See generally
KArz, supra note 15, at 78 (arguing that instead of focusing on objective and subjective tests
to determine whether informed consent was given, the courts "should... consider[ ] ...
the patients' plight and require[ ] physicians to learn new skills: how to inquire openly
about their patients' individual information needs and patients' concerns, doubts, and mis-
conceptions about treatment-its risks, benefits, and alternatives").
199. One commentator has noted:
Racism, prejudice, and genetics have made for a socially combustible and often
deadly mix. The mixture has proven so toxic that a strong case can be made that
applying knowledge from the realm of human genetics to public policy has led to
far more misery, confusion, and suffering in the twentieth century than it has to
human betterment.
Caplan, supra note 35, at 32-33; see also Andrews, supra note 27, at 908 (noting that "genetic
arguments were part of the Social Darwinism that insisted that those on the bottom of the
social ladder belonged there"); Randall, supra note 39, at 196-97 (describing the testing of
smallpox and typhoid vaccines, as well as the development of anesthetics, on African Amer-
icans without informed consent); supra notes 35-42 and accompanying text.
200. See Bowman, supra note 36, at 921 (noting that policy makers frequently comment
on the scarcity of health care resources, but that, in fact, they are scarce only for the poor)
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
especially important to develop an appropriate informed consent pro-
cess in the context of genetic testing.201 As explained by Lisa
Ikemoto, there is particular fear in minority communities of a "racial-
ization of genomic knowledge, 2 °2 or the use of genetic knowledge in
a way "that reinforces and recreates racial subordination. '2 3  This
could happen, as it has in the past, with the conflation of "whiteness
with a medicalized understanding of good citizenry. '204 Should this
occur with continued disparate access to medical care, the danger of
misuse of genetic information without benefit to the patient would
Randall, supra note 39, at 210-13, 218-19 (noting the recent closure of hospitals in primar-
ily African American neighborhoods; the serious underrepresentation of blacks in the
health care professions; and the inadequacy of managed care, as currently operated, to
meet the needs of African Americans).
201. See Murphy, supra note 23, at 7 (wondering whether, in the absence of appropriate
action, "the genome project [will] generate new classes of human inferiority" and whether
it will "mark difference as an undesirable trait and justify its eradication").
202. Ikemoto, supra note 40, at 937.
203. Id. at 937-38. Similarly, Professor Andrews notes that African Americans, immi-
grants, and women are "the groups most likely to have their individual decisions overrid-
den sometimes on the grounds that it is for their own good, other times for the supposed
good of society." Andrews, supra note 27, at 908. For example, "pregnant African-Ameri-
can women are tested for the sickle cell mutation (which is of high prevalence among
African-Americans) without their advance knowledge or consent," while "pregnant white
women [are tested] for the cystic fibrosis mutation (which is of high prevalence among
Whites) [only following] elaborate consent procedures." Id. at 909. Similarly, with cystic
fibrosis, a disease in which both parents must transmit the trait for the condition to be
inherited-it is often the woman who is tested first. Only if she tests positive is the man
tested, sending the message that "once again, it is women who are expected to be guaran-
tors of their children's health." Id. at 910. When asked why they did not ask African Amer-
ican women for their consent to test for the sickle cell test, physicians at "an elite medical
school" indicated: "the women 'wouldn't understand;'" it was done for their benefit; and
"other types of testing are performed without consent during pregnancy." Andrews, supra
note 7, at 1003.
204. See Ikemoto, supra note 40, at 941 (noting that "disease and health, like genomic
knowledge, are constructs that are socially and historically located, informed by the matri-
ces of domination"). Ikemoto looks at recent efforts to determine whether a link exists
between genetics and violence and notes that such studies tend to move the focus away
from societal factors that may foster violent behavior. Id. at 944-45. When we "isolate[ ]
the source of disorder within the individual[, we are] reliev[ed] from having to acknowl-
edge the matrix of domination or to examine our social structures, our institutional ar-
rangements, and ourselves." Id. at 946. When knowledge about genetics is taken to
represent our understanding of humanity, "genetic disease [is viewed] as a bad component
that can be isolated and removed." Id. at 942. Seen in the light of historical and ongoing
medical mistreatment based on race, class, or gender, an intent to "cure" flawed genes may
be (perceived as) dangerously close to our prior experience with eugenics. Id. at 940; see
also Andrews, supra note 27, at 913 ("It is likely that any medical intervention to curtail the
manifestation of alleged criminal genes would be applied in a discriminatory fashion.");
Randall, supra note 39, at 204 (observing that "science" has been the source of theories
perpetuating the notion "that Blacks were biologically inferior to whites").
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increase; 20 5 concomitantly, existing distrust of and alienation from
health care institutions would be reinforced.2 °6 To counter this risk, it
becomes especially important to incorporate this "mistrust of the med-
ical profession and social justice concerns . . . into ethical delibera-
tions about genetic testing and research." 20 7  Not unexpectedly,
commentators emphasize the importance of ensuring that patients be
given the opportunity to provide-or withhold-genuine informed
consent in the context of genetic testing.20 8
The foregoing considerations have an impact on the common
law doctrine of informed consent; in this context, it is evident that the
"reasonable physician" standard, which determines the nature and
scope of information that must be disclosed to a patient solely from
the perspective of the physician, and which generally has fallen out of
favor, is particularly inadequate to meet the needs of those who may
be disenfranchised from the health care system.20 9 In comparison, a
shift to a "reasonable patient" standard is one that is more likely to
benefit and protect health care consumers-even across race, gender,
and class lines. For example, judges and juries are likely to be more
sympathetic to claims onto which they can, consciously or uncon-
205. See Murphy, supra note 23, at 10 (questioning whether "genetic disease [will] be-
come another affliction of the poor" if certain steps are not taken); Randall, supra note 39,
at 204 (stating that fear and distrust lead African Americans to believe that traditional
principles of bioethics (autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice) will not pro-
tect against mistreatment and abuse of genetic information); Roberts, supra note 193, at
971 ("Racial minorities are particularly vulnerable to the misuse of genetic information.");
Dorothy E. Roberts, Reconstructing the Patient: Starting with Women of Color, in FEMINISM &
BIOETHICS, supra note 69, at 116, 117 (noting that "[b]ecause racism makes the oppressive
use of medicine so obvious to many of them, women of color may be more suspicious of
doctors' claims of beneficence"); cf Andrews, supra note 24, at 51 (noting that the expense
of genetic tests may prevent lower-income people from having access to a health care de-
vice that may grow to be an important part of health care services).
206. See Andrews, supra note 27, at 898 ("Today's geneticists reject the earlier genetic
assessments as due to poor science, and insist that their own analysis is credible. But the
incentives today (obtaining scientific prizes and funding, legitimating the social status quo)
are much the same as before, and the results look strikingly similar."); Randall, supra note
39, at 217 (noting that the fears of African Americans "are, at best, put on the back burner
and are, at worst, discounted as unreasonable").
207. Roberts, supra note 193, at 979 (noting, in addition, that "we should be less con-
cerned about overcoming Blacks' cultural resistance to genetic testing and more con-
cerned about eliminating the racist practices that underlie Blacks' skepticism about genetic
testing").
208. See Bowman, supra note 36, at 935 (noting further that patient education must be
conducted with ethnically relevant materials); Randall, supra note 39, at 234 (calling on
bioethicists to "construct[ ] a practical, ethical approach to the anxiety and fear which
would lead to community empowerment").
209. See supra notes 157-161 and accompanying text.
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sciously, graft their own perceptions of what they would like to know
prior to consenting to a given medical procedure.
210
Still, the "reasonable patient" standard does not always ade-
quately consider the life circumstances of an individual patient.
211
Most courts characterize the "reasonable patient" standard as an ob-
jective measure of the "materiality of the risk,"212 and define "reason-
ableness" as "'what a [reasonable] prudent person in the patient's
position would have decided if suitably informed.' 213 Some courts
further modify this definition by adding the phrase, "in what the phy-
sician knows or should know to be [in] the patient's position. '214 To
the extent this modifying phrase is applied, the "reasonable patient"
standard remains remarkably close to the "reasonable physician" stan-
210. This shift also is likely to facilitate a patient's bringing an informed consent claim
by reducing (although not eliminating) the cost of retaining experts. In states that main-
tain the "reasonable physician" standard, plaintiffs must incur the expense of retaining a
medical expert to establish what "'a reasonable practitioner of like training would have
disclosed in the same or similar circumstances'" and that "'the departure... from a recog-
nized standard of practice was a proximate cause of her injury.'" Weber v. McCoy, 950
P.2d 548, 552 (Wyo. 1997) (quoting Havens v. Hoffman, 902 P.2d 219, 222 (Wyo. 1995)
(quoting Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108, 112-13 (Wyo. 1989))).
Under the "reasonable patient" standard, expert testimony on the existence of a duty
to disclose is theoretically unnecessary because "the jury itself can determine the reasona-
bleness of the disclosure." FADEN & BEAucHA, supra note 44, at 32. Note, however, that
even under this standard, most plaintiffs must retain medical experts to help establish cau-
sation. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (observing that
medical experts "are normally needed on issues as to the cause of any injury or disability
suffered by the patient"). But see infra note 218 and accompanying text (noting criticisms
of the reasonable patient standard).
211. See Randall, supra note 39, at 230-31 (criticizing current bioethical principles as
Eurocentric in their valuing of the individual and autonomy and their failure to incorpo-
rate Afrocentric beliefs concerning the importance of parents and community); Wolf,
supra note 193, at 15 (noting that "universal moral rules or principles posited for the ab-
stract, generic person erase that person's gender (not to mention race, class, and other
characteristics)"). Jay Katz observes that it should not be the patient's burden to show she
has suffered a physical harm or injury; rather, the lack of full disclosure should be recog-
nized as an injury in itself. See KATz, supra note 15, at 79 ("[P] atients are wronged when
physicians begin treatment without fulfilling their disclosure obligation."). Although this
approach is appealing, it also has flaws, particularly with regard to its inherent indetermi-
nacy and its open invitation to less-than-substantial claims.
212. See FADEN & B.AucHAMp, supra note 44, at 32 (characterizing "materiality" as the
significance of the information to the decision-making process of the patient).
213. KATz, supra note 15, at 75 (alteration in original) (quoting Canterbury, 464 F.2d at
791); see FADEN & BAucHAMp, supra note 44, at 32 (stating that "[t]he reasonable person
standard requires a physician to divulge any fact that is material to a reasonable person's
decision").
214. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Largey v. Rothman,
540 A.2d 504, 508 (N.J. 1988) (per curiam).
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dard: the perspective of the physician is the lens through which liabil-
ity must be assessed.21 1
If a court were concerned only with the viewpoint of the "prudent
patient," (i.e., not modified by what the physician knew or should
have known about the position of the patient),26 there would be
more room to acknowledge aspects of the subjective position of a pa-
tient who is asked to consent to a particular medical procedure.217
However, even in this circumstance, the life experiences of the trier-
of-fact (judge or jury) may cause her to define the "prudent patient"
rather differently than a particular claimant would define the term. 211
This phenomenon may be particularly manifest should the gen-
der, race, or socioeconomic background of the judge and jury differ
215. Cf Randall, supra note 39, at 231 ("Eurocentric bioethical principles such as auton-
omy, beneficence, and informed consent do not have the same force when viewed through
the African American bioethical perspective of distrust. These principles leave considera-
ble room for individual judgment by health care practitioners.... In a racist society (such
as ours), the judgment is often exercised in a racist manner[, such as unconsented-to medi-
cal experimentation].").
216. See, e.g., Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787 (noting that the standard for disclosure "re-
mains objective with due regard for the patient's informational needs and with suitable
leeway for the physician's situation"); Daum v. Spinecare Med. Group, Inc., 61 Cal. Rptr.
2d 260, 269 n.4 (Ct. App. 1997) (defining material information as that "which the physi-
cian knows or should know would be regarded as significant by a reasonable person in the
patient's position") (citing California jury instruction BAJI No. 6.30); Percle v. St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 1289, 1300 (La. Ct. App. 1977) (adopting an objective test
for the establishment of causation, namely, "what a prudent person in plaintiffs position
would have decided if adequately informed"); Largey, 540 A.2d at 508 ("A risk would be
deemed 'material' when a reasonable patient, in what the physician knows or should know
to be the patient's position, would be 'likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of
risks' in deciding whether to forego the proposed therapy or to submit to it." (quoting
Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787)).
217. See FADEN & BEAucHAMp, supra note 44, at 33 (noting that the degree to which the
reasonable person standard incorporates factors relevant to the individual patient exists on
a continuum that depends on how literally the standard is applied "[b ] ecause application
of the abstract reasonable person standard ... requires the incorporation of specific facts
of the case, [and] the pressing question is always what the reasonable person would need
to know 'under the same or similar circumstances'").
218. See MARTHA MINow, NOT ONLY FOR MYSELF: IDENTrIY, PoLrmcs, AND THE LAW 100
(1997) (critiquing the reasonable person standard "for installing the views and beliefs of
only some people-typically, middle-class, white, Protestant, able-bodied men-rather
than helping to create new common-law categories for setting standards of care or reasona-
bleness"). See generally Anita Bernstein, Treating Sexual Harassment with Respec 111 HARv. L.
REv. 445, 450, 453 (1997) (arguing that in the context of sexual harassment, the defendant
should be held "to the standard of a respectful person" rather than the defective standard
of reasonableness); Dan M. Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in
Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 269, 321-23 (1996) (examining the role of "reasonable-
ness" and "emotion" in criminal law); Victoria Nourse, Passion's Progress: Modern Law Re-
form and the Provocation Defense, 106 YALE L.J. 1331, 1395 (1997) (proposing a provocation
defense based on emotion in light of a feminist critique of objective standards).
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from that of the plaintiff.21 9 Some commentators suggest that we
should shift our understanding of the "prudent patient" standard so
as to incorporate the perspective of the person bringing a claim.
2 20
While adapting this standard to incorporate the experiences of
"groups to which actors may belong,"221 it is equally important not to
fall into a "trap of essentialism"222 that can be as damaging as ignoring
the context of a person's life. As such, when taking the viewpoint of
the patient into account, one must avoid stereotyping each patient's
experience. As Susan Wolf has written, "[O] ne can remain alert to
difference and seek to be schooled by the varieties of experience, and
still investigate the significance of being identified with a certain
group."223
Martha Minow pointedly asks whether it is possible to devise an
alternative to the "faulty neutrality of the 'reasonable person' stan-
dard," without falling prey to the temptation to replace the "reason-
able person" standard by a "reasonable woman" or by a "reasonable
219. See supra notes 192-194, 199-207.
220. See FADEN & BEAucHAmp, supra note 44, at 33 ("If patients have a right to make
idiosyncratic choices, they may need information that would not be considered material by
reference to the standard of a reasonable person. . . ."); id. at 306 (describing the subjec-
tive standard as "the most adequate" because it is based on "the specific informational
needs of the individual patient or subject"); KATZ, supra note 15, at 78 (arguing against
"obliterating the 'subjective' person in an 'objective' mass of persons"); see also Roberts,
supra note 205, at 119 ("[Plhysicians can successfully care for patients only by considering
much more about them than the pathophysiology of their illness, including their own val-
ues and relationships.").
221. Wolf, supra note 193, at 17 (arguing that bioethics ought to look beyond dyadic
relationships like that "between a doctor and patient, between a researcher and subject, or
between a nurse and physician"); see also Roberts, supra note 205, at 116-17 (appealing to
medical ethicists to explore the perspective of women of color because the combination of
race and gender oppression "profoundly affect[s] their relationship to medical practice");
Roberts, supra note 193, at 979 (arguing that blacks' resistance to genetic testing is "based
largely on mistrust of the medical profession and social justice concerns, [and that this
reality] should be incorporated into ethical deliberations about genetic testing and re-
search"); Susan Wolf, Foreword: Bioethics-From Mirror to Window, 15 ST. Louis U. PUB. L.
REv. 183, 185 (1996) (noting that "[t]he documented persistence of racial and gender
disparities in health care made it even clearer that not all patients faced the same
problems").
222. Wolf, supra note 193, at 17; see also Mahowald, supra note 171, at 102 (noting that
"taking account of cultural, racial, and class differences can also involve generalizations
that ignore significant differences among women belonging to the same culture, race, and
class").
223. Wolf, supra note 193, at 17; see id. at 27 (arguing for the need to "travel back and
forth between specific cases and higher-order normative generalizations" to see problems
with the existing system of physician-patient relationships); see also Mahowald, supra note
171, at 106 ("Of necessity, just caring requires recognition of the link between health and
the personal and societal conditions that influence health.").
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Caribbean American gay male" standard.224 She suggests that "[o] ne
route would retain 'reasonable person' but link it to 'the circum-
stances,' where circumstances include encountering the meanings of
group identity in a given community during a specific time period. '2 25
One advantage to this approach is that it would "permit testimony and
even expert evidence about such meanings while resisting the easy but
faulty route of assigning individuals to group categories that then ac-
quire the force of a legal norm. '22 6
This approach would accomplish three important goals: The
physician would have an obligation to be attuned to her patient's
standpoint;227 the physician is less likely to be blindsided by a patient
with individualistic needs that she has not expressed to the physi-
cian;228 and the patient would have a certain degree of flexibility re-
garding the type of claims and evidence she could bring and use to
show what someone generally in her position reasonably would need
to know for consent to be informed.
Admittedly, these goals are difficult to achieve without specific
guidance. As such, it may well be worthwhile to examine and learn
from statutory provisions that attempt to supply support for this type
of structure. Perhaps the best example of this approach is the in-
formed consent statutory scheme that was developed in response to
the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
III. AN HIV-SPECIFIC MODEL OF INFORMED CONSENT
The advent of HIV/AIDS has led to a reexamination of some ba-
sic assumptions concerning the appropriate way to deliver health care
and services.229 The disease that came to be known as Acquired Im-
224. MINOW, supra note 218, at 100. Minow further notes that "the practical problems
posed by proliferating subgroup standards are immense, and so are the symbolic and psy-
chological risks of confining individuals to governmentally prescribed group categories."
Id.
225. Id. Minow suggests other routes as well, such as articulating more fully the stan-
dards of care that the law demands, or shifting burdens of care to those best able to antici-
pate them. Id. at 100-01.
226. Id. at 100.
227. See Mahowald, supra note 171, at 105 (arguing that " [d] iscovery and treatment of [a
patient's] needs are impossible without attunement to the patient's standpoint as privi-
leged epistemologically and ethically").
228. This, of course, would be one of the chief problems with a wholly subjective stan-
dard. For an excellent exploration of the difficulties inherent within objective and subjec-
tive standards, see Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REv.
813, 815-16 (1992) (including a discussion of informed consent to medical treatment).
229. For example, in 1989, in response to further understanding of the hepatitis-B virus
and HIV, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) established guidelines
urging the implementation of "universal precautions" (e.g., use of latex gloves, safe dispo-
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mune DeficiencySyndrome (AIDS) first was recognized in 1981 230 It
was not until 1983 that the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) was
determined to be the causative agent of AIDS. 23 1 In 1985, a mecha-
nism to test for antibodies to HIV was approved by the Federal Drug
Administration (FDA), specifically to allow for the screening of the
nation's blood supply.232 In 1987, the CDC issued guidelines regard-
ing HIV counseling and testing.2 3
These advances both caused extraordinary relief and signaled an
alarm.2 4 A widely accepted means of testing for HIV-antibodies, as a
significant breakthrough in the diagnosis of HIV, raised hopes that
treatment would soon follow. 23 5 However, because the initial demo-
graphic groups to be diagnosed with AIDS-gay men and injection
sal of needles and other "sharps") in dealing with blood and bodily fluids. See CDC, U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Guidelines for Prevention of Transmission of Human Immu-
nodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Health-Care and Public-Safety Workers, 38 MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. (June 23, 1989). However, it was not until the early 1990s, when the
alleged transmission of HIV from a dentist to six of his patients was made public, that both
health care providers and health care consumers began to insist on the use of such precau-
tions. CDC, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., Recommendations for Preventing Trans-
mission of Human Immunodeficiency Virus and Hepatitis B Virus to Patients During Exposure-Prone
Invasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDrrY & MORTALITY WKLV. REP. (July 12, 1991).
230. See CDC, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., Pneumocystis Pneumonia-Los An-
geles, 30 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 250, 251 (June 5, 1981) [hereinafter CDC,
Pneumocystis Pneumonia] (suggesting "the possibility of a cellular immune dysfunction ...
that predisposes individuals to opportunistic infections" in light of five case reports where
homosexual men all had cytomegalovirus (CMV), candidal mucosal infection, and
pneumocystis carinii pneumonia (PCP)).
231. See generally F. Barr-Sinoussi et al., Isolation of a T-Lymphotropic Retrovirus from a Pa-
tient at Risk for Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS), 220 SCIENCE 868, 870 (1983)
(reporting the discovery of a retrovirus that belonged to the human T-cell leukemia virus
(HTLV) family, transmitted horizontally in humans and perhaps involved in several patho-
logical syndromes, including AIDS).
232. See SENAK, supra note 50, at 181 (noting that "[t]he test was originally designed to
screen blood donations to stem the flow of transmission by that route"); see also Brett-Smith
& Friedland, supra note 48, at 28-29 (noting a marked reduction in the risk of "transfusion-
associated transmission" since March 1985 "when nationwide antibody screening of the
blood supply was introduced").
233. CDC, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Public Health Service Guidelines for
Counseling and Antibody Testing to Prevent HIV Infection and AIDS, 36 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLv. REP. 509 (Aug. 14, 1987).
234. See SENAK, supra note 50, at 167 (noting that testing for HIV permits knowledge of
one's status and the possibility of acquiring medical care, but also may serve as a means for
discrimination and mistreatment); RANDY SHILTS, AND THE BAND PLAYED ON: POLITICS,
PEOPLE, AND THE AIDS EPIDEMIC 471 (1987) (noting the concern in the gay community at
the prospect of a registry of everyone whose blood donations proved to be infected that
"such a list would amount to little more than a registry of homosexual men" that "could be
put to nefarious use in the twenty-five states where gay sexual acts remained illegal").
235. See SENAK,, supra note 50, at 181 (stating that "the HIV antibody test quickly became
the instrument by which many hoped to stop the spread of AIDS"); SHILTS, supra note 234,
at 450 (recounting the declaration of Health and Human Services Secretary Margaret
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drug users2 6-had been subject to substantial stigma and discrimina-
tion, 23 7 numerous communities raised concerns that the test would be
used to segregate and quarantine, not to conduct outreach and de-
liver treatment.23 8
Indeed, traditional informed consent doctrine would neither
meet the needs nor protect the rights of people who might seek, or be
targeted for, HIV-antibody testing. The doctrine of informed consent
was designed to meet a different need than that posed by the availabil-
ity of HIV testing. The crudeness of original informed consent doc-
trine, based on an intentional tort theory of battery, in some ways
correlated to the less sophisticated medical care that was available in
the earlier part of this century. 23 9 Although the doctrine has shifted
from requiring that a patient "consent" to touching, to requiring that
a doctor obtain "informed consent" prior to performing a medical
procedure, the focus largely remains on the medical nature of the
procedure and the risks and benefits that might be associated with its
performance. 240 The availability of a procedure that could test for the
presence of HIV antibodies brought with it a series of social risks24 1
that were not, and in fact, could not be addressed under then-existing
informed consent doctrine.
Heckler that "[t]oday's discovery [of HTLV-III antibody testing] represents the triumph of
science over a dreaded disease").
236. See CDC, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., Prevention of Acquired Immune Defi-
ciency Syndrome (AIDS): Report of Inter-Agency Recommendations, 32 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY
WKLv. REP. 101, 101 (Mar. 4, 1983) (noting that "[m]ost cases have been reported among
homosexual men with multiple sexual partners, abusers of intravenous (IV) drugs, and
Haitians"); CDC, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuMAN SERVS., Update on Acquired Immune Dqi-
ciency Syndrome (AIDS)-United States 1982, 31 MORaIDrIY & MORTALITY WKLV. REP. 507, 507
(1982) (stating that, among the early cases of AIDS, approximately 75% occurred among
homosexual or bisexual males, and that among the 20% of known heterosexual cases
(males and females), the prevalence of intravenous drug abuse was about 60%).
237. See SENAK, supra note 50, at 180-81 (noting that, with AIDS affecting disadvantaged
groups, some may desire to enact policies that will be construed as punishing those with
the disease); supra note 234 and accompanying text.
238. See SENAK, supra note 50, at 178-79 (discussing the effect of mandatory names re-
porting). See generally id. at 163-87 (discussing the importance of patient confidentiality
and testing in the context of HIV).
239. See supra notes 149-154 and accompanying text (discussing the transition from bat-
tery to negligence as the basis for informed consent when medical procedures grew more
complicated).
240. See FADEN & BEAucHAMP, supra note 44, at 131 (noting that, under theories of both
battery and negligence, a "procedure's nature, consequences, and risks, as well as its alter-
natives, all had to be transmitted").
241. See SENAX, supra note 50, at 181-82 (indicating that the test was sometimes used "to
discriminate, and to punish and exclude people with HIV from employment, schooling,
and even medical treatment"); supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text.
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A number of state legislatures heeded the call for protection
against forced testing and implemented careful counseling require-
ments.242 New York led the way by requiring consent to be indicated
in writing, and by defining informed consent to include "at least the
following" elements:
(a) an explanation of the test, including its purpose, the
meaning of its results, and the benefits of early diagnosis and
medical intervention; and
(b) an explanation of the procedures to be followed, includ-
ing that the test is voluntary, that consent may be withdrawn
at any time, and a statement advising the subject that anony-
mous testing is available; and
(c) an explanation of the confidentiality protections af-
forded confidential HIV related information under this arti-
cle, including the circumstances under which and classes of
persons to whom disclosure of such information may be re-
quired, authorized or permitted under this article or in ac-
cordance with other provisions of law or regulation.243
A person conducting an HIV-related test also is required to pro-
vide "an explanation of the nature of AIDS and HIV related illness,
information about discrimination problems that disclosure of the test
result could cause and legal protections against such discrimination,
and information about behavior known to pose risks for transmission
and contraction of HIV infection." '244
Finally, the person who communicates the test results to the per-
son tested must provide her with:
counseling or referrals for counseling: (a) for coping with
the emotional consequences of learning the result; (b) re-
garding the discrimination problems that disclosure of the
result could cause; (c) for behavior change to prevent trans-
242. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 125107(b), (f) (West Supp. 1998) (requiring
health care providers to "offer human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) information and
counseling to every pregnant patient," and clarifying that "[niothing in this section shall
be construed to require testing"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:5C-16(a) (West 1996) (stating that
"[a] physician or other health care practitioner who is the primary caregiver for a pregnant
woman or a woman who seeks treatment within four weeks of giving birth, shall... provide
the woman with information about HIV and AIDS," and that "[a] woman shall not be
denied appropriate prenatal or other medical care because she decides not to be tested for
HIV"); TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 81.105-.106, 81.109 (West 1992) (requiring
informed consent before administering an HIV test, and that "[a] positive test result may
not be revealed to the person tested without giving that person the immediate opportunity
for individual, face-to-face post-test counseling").
243. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2781(2) (McKinney 1993).
244. Id. § 2781(3).
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mission of HIV infection; (d) to inform [the patient] of avail-
able medical treatments; and (e) regarding the... need to
notify his or her contacts.245
These provisions were designed to make the patient aware of the
full range of social risks and medical benefits to be found in con-
senting to the test.246 Indeed, throughout the mid-to-late 1980s, many
AIDS experts believed that the counseling process was at least as im-
portant-if not more important-than the actual HIV-antibody
test.
24 7
What led to this extraordinary valuation of counseling? A
number of factors. First, when the antibody test initially was devel-
oped there were no treatments for the underlying HIV infection and
few for the symptoms of advanced stages of infection. 2 " Therefore,
although knowing that one was HIV-infected did not necessarily do
much for one's health or general well-being, there was optimism that
knowledge might influence an individual to practice safe sex.249
Second, as noted above, because doctors initially identified AIDS
in gay men and in intravenous drug users, it was a highly stigmatizing
condition. 25" The assumption was clear: if a person had AIDS he
245. Id. § 2781 (5).
246. See generally David W. Lyter et al., The HIV Antibody Test: Why Gay and Bisexual Men
Want orDo Not Want to Know Their Results, 102 PUB. HEALTH REPS. 468, 469 (1987) (stating
that the use of the test as a screening tool may result in "tremendous social stigma and
discrimination associated with infection with this virus").
247. See GoSTIN & LAzZARINI, supra note 48, at 80 (noting that, while testing alone may
not effect behavioral change, pre- and post-test counseling may help create "a supportive
climate in which individuals are more likely to alter their conduct prudently, regardless of
test results").
248. SeeJoNATHAN Kwrrv, AccEPTABLE RisKs 142-43 (1992) (noting that AZT, the first
drug available to fight against HIV itself, rather than manifestations of HIV-related illness,
was not developed until 1986).
249. Lewis H. Kuller & Lawrence A. Kingsley, The Epidemic of AIDS: A Failure of Public
Health Policy, 64 MILANK Q. (Supp. I) 56, 64-65 (1986) (discussing the importance of HIV
testing, particularly among people who had engaged in risky conduct, with the hope that
behavior modification would follow, and stating that "[r ] ecent changes in sexual behavior,
most notably a decrease in both the number of partners and high-risk sexual practices ...
suggest that behavioral change is an achievable goal" (citations omitted)).
250. AIDS initially was diagnosed among young gay men at least in part because they
otherwise were healthy. It was odd-and noteworthy-to discover such rare medical con-
ditions as PCP and Kaposi's Sarcoma in this population. These events were so unusual that
treating physicians related their occurrence to the CDC. See CDC, Pneumocystis Pneumo-
nia, supra note 230, at 251 (noting the unusual occurrence of pneumocystis pneumonia in
five previously healthy homosexual men). This 1981 document was the first report of what
initially, and informally, became known as "GRID" (Gay-Related Immune Deficiency), and
what the CDC later named "AIDS" (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome). See SENAK,
supra note 50, at 84. Still, as early as 1981, not insignificant numbers of drug-using and
former drug-using women were falling ill and not recovering from conditions that nor-
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either was gay or used drugs-or both.2 51 At the same time, the legal
protections available to people living with HIV/AIDS were minimal.
The Americans with Disabilities Act would not be passed until 1990
and would not begin to go into effect until 1992.252 The Federal Re-
habilitation Act of 1973 had been enacted, but was limited in applica-
bility to federal institutions or those entities that received federal
funding,2 3 thereby eliminating most employment settings. Moreover,
it was not until 1987 that the Supreme Court even hinted that the Act
might apply to people living with HIV/AIDS.254 While a number of
states and localities had passed statutes that protected people with dis-
abilities from discrimination, 255 it was quite some time before it be-
came widely accepted that people living with HIV/AIDS were people
living with a disability deserving of such protection.256
Still, despite the growing recognition of the legal rights of people
living with HIV/AIDS, the late 1980s were replete with initiatives to
quarantine people living with HLV disease;211 to preclude HIV-in-
mally are not fatal and that later came to be associated with HIV/AIDS. See GENA COREA,
THE INVISIBLE EPIDEMIC: THE STORY OF WOMEN AND AIDS 5-6 (1992).
251. Cf SENAK, supra note 50, at 84 (noting that "[tihe reaction of families was often
more severe to the news that a son or brother was dying because he had had sex with
another man than it was to the fact that he was dying").
252. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994).
253. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797, 794(a) (1994) (limiting the antidiscrimination prohibi-
tion of the Act to "any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance" or pro-
grams conducted by an executive agency).
254. See School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 282 n.7 (1987) (deciding that a non-conta-
gious carrier of TB is not barred from bringing a claim under the Rehabilitation Act and
declining to analogize to the context of AIDS because that was not the question presented
to the Court); see also Bragdon v. Abbott, 118 S. Ct. 2196, 2207 (1998) (holding that an
individual with asymptomatic HIV infection may be considered a person with a disability,
and as such, may bring a claim under the ADA); cf Daniel R Mandelker, Housing Issues, in
AIDS LAW TODAY, supra note 48, 320 (noting that in 1988, Congress amended the Fair
Housing Act to prohibit discrimination based on "handicap" in the sale or rental of hous-
ing (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604-3606 (1988))).
255. See AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION AIDS PROJECT, EPIDEMIC OF FEAR: A SURVEY OF
AIDS DISCRIMINATION IN THE 1980s & POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE 1990s, at 83-133
(1990) [hereinafter ACLU, AIDS PROJECT] (providing a survey of state disability antidis-
crimination laws as of March 1, 1990).
256. See id. at 3 (asserting that "legal protections from HIV-related discrimination have
been fragmented and inconsistent," and noting that there are gaps and definitional
problems in state and federal law). The Supreme Court recently resolved a conflict among
the circuits as to whether asymptomatic HIV infection can be a disability under the ADA.
See Bragdon, 118 S. Ct. at 2207 (holding that asymptomatic "HIV infection is a physical
impairment which substantially limits a major life activity, as the ADA defines it").
257. See SENAK, supra note 50, at 178-79. This was, in fact, the policy that was developed
by the government of Cuba. See BRODY, supra note 5, at 49.
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fected children from attending school 258 and HIV-infected adults
from teaching school;259 and to require testing of immigrants, 260 in-
mates,2 61 and others. 26 2 There was a sense of hysteria that frequently
surrounded an individual's disclosure that he or she was HIV-in-
fected.263 Indeed, many people lost their jobs, their homes, their in-
surance, and that which could not be legislated against: their family
and friends. 264 As a result, counseling came to be valued as a means
by which to assist those tested with coping with such discrimination.
Third, health care providers and public health organizations al-
most uniformly issued guidelines calling on the public to react to the
258. See generally Elizabeth B. Cooper, AJDS Law: The Impact of AIDS on American Schools
and Prisons, 1987 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 117. In many of the early cases, children became HIV-
infected as a result of the blood product they had received to treat their hemophilia prior
to the development of a test to detect HIV antibodies. Indeed, testing the blood supply
was the initial impetus for the development of such a test. Some people took extraordinary
measures to ensure that families with HIV-infected children would be barred from school:
one family's home was torched in an incident that was linked to the HIV status of the
couple's three sons. Id. at 129; see also SENAK, supra note 50, at 201 (noting the case of Ryan
White).
259. See, e.g., Chalk v. District Court, 840 F.2d 701, 712 (9th Cir. 1988) (issuing an in-junction to restore a teacher to his classroom duties after he had been assigned to adminis-
trative duties on the basis of his AIDS diagnosis).
260. See 42 C.F.R_ §§ 34.2(4), 34.3(a)(1), (b)(i-iv) (1997) (requiring HIV testing for
aliens applying for immigrant visas, student visas, refugee status, and adjustment of status
under immigration law).
261. See Alexa Freeman, HIV in Prison, in AIDS LAw TODAY, supra note 48, at 263, 269
(stating that, as of 1991, "eighteen prison systems, including the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
mandate HIV antibody testing of all prisoners in order to identify those who are positive").
262. See Scott Burris, Testing, Disclosure, and the Right to Privay, in AIDS LAw TODAY, supra
note 48, at 115, 127 (noting that "[s]ome states authorize involuntary testing of, and disclo-
sure of information about, people in prisons, mental hospitals, juvenile facilities, and resi-
dential centers for the developmentally disabled"); Donna I. Dennis, HIV Screening &
Discrimination: The Federal Example, in AIDS LAw TODAY, supra note 48, at 187, 187 (noting
that the United States government requires HIV testing in the four areas "over which it
exercises complete control-the military, the Foreign Service, the Job Corps, and immigra-
tion policy"); Larry Gostin, Traditional Public Health Strategies, in AIDS LAw TODAY, supra
note 48, at 59, 60 (indicating that compulsory screening has been employed "by the De-
partment of Defense, the State Department, the Job Corps, and the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Service").
263. See Arthur S. Leonard, Discrimination, in AIDS LAw TODAY, supra note 48, at 297, 297(stating that "a secondary epidemic of fear has accompanied the epidemic of illness and
death, generating a wave of discrimination against those identified with the disease").
264. See SENAK, supra note 50, at 84 (noting that, although discrimination is often
thought to occur only in formal relationships, such as between employer and employee, it
also occurs "in informal relationships with friends and family"); Leonard, supra note 263, at
297 (noting that a 1990 survey of civil rights agencies revealed approximately thirteen
thousand complaints of HIV-related discrimination ranging from "discrimination in access
to health care, insurance, housing, or public benefits to workplace discrimination against
employees or customers").
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facts about HIV, rather than the fear it tended to generate.265 Recog-
nizing the degree of generalized AIDS hysteria, these medical experts,
working in tandem with leadership from the gay and lesbian commu-
nity,26 acknowledged the need for certain protections, consistent
with public health principles, to ensure that individuals came forward
to be tested and to receive HIV-related care, as it became available,
rather than to drive the epidemic underground.267
In addition to mandating HIV-related counseling to ensure that
an individual was prepared to receive his test results,268 the essential
elements of this new approach included extensive confidentiality pro-
tections to help preclude incidents of discrimination, 269 and the en-
actment of provisions that would provide a cause of action if an HIV-
infected individual suffered from discrimination. 270 Indeed, these ele-
ments provide the underpinning to comprehensive legislation passed
in many states in the late 1980s to help stem the spread of the epi-
demic and its ancillary effects.
2 7
'
265. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, American Public Health Ass'n, Ameri-
can Medical Ass'n, Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York, position statements (on file
with author). Such facts included that HIV was difficult to transmit, except through signifi-
cant exposure to the blood or bodily fluids of an HIV-infected person. Despite a mailing
containing these facts to every household in the United States by the Surgeon General in
1987, considerable misinformation continued to influence public perception and behav-
ior. See generally C. EVERETT Koop, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, SUR-
GEON GENERAL'S REPORT ON ACQUIRED IMMUNE DEFICIENCY SYNDROME (1987) (reporting
factual information about AIDS in order to educate and alleviate fear).
266. See Ronald Bayer, Public Health Policy and the AIDS Epidemic: An End to HIVException-
alism?, 324 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1500, 1501 (1991) (noting that "[i]n the first decade of the
AIDS epidemic, an alliance of gay leaders, civil libertarians, physicians, and public health
officials began to shape a policy for dealing with AIDS"). This Article posits that, at least in
part, the changing demographics of HIV/AIDS (i.e., the increasing percentage of low-
income, people of color diagnosed with AIDS) has precipitated the growing acceptance of
more restrictive public policy and legislative approaches to people living with HIV/AIDS.
See generally id. at 1503 (noting that "policy directed toward the poor is often characterized
by authoritarian tendencies").
267. See SENAK, supra note 50, at 166 (discussing "HIV exceptionalism," a doctrine that
"divorced HIV from the traditional model for handling sexually transmitted diseases" in
order to encourage people to come forward for testing).
268. See supra text accompanying notes 243-245 (discussing New York's informed con-
sent law). See generally SENAK, supra note 50, at 168 (noting that "[a] person should know as
much as possible about an HIV test before taking it" because "[i]t is a test of your insurabil-
ity, of your friends, of your family, of your relationship with a spouse or significant other, of
your employer, of your legal rights, and of your physician's loyalty to you").
269. See SENAK, supra note 50, at 166 ("State legislatures around the nation, particularly
in the epicenters of the AIDS epidemic, enacted laws providing for the confidentiality of
people who stepped forward to take an HIV-antibody test.").
270. Id. (noting that "[ult became illegal in many jurisdictions to reveal to third parties
that a person had tested antibody-positive").
271. See generally ACLU, AIDS PROJECT, supra note 255, at 88-133 (containing an appen-
dix of state disability discrimination laws); Leonard, supra note 263, at 297-98 (noting that,
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This approach to conducting a diagnostic test was significantly
different from most other pre-test procedures because it provided an
externally imposed structure to ensure that an individual considering
HIV testing was aware of the social risks, as well as the medical bene-
fits, of testing.272
By the early 1990s, however, sufficient attention had been drawn
to this phenomenon that a new phrase was coined: "HIV exceptional-
ism. ' ' 273 Most frequently, this term is used in a derogatory manner,
implying that consent procedures are inappropriate and exist largely
because of a "powerful AIDS lobby," primarily supported by gay men.
Therefore, some argue, we should curtail such protections and treat
HIV/AIDS the way we treat other conditions. 274 At times, however,
health care professionals caring for people living with HLV/AIDS also
use the phrase to draw attention to the significant ways in which soci-
ety constructively has come to terms with the epidemic, recognizing
that this disease does, in fact, require a new approach to testing and
prevention efforts. 275
The debate concerning HIV exceptionalism, however, begs the
question of whether existing standards of informed consent-in the
realm of HIV and otherwise-are appropriate. Instead of questioning
whether HIV-related policies should reflect approaches developed re-
garding other medical conditions, it is important to consider whether
the lessons learned from HIV/AIDS should more directly influence
the development of policy concerning health conditions generally,
and genetic testing specifically.
The statutory proposal described in the next section provides a
unique response to the view that HIV-related pre-test counseling con-
stitutes a form of inappropriate HIV exceptionalism.2 76 This proposal
during the early days of HIV, there was no existing body of law to deal with discrimination
due to a contagious condition, and that, as the epidemic progressed through the 1980s,
"lawyers, judges and legislators responded to the need for answers by adopting disability
discrimination law.., to [address] this new problem").
272. See supra text accompanying notes 243-246.
273. See Bayer, supra note 266, at 1500 (coining the term "HIV exceptionalism" to indi-
cate that AIDS had not fallen under "the [traditional] policies developed to control sexu-
ally transmitted diseases or other communicable conditions," such as use of public health
registries and quarantine).
274. See Bayer, supra note 266, at 1503 (noting that "the effort to sustain a set of polities
treating HIV infection as fundamentally different from all other public health threats will
be increasingly difficult").
275. SeeSENA, supra note 50, at 87 (noting that "[tihe public health strategy to fight the
epidemic was based on creating an atmosphere that would encourage people to come
forward voluntarily to be tested").
276. See generally Bayer, supra note 266, at 1503 ("[T] he effort to sustain a set of policies
treating HIV infection as fundamentally different from all other public threats will be in-
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asserts that the difference between HIV disease and other conditions
is best minimized, not by reducing HIV-related counseling, but by in-
creasing the requirements for counseling in other medical con-
texts.27 7 Such increased requirements will enhance the likelihood
that the consent granted is, indeed, informed consent.
IV. TowARDS A NEw MODEL OF INFORMED CONSENT: MEETING THE
CHALLENGE OF GENETIC TESTING
A. Introduction
It is not possible for this Article to resolve the full host of conflicts
and problems that have been highlighted regarding the informed
consent doctrine and its application. Instead, this Part seeks to iden-
tify a core set of principles that can be used to guide the development
of this doctrine through the potential land mines of new medical tech-
nology, changing reimbursement systems, and individual needs that
may occur in the context of genetic testing.
27 8
As noted previously, unless legislated by Congress, or perhaps a
state assembly, traditional principles of informed consent generally do
not apply to the drawing of blood to perform diagnostic tests. Thus,
statutorily required pre-test counseling and obtaining of written con-
sent as preconditions to HIV-antibody testing are significant. 279 Legis-
lative approval of these requirements reflects a consensus among
public health professionals that this approach was essential both for
the emotional and physical well-being of the person considering test-
ing, and for the general public health.2 8 °
The context of genetic testing today is quite similar to the context
in which researchers first identified HIV and developed a test that
could detect its antibodies. Medical treatment is, at best, limited; soci-
etal stigma and discrimination exist, with limited means of recourse,
especially with regard to insurance and employment; the scientific
community is urging caution, but the market and the political envi-
ronment are making the tests more widely available; and the medical
creasingly difficult. Inevitably, HIV exceptionalism will be viewed as a relic of the epi-
demic's first years.").
277. Cf Gabriel Rotello, AIDS Is Still an Exceptional Disease, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 22, 1997, at
A23 (arguing that HIV is still a unique exceptional disease and that confidentiality should
be maintained).
278. See Andrews, supra note 27, at 897 ("To a great extent, it will be the law that will be
the caretaker of our values as we decide upon the proper uses of genetic technologies.").
279. See supra notes 47-54,143-144, and 242-247.
280. See Bayer, supra note 266, at 1501 (noting the existence of a "broad consensus that
... people should be tested only with their informed voluntary and specific consent").
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profession does not quite know what to do with the information the
testing can provide or how to advise patients. 281
Not surprisingly, the core set of elements identified as essential to
appropriate pre-test genetic counseling and consent procedures look
remarkably similar to those valued so highly in the context of HIV
testing and counseling. 282 This approach attempts not only to warrant
that patients who seek such testing are provided with a standard re-
view of risks and benefits that might inure as a result of being tested,
but also to ensure that patients have the opportunity to have a full
discussion (with health care providers, counselors, and family mem-
bers) regarding the implications-positive and negative-that might
follow a decision to be tested.283
As the HIV epidemic showed, it is not wise to allow hospital com-
mittees and doctors' offices to blunder into a "standard of care" re-
garding genetic pre-test counseling. 284 Instead, states should enact
appropriate statutory protections to ensure that each person who con-
siders genetic testing is the ultimate decision maker regarding the ad-
ministration of such tests. 285 Ideally, such a law would be enacted
federally, in order to provide the greatest and most consistent protec-
tion.286 However, because the regulation of general health and well-
281. See supra notes 69-81, 91-111 and accompanying text.
282. See generally Ellen Wright Clayton, Informed Consent and Genetic Research, in GENETIC
SECRETS, supra note 3, at 126, 126-35 (reviewing the numerous considerations to be shared
with participants in genetic research protocols). See also infra notes 283, 285, 290 and ac-
companying text.
283. See Andrews, supra note 27, at 918 ("[T]he law should guarantee that individuals
can refuse genetic testing and other genetic interventions, that they receive accurate infor-
mation upon which to base their decisions about using genetic technologies, that they
control access to their genetic test results, and that they are protected from discrimination
based on their genotype."); Geller et al., supra note 172, at 1970-72 (discussing the impor-
tance of informing potential testees about the ramifications of genetic testing, and provid-
ing guideposts to counseling); Patenaude, supra note 7, at 404 (observing that "genetic
counseling must involve a two-way dialogue").
284. See supra Part III (noting the importance of pre-test HIV counseling as proscribed
by statutory provisions); supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text (discussing how financial
pressures can affect the doctor-patient relationship in the absence of a legal standard to
guide diagnostic testing).
285. See supra notes 243-245 and accompanying text (discussing New York's informed-
consent legislation); see also Andrews, supra note 7, at 994 (noting that "[v]arious blue
ribbon panels of government, ethics organizations, and entities like the Institute of
Medicine have already concluded that, due to the various psychological and social risks of
genetic testing, genetics services should be voluntary"). Andrews further observes that na-
tional advisory groups have stressed the importance of incorporating education and coun-
seling into any genetic testing program. Id. at 977.
286. Legislation also should guard against discrimination in insurance, employment,
and the like. See Malinowski & Blatt, supra note 1, at 1302 (arguing that national legislation
is needed to overcome regulatory disparities in state insurance law and the preemptive
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being is an area in which the federal government traditionally defers
to the states, it is necessary to look to each state's legislature to enact
protective legislation.287 One of the richest sources from which these
statutes can be developed is the statutory model of HIV-related coun-
seling and testing that constitutes the standard of care in the United
States.
B. A Model Statute for Informed Consent to Genetic Testing for Life-
Threatening Conditions
A model statute, while ambitious, is important to contemplate.
Its roots appropriately are found in H1V testing and consent statutes
and in a New York statute that sets forth pre-test counseling and con-
sent requirements for genetic testing, the first state to do so.288 Nota-
bly, the design of New York's genetic testing statutory scheme 289 draws
directly from the state's HIV testing statute.29°
effect of ERISA); infra notes 321-322 and accompanying text (discussing how insurers gain
access to confidential test results and reject coverage based on this information, and how
employers may use genetic test results to take adverse actions against employees).
287. Cf Report, supra note 23, at 87 ("[It would be impractical and unwise to try to
resolve all of these [complex, ethical, societal, and legal] problems in a single omnibus bill.
... [I]nitial legislation in the field should have as its aim assuring strict confidentiality of
the collection, retention, use and dissemination of genetic information."). This is the
highest priority, in part, because "[fluture examination of [a] DNA sample .. .might
exceed the intended use granted by the original consent." Id. As such, it "might be used
in ways that are adverse to the subject in ways unforeseeable at the time permission to test
was granted and therefore not implicit in the consent initially given." Id.
288. See N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw § 79-1 (McKinney Supp. 1998).
289. See id. Only three other states have enacted statutes that reflect an interest in en-
suring that consent to genetic testing is informed or that test results are protected,
although none of these statutes is as comprehensive as the New York law. See GA. CODE
ANN. §§ 33-54-(3), (4) (1996) (requiring prior written consent to genetic testing and
prohibiting insurers from using such information for any nontherapeutic purpose); 410
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 513/20(a) (West 1997) (stating that an insurer may "not seek infor-
mation derived from genetic testing for use in connection with a policy of accident and
health insurance"); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-48 (West Supp. 1998) (calling upon the Com-
missioner of Health and Senior Services to promulgate regulations "governing procedures
for obtaining informed written consent" for genetic testing and further providing that
these provisions "shall not apply to newborn screening requirements established by State
or federal law").
290. Compare N.Y. CIv. RGHTs LAw § 79-1(2) (a) (providing that "[n]o person shall per-
form a genetic test on a biological sample taken from an individual without [ ] prior writ-
ten informed consent") with N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2781 (1) (McKinney 1993) (stating
that "no person shall order the performance of an HIV related test without first receiving
the written, informed consent of the subject of the test"). See also KoTVAL, supra note 55, at
29 ("Although the public health concern related to HIV testing does not directly apply to
genetic testing, the social consequences of the misuse of genetic information are similar to
those related to knowledge about HIV information.").
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1. The Model Statute: Essential Elements of Pre-Test Genetic Counsel-
ing.-Consistent with the statutory model for HIV pre-test counseling
and consent, the genetic testing model statute should start with the
requirement that no genetic testing shall occur without the signed
and dated informed consent of the person to be tested.291 The con-
sent form itself should be designed to ensure that the patient is given
sufficient information so that her consent-or refusal to consent-is
informed. Its contents should include the following: a description of
the test and a statement of its purpose;2 9 2 a description of the dis-
ease(s) or condition(s) for which a test will be conducted;293 an expla-
nation of the risks of stigma and discrimination; 294 and assurances
that the patient's medical confidentiality will be protected, with any
pertinent exceptions specifically stated.295  Indeed, these require-
ments would be appropriate for virtually any diagnostic test that re-
quires minimal invasion but whose results, if positive, carry significant
social risks.29 6
The model statute also must specifically address concerns unique
to genetic testing. The New York genetic testing statute provides an
important starting point. For example, the statute appropriately man-
dates that individuals considering testing should be informed of "the
level of certainty[, if known,] that a positive test result for that disease
or condition serves as a predictor of such disease"; 297 they should be
provided with a statement that only those tests authorized will be per-
291. See N.Y. Crv. RicHrs LAw § 79-l(2)(a); see also Report, supra note 23, at 87
("[L]egislation should require that genetic tests must be preceded by a signed document
assuring the informed consent of the person to be tested. Such consent must be preceded
by pre-test counseling consisting of an explanation of the test, including its purpose, poten-
tial use, limitations, interpretation and the consequences of test results.").
292. See N.Y. Cirv. RiGHTs LAw § 79-1(2) (b) (1), (2).
293. Id. § 79-1(2) (b) (4).
294. Cf N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2781(3) (including disclosure of risks of stigma and
discrimination attendant to a positive HIV test).
295. See Report, supra note 23, at 87 (affirming that any authorization for genetic testing
.must specifically provide that further disclosure is prohibited"); Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy
and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEX. L. REv. 1, 42 (1997) (noting
that " [c] onsiderable evidence exists of a strong consumer desire for health care privacy");
see also infra notes 311-323 and accompanying text.
296. See supra notes 22-25, 49-50, 95-111, 234-238, 250-264, infra notes 308-310 and ac-
companying text.
297. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTs LAW § 79-1(2) (b) (5).
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formed;2 9 8 and they must be given information regarding other op-
tions to assess their risk of disease.299
Provisions not currently codified in New York, but which must be
incorporated into the model statute, include the requirement that the
counselor provide a review of the available treatment options, if
any;30 the potential for inaccurate test results;3 0 1 the costs of testing
and counseling, if any; and the risk of transmission to offspring.
302
The patient also should be reassured that she can withdraw her con-
sent-to having the blood drawn, having the test processed, or having
the results told to her-at any time.
This model statute is designed to ensure that a patient has the
opportunity to explore the range of risks and benefits that may attend
to a decision to consent or refuse to test for particular traits that reveal
an increased risk for life-threatening illness. The areas of heightened
sensitivity primarily fall into three categories: treatment options; dis-
298. Id. § 79-1(2) (b) (7). The statute further states that a "general waiver" that does not
comply with the foregoing "shall not constitute informed consent," unless executed for
research purposes. Id. § 79-1(2) (c). This provision is especially important in light of the
advent of tests that can detect more than one trait. See Wachbroit, supra note 1, at 132-33.
The consent form also should contain a statement that, either prior to the test or following
receipt of a positive result, "the individual... may wish to consider further independent
testing, consult their physician or pursue genetic counseling." N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAw § 79-
1(2) (b) (3). :
299. See McKinnon et al., supra note 5, at 1218 (encouraging counselors to discuss the
"feasibility of alternative measures" to genetic testing with their patients).
300. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
301. See McKinnon et al., supra note 5, at 1218 (directing counselors to discuss the "accu-
racy of the [genetic] test").
302. See generally George C. Cunningham, A Public Health Perspective on the Control of Pre-
dictive Screening for Breast Cancer, 7 HALTH MATmrx 31, 41 (1997) (arguing that "[t]estees
must be informed of... the current limitations on our knowledge of the consequences of
potential interventions [with respect to breast cancer]"); Lerman et al., supra note 104, at
1886 (noting that risks of genetic testing include "uncertainties inherent in cancer risk
figures, the absence of proven strategies for preventing cancer in carriers . . . and the
potential for negative psychological consequences of learning one's genetic status" (foot-
note omitted)); McKinnon et al., supra note 5, at 1218 (urging counselors to discuss "the
life-altering impact testing may have on the individual"). In addition to face-to-face pre-
test counseling, providing the patient with written or videotaped information to reinforce
her understanding of the test, as well as the information it may reveal, may encourage the
patient to consider her options further in a more comfortable setting, such as her home.
See id. (noting that written summaries "allow[ ] the person to refer to the information at a
later date, and to share it with family members and support people"); infta notes 344-345
and accompanying text (discussing the methods and costs of educating the public about
pre- and post-test genetic counseling).
303. See Geller et al., supra note 172, at 1469 (arguing that "those considering genetic
testing must be given every chance to rethink and confirm their final decision"). This
reinforces the principle that medical care generally, and the testing process specifically, is
available for the patient's benefit, not the physician's. See KATZ, supra note 15, at 83-84
(arguing that informed consent serves the benefit of patient self-determination).
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closure to family; and confidentiality concerns, particularly as they
pertain to discrimination.
Physicians must provide an explanation of the correlation, if
known, between carrying a particular genetic trait and developing a
serious illness because an assessment of this risk may have a significant
impact on an individual's decision to pursue testing-particularly if
treatment options are limited.30 4 It should also be the responsibility
of the physician and genetic counselor to know and to describe to the
patient the range of treatment that may be available. For example,
the fact that there is no treatment for Huntington's disease contrib-
utes significantly to the low rate of testing among those at risk.30 5 Sim-
ilarly, the lack of palatable treatment options may reasonably deter a
woman from testing for the BRCA genes;306 alternatively, for a woman
willing to undergo prophylactic mastectomy or oophorectomy, being
tested either can obviate this action or reaffirm her decision.30 7
The nature of genetically linked illness ensures that among the
most troubling concerns of a person considering genetic testing are
likely to be: "What will this information reveal about me and my fam-
ily"? and "What information should I disclose to my family"?
Although having a genetic trait for cancer is not contagious,308 learn-
ing that one has such a trait raises painful questions about disclosure
to one's siblings, partner, children, and parents. Moreover, because
genetic flaws are transmissible, a woman who wishes to bear children,
but has not yet done so, faces complex dilemmas concerning the risk
of transmission to her future children. 0 9 If she already has children,
304. See Biesecker, supra note 7, at 152 (predicting that "[o]nce there is sufficient evi-
dence that a disease can be effectively treated or prevented... [g]enetic tests will become
more routine").
305. See supra notes 71, 76 and 78 and accompanying text.
306. See supra notes 92-95 and accompanying text.
307. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text.
308. See Lori B. Andrews, Torts and the Double Helix: Malpractice Liability for Failure to Warn
of Genetic Risks, 29 Hous. L. Rxv. 149, 177-78 (1992) (comparing uncommunicable genetic
disorders with AIDS or other communicable diseases, for which some argue disclosure to
current and former partners is necessary). As noted earlier, knowing that one has a trait
for a particular type of cancer, or other life-threatening condition, raises other questions
concerning disclosure, especially to family members. See id. at 178 ("Since genetic disor-
ders are not communicable, one can argue that no legitimate reason exists for disclosing
them to a spouse. However, the spouse may have great interest in the genetic information
in order to protect any potential children from risk."); Rothenberg, supra note 27, at 118
(noting that in the orthodox Jewish Community, there is fear that genetic testing may
threaten the privacy of families, or hamper the prospects of marriage).
309. See Rothenberg, supra note 27, at 122-23 (discussing a mother's decision whether to
terminate a pregnancy after learning of genetic mutation in a parent). Of course, these
concerns also must be addressed by men considering genetic testing. SeeJoseph M. Hea-
ley, Jr., The Legal Obligations of Genetic Counselors, in GENETICS AND THE LAw 1169, 72 (Aubrey
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she must confront difficult questions regarding disclosure to them,
because they also may carry her genetic predisposition to the
illness.310
Legislatively prescribed confidentiality provisions-and any gaps
therein-can have a significant impact on a person's decision to con-
sent to genetic testing.311 As such, it is prudent to set forth, with as
much specificity as possible, the confidentiality protections that ought
to be incorporated into the proposed model statute. Once again, it
makes sense to start with existing law.
The confidentiality provisions of the New York genetic testing
statute are similar to the requirements found in the state's HIV testing
law. Both statutes attempt to protect against breaches of confidential-
ity in two ways: by mandating that the counselor identify the name of
the person, categories of persons, or organizations to whom the test
results may be disclosed, 312 and by providing that disclosure of results
to anyone not named on the original informed consent form cannot
occur without the further informed consent of the tested individ-
ual."'3 Notwithstanding some important exceptions, 314 all records re-
lated to the genetic test are deemed confidential.3 1 5
Miluski & GeorgeJ. Annas eds., 1980) (noting that the decisions at stake in genetic coun-
seling apply to couples deciding whether to conceive); see also supra notes 77, 99-107 and
accompanying text.
310. These are excruciating questions. See Rothenberg, supra note 27, at 122 (emphasiz-
ing that reproductive decision making will grow only more complicated as it becomes pos-
sible to select embryos with normal BRCA1 genes for implantation, and as genetic testing
increasingly becomes available to pregnant women). While the patient must decide how to
respond to these questions, she must be given the opportunity to discuss them during both
pre-test and post-test counseling. See Andrews, supra note 7, at 967-68, 1005 (discussing the
range of genetic testing related dilemmas faced by women during pregnancy).
311. See McKinnon et al., supra note 5, at 1218 ("At-risk persons must understand the
advantages and disadvantages of sequestering genetic information and that, even with pro-
tections in place, confidentiality cannot be guaranteed."); Rothenberg, supra note 27, at
112 (discussing how insurers are not prohibited from "requiring or requesting genetic
testing . . . [and] results," and that this information may be used to "deny coverage or
affect the terms and conditions of insurance"); Schwartz, supra note 295, at 22 (stating that,
with respect to genetic testing, people will avoid seeking care rather than risk loss of em-
ployment and social discrimination); supra text accompanying note 243.
312. See N.Y. CIv. RIGHTs LAw § 79-1(3) (a) (McKinney Supp. 1998); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH
LAw § 2782(1) (McKinney 1993 & Supp. 1998).
313. See N.Y. Cirv. RIGHTs Lw § 79-1(3) (a); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2782(5)(a). The
genetic testing statute also provides that the biological (blood) sample shall be destroyed
within 60 days, unless otherwise specified in the written consent form. N.Y. Cxv. RIGHTS
LAw § 79-1(2) (b) (7), (2) (f). There are some rare exceptions to these provisions in both
the genetic testing and HIV statutes. See id. § 79-1(4); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2782(1) (c)-
(p).
314. See N.Y. Civ. Rights Law § 791(3) (a), 4(a-d), (6), (7), (8); infra note 318.
315. N.Y. CIv. RGHTS LAw § 79-1(3).
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The New York genetic testing statute also incorporates a unique
provision prohibiting the incorporation of the results of an individ-
ual's genetic test "into the records of a non-consenting individual who
may be genetically related to the tested individual, '31 6 and further
provides that no "inferences [shall] be drawn, used, or communicated
regarding the possible genetic status of the non-consenting individ-
ual."3" 7 These statutory elements are crucial because genetic test re-
sults for a particular individual may reveal genetic information about
family members who do not wish to be tested or who may draw inaccu-
rate conclusions.318
Notably, however, none of these confidentiality provisions applies
to authorized insurers, and the statute does not mandate that patients
be informed of this exception.3 19 The risk of discrimination by insur-
ance companies is not insignificant and is a matter that the patient
should consider.32 ° When a patient seeks insurance reimbursement,
the insurance company will know that the patient wanted to be tested
(an indication that she may perceive herself to be at risk for a particu-
lar genetic condition), and may learn the results of the test.3 2 ' The
company may then use, or attempt to use, that knowledge as a means
of restricting insurance coverage.322 If the employer is self-insured,
316. Id. § 79-1(3)(b).
317. Id.
318. See KorvAL, supra note 55, at 16.
319. See N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAw § 79-1(6). In addition, the statute is not designed to apply
to any test "in routine use that has been or may be hereafter found to be associated with a
genetic variation," id. § 79-1(1) (a), to genetic testing of newborn infants, id. § 79-1(7), or to
specified, anonymous research, id. § 79-1(9).
320. See Biesecker, supra note 7, at 150 (noting that "[i]f a federal law is passed that
protects clients from insurance and employment discrimination based on a genetic condi-
tion or risk, one of the concerns about confidentiality will be addressed").
321. See Geller et al., supra note 172, at 1471 (noting that "insurance providers may gain
access to [patients'] genetic test results through their physician's records, hospital records,
or disclosure by the participant in an insurance application process").
322. See UCSF Cancer Center, supra note 34 (reporting on a study in the journal Science
which showed that "47 percent of people questioned on health insurance applications
about genetic disorders were subsequently rejected for coverage"); see also supra notes 28,
33-34, 79-80, 108-111 and 321.
States are just beginning to enact legislation regarding genetic testing and insurance;
of the handful that have done so, most permit test results to be used, so long as "informed
consent" is given, regarding the issuance of life and health insurance. See, e.g., ARiz. Rv.
STAT. ANN. § 20-448.02(A) (West Supp. 1997) (stating that genetic testing shall not be per-
formed without "specific written informed consent" and that results are "privileged and
confidential"); CAL. INS. CODE § 10148 (West Supp. 1998) (asserting that "[n]o insurer
shall require a test for the presence of a genetic characteristic for the purpose of determin-
ing insurability other than in accordance with the informed consent and privacy provisions
of this article"); HAw. REV. STAT. ANN. § 431:1OA-118(a), (c) (Michie 1998) (stating that,
while no insurer may use genetic information to deny or limit any coverage, this limitation
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there also is a risk that the testee's employer will learn her test re-
suIts.A23 As such, a model statute ought to ensure that insurers are not
permitted to obtain genetic test results without explicit consent by an
individual. Absent this provision, patients must be informed of this
gap in confidentiality protection.
To guard further against discrimination by insurers or employers,
and in this way to encourage genetic testing, it may be especially ap-
propriate to make available anonymous genetic testing. Anonymous
testing has been used widely in the context of HIV.3 24 Under this ap-
does not apply to "life insurance, disability income insurance, and long-term care insur-
ance"); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-39-5-2 (Michie 1993) (requiring written consent for an insur-
ance company to obtain test results); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 72A.139 (West Supp. 1998)
(stating that life insurance companies can conduct genetic tests, but only with the individ-
ual's written informed consent); N.Y. INs. LAW § 2612(a), (e) (McKinney Supp. 1998)
(mandating that insurers receive written informed consent prior to requiring individuals
to be tested, but also permitting "adverse underwriting decision[s]" on the basis of the
test).
Apparently only Georgia and New Jersey prohibit insurers from using genetic tests to
determine insurability. See GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-1 (4) (1996) (noting that the intent of
this section is to prohibit insurers "from using information derived from genetic testing to
deny access to accident and sickness insurance"); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:30-12(f) (West
Supp. 1998) (prohibiting "any unfair discrimination against an individual in the applica-
tion of the results of a genetic test or genetic information in the issuance, withholding,
extension, or renewal of a policy of life insurance").
Cf HAw. REv. STAT. ANN. § 431:1OA-118(a) (1) (prohibiting insurers-except those
providing life, disability, or long-term care insurance-from using an individual's or family
member's genetic information to deny or limit any coverage); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-39-5-
2(e) (Michie 1993) (stating that except for life insurance companies, insurers cannot use
test results to exclude a person from coverage if they were received "inadvertently").
323. See Rothenberg, supra note 27, at 114 (noting that employers offering self-funded
plans can alter benefits for specific conditions or procedures in light of genetic informa-
tion). Despite attempts to limit the flow of information between the employer and its
insurance arm, the transfer of information between these entities is not unusual. See id.;
Mark A. Rothstein, The Law of Medical and Genetic Privacy in the Workplace, in GENETIC
SECRETS, supra note 3, at 281, 290-91 ("[A] llowing access to the [genetic] information facili-
tates surreptitious discrimination by the unknown number of employers determined to
exclude form the workplace all individuals with certain genetic traits, predispositions, or
conditions."). Furthermore, in the case of self-insured plans, many state and local (ge-
netic) antidiscrimination provisions are pre-empted by ERISA. See Rothenberg, supra note
27, at 109-10.
While both the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1994), and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994), prohibit certain types of
disability-based discrimination, it remains to be seen whether these laws will apply to ge-
netic flaws. See supra note 256 (discussing the Supreme Court's recent resolution of
whether the ADA applies to asymptomatic HIV). Of course, even if these laws do apply, a
patient's vindication of her rights through litigation can be a long, painful, and ultimately
uncertain process.
324. See SENAK, supra note 50, at 169-70 (discussing anonymous testing in the context of
HIV). A number of states and localities have established anonymous test sites. See N.Y.
PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2781(4) (McKinney 1993) (requiring health care providers, who are
unauthorized and unable to provide anonymous HIV tests, to refer patients seeking anony-
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proach, a person seeking to be tested is given a number, or other
means by which her test sample will be tracked, without revealing her
identity. Standard pre-test counseling is required; post-test counseling
occurs when the testee returns for her results.3 25
Because the test is anonymous, and it is impossible for the test site
to conduct follow-up without the testee returning to the facility, this
approach also provides a person with an easily exercised "opt-out,"
should she decide she is not yet ready to learn her test results.3 26
Anonymous testing has been an important vehicle for encouraging
HIV testing, especially in the context of ongoing stigma and discrimi-
nation.327 Unfortunately, expense is among the greatest barriers to
making such programs available in the context of genetic testing.328
As already noted, a dialogue between the physician or counselor
and the patient is the essential prerequisite to voluntary and informed
medical decision making.329 The model statute is designed to provide
the structure in which this dialogue can occur. As reluctant as health
care providers, or counselors, may be to discuss issues such as insur-
ance, confidentiality, and discrimination with people who are consid-
ering testing, it is vitally important that they do so. 33 0 In the context
mous testing "to a test site which does provide anonymous testing"); HIV Testing: Voluntary
Testing Programs Expanded Around the Nation, HEALTH LETTER ON THE CDC, July 7, 1997,
available in 1997 WL 7716417 [hereinafter Voluntary Testing] (offering information about
anonymous testing sites nationwide via a toll-free hotline).
325. See SENAK, supra note 50, at 169.
326. Cf KATz, supra note 15, at 104-05 (providing an overview of the contemporary de-
bate over patient self-determination); Groopman, supra note 92, at 42 (stating that patients
at the author's particular medical institution may elect not to know genetic test results
immediately, but may wait or even change their minds and never know the results).
327. See SENAK, supra note 50, at 169-70 (noting that anonymous testing protects one
from adverse consequences from "an employer, a physician, a parent, a teacher, or, most
important of all, an insurance company").
328. See Rothstein, supra note 110, at 458-59 (noting that an insurer will not pay for an
anonymous genetic test, so that it would be restricted to those who can afford it, and that
genetic tests are complex in comparison to the "relatively easy" task of establishing HIV
seropositivity). The comparatively lower cost of HIV tests, in tandem with the desire of
public health officials to stem the spread of the epidemic through testing, were strong
reasons for public entities to pay to establish anonymous testing sites. See Voluntary Testing,
supra note 324 (discussing state and corporate sponsorship of National HIV Testing Day).
Similar incentives do not currently exist regarding genetic testing. See Rothstein, supra
note 110, at 458 (discussing the lack of insurance funding for anonymous genetic testing).
329. See supra notes 177-181, 184-196 and accompanying text; see also KATz, supra note
15, at 78 (noting that "[s]afeguarding self-determination requires assessing whether pa-
tients' informational needs have been satisfied by asking them whether they understand
what has been explained to them").
330. See Burke et al., supra note 83, at 998 (arguing that counseling should take into
account "[q] uality of life, insurance concerns, and other personal considerations"); Geller
et al., supra note 172, at 1471 ("Participants should be informed that genetic testing for
cancer susceptibility may limit their ability to obtain health, life, or disability insurance,
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of such powerful diagnostic blood tests, a failure to ensure that a pa-
tient's "consent" truly is informed is tantamount to testing without
consent.331 Making the disclosures described herein, and having the
attendant discussions, reflect an acknowledgment that a person is
more than the disease she may have. 3 2 For some people, the counter-
vailing realities of their lives may lead them to conclude that it is inap-
propriate to be tested.33 3 As difficult as it sometimes may be for
"outsiders" to understand this decision, so long as it is an informed
decision, it must be accepted. 3 4 Proceeding in the manner set forth
in the model statute can help foster self-determination for the person
considering genetic testing. 3 5 Indeed, this process would reinforce
may lead to limitations in coverage, or may result in higher premiums for insurance prod-
ucts."); Wertz, supra note 56, at 327 (pointing out that, despite legal and ethical emphasis
on privacy, disclosure of genetic information to health insurers and employers is rarely
discussed in today's counseling).
331. Cf KATZ, supra note 15, at 84; Burris & Gostin, supra note 3, at 140 (noting that
completely voluntary testing requires adequate information, not merely a signature on a
consent form).
332. See KATZ, supra note 15, at xix (indicating that, because doctors sometimes engross
themselves with the "disease in the body in the bed," the physician-patient relationship
becomes depersonalized).
333. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 193, at 976 (noting that values other than patient au-
tonomy, such as "family integrity and physician responsibility, are as important as individ-
ual rights and have been downplayed as a result of Western cultural biases on the part of
the medical and bioethics communities"); Groopman, supra note 92, at 42 (describing a
patient's father who opposed genetic testing because, having fled from Poland prior to the
Nazi invasion, he feared the potential abuse of genetic information). See also supra notes
23-24, 28-29, 33-34, 75-80, 96-111, 308-311 and 320-333 (discussing the lack of available
treatment, potential psychological ramifications, and risk of discrimination as reasons,
among others, that some people reject the option of genetic testing).
334. See McKinnon et al., supra note 5, at 1218 ("The person's right not to know
[whether they carry genetic alterations] must be respected."); Wertz, supra note 56, at 324
(arguing for nondirective genetic counseling, which "means helping clients determine
what decisions are best for them, in view of their own values and goals," even if the medical
professional disagrees with the decision). Compare Biesecker, supra note 29, at 146-49
(describing the traditional function of genetic counseling as "facilitating and supporting
clients' decision making, rather than persuading or coercing them to choose a particular
outcome," as appropriate because "the counselor, in most circumstances, does not know
what outcome would be best for the client") with Sonia M. Suter, Value Neutrality and
Nondirectiveness: Comments on 'Future Directions in Genetic Counseling '8 KENNEDY INsT. ETHICS
J. 161-63 (1998) (noting that, based on their expertise and experience, "genetic counselors
can sometimes correctly determine the best decision for a particular client").
335. Some may suggest that, as in the context of abortion, any mandated counseling is
paternalistic and inappropriate. See Anita L. Allen, Genetic Privacy: Emerging Concepts and
Values, in GENETIC SECRETS, supra note 3, at 31, 47 (discussing the argument that choices
about counseling should be voluntary and "free of unwanted governmental or other third-
party interference"). To the extent that the state offers genetic counseling to patients, with-
out forcing them to listen to or to read certain information, this criticism can be withstood.
Moreover, because genetic testing of the sort described in this Article is so new, much of
this education is likely to occur in the context of patient pre-test counseling. This counsel-
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the concept of the patient as an equal partner in the physician-patient
relationship.336
2. The Model Statute: Elements of Post-Test Counseling.-Assuming
a person chooses to be tested for a particular condition, it is critically
important that the model statute require that she be provided with
appropriate post-test counseling.1 7 This is the first step to ensuring
that she is provided with appropriate health care and support services.
As with HIV testing, a person receiving test results (regardless of
whether they are positive or negative) must be provided with appro-
priate emotional support or, at a minimum, referrals to counseling
resources.
3 38
During post-test genetic counseling, it is essential to confirm that
the patient truly understands the nature of the diagnostic blood test,
what it reveals (or does not reveal), and the potential for disease pro-
gression should the tested-for trait be present.33 9 If the test reveals a
genetic flaw, the patient also must be provided with post-test counsel-
ing to inform her of any available medical treatment, as well as to
discuss the ramifications of disclosing (or not disclosing) test results to
ing encourages dialogue between health care provider and patient; as such, it is designed
to support patient autonomy, not squelch it. As one commentator has advised:
[A] professional's insistence that he and his patient-clients converse and think
together should be honored, even if the dialogue has to be forced. That much
invasion of privacy must be permitted in order to safeguard patient-clients' auton-
omy through insight, and not to abandon it to corruption by unnecessary fears,
blind misconceptions, and false certainties.
Jay Katz, Disclosure and Consent: In Search of Their Roots, in GENETICS AND THE LAw II, supra
note 309, at 121, 125; see also supra notes 130-143 and accompanying text (discussing recent
Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning medical counseling).
336. See Healey, supra note 309, at 72 (discussing the principle of the patient rights
movement that "the patient is a person who does not surrender his/her rights by entering
the health care process").
337. See McKinnon et al., supra note 5, at 1219 (stating that test results should be "dis-
closed in a face-to-face encounter" by a medical professional with an established relation-
ship with the testee); Report, supra note 23, at 87 (stating that post-test counseling must
accompany the disclosure of test results to the subject of the test).
338. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAw § 2781 (McKinney 1993) (requiring doctors to provide
counseling or referrals for counseling "[a]t the time of communicating the test result[s]"
in order to help patiens "cop[e] with the emotional consequences of learning the re-
sults"); McKinnon et al., supra note 5, at 1219 (arguing that genetic counselors should
refer patients to medical specialists and support organizations as part of the follow-up pro-
cedure). It may be particularly problematic for persons without health insurance or other
appropriate coverage to obtain appropriate follow-up counseling. See supra notes 62-66,
195-196 and accompanying text.
339. See Patenaude, supra note 7, at 404 (observing that although disclosure of genetic
information does not necessarily convey information about "immediate physical risks," it
could be useful if it spurs the testee to engage in behavior that would reduce the chances
of developing the condition for which she is at increased genetic risk).
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family members.3 4 ° She must be given the opportunity to discuss her
medical and disclosure options and to reach decisions, tentative as
they may be, with which she is comfortable. 41 Ideally, the patient
should not leave the facility without an appointment to come back for
follow-up care, whether it is for one week or one year hence, as appro-
priate."' In addition, she should be provided with as much guidance
as possible regarding what she should expect physiologically and emo-
tionally, and how she can best take care of herself.3 43
3. Non-Statutory Concerns: Creating Institutional Supports to Ensure
Informed Consent-Although time is at a premium in any health care
setting, it is particularly valuable in the context of pre- and post-test
counseling for genetic traits and conditions. 44 While economies of
scale can be achieved through use of videotapes and written materials
to provide some basic information, 34' decisions regarding testing re-
main remarkably complex. 46 Therefore, to the extent physicians are
going to offer genetic testing, they have the obligation to create suffi-
cient time in their schedules to provide appropriate pre- and post-test
counseling.
340. See Biesecker, supra note 29, at 152-53 ("As genes are identified that lead to treata-
ble conditions such as diabetes and hypertension, counselors, nurses, and physicians will
find it increasingly difficult to honor the rare client's request not to notify family members.
Genetic counselors may come to consider families, rather than individuals, as their cli-
ents."); cf Geller et al., supra note 172, at 1468 (stating that "primary risks and benefits of
testing at this time are psychological and social rather than physical (because the efficacy of
preventive and therapeutic strategies has not been proven)").
341. See generally KATZ, supra note 15, at 121-28 (discussing the process of self-reflection
as an element of patient autonomy); Groopman, supra note 92, at 44 (relating the experi-
ence of a BRCA carrier deciding between surveillance and removal of her breasts and
ovaries).
342. See McKinnon et al., supra note 5, at 1219 (stating that counselors should
"[e]ncourage follow-up, in person sessions" and "[p]rovide access by telephone for ques-
tions and concerns that may arise").
343. See Geller et al., supra note 172, at 1472 (discussing types of treatments to reduce
morbidity and mortality after a positive genetic test).
344. See Groopman, supra note 92, at 42-45 (illustrating through a patient's experience
the importance of providing information as well as time to consider carefully the numer-
ous implications of genetic testing).
345. See Geller et al., supra note 172, at 1469 (discussing the use of written brochures);
Jill Rips, Establishing a Successful HIV Counseling and Testing Service: A Blueprint for Preventing
Pediatric HIV Infections and Translating Research into Clinical Practice, 24 OBs-armcs & GYNE-
COLOGY CLINICS OF N. AM. 873, 881 (1997) (discussing group education sessions and the
use of literature and videos in the context of HIV counseling).
346. See Patenaude, supra note 7, at 408 (noting that although videos, brochures, CD-
ROMs and the like will be useful, "personal discussion with an informed professional of the
anticipated meaning and utility of the genetic information should be included in any deci-
sion-making process").
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Even when our health care providers say that certain decisions
are up to us, we often know what they want us to do. Sometimes our
physician explicitly tells us his recommendation; sometimes we can
sense his preferences from word choice or body language.14 1 It is of
utmost importance, however, that we believe that we will receive the
best available care and services, regardless of our decision to follow
our physician's (implicit or explicit) advice.
It is this expression of trust that is at the heart of the successful
physician-patient relationship: Our physician must trust that we will
make decisions that are in our own best interest, and we must trust
that our physician will continue to provide us with the (one hopes
high) standard of care that we have been receiving. 48
One way to facilitate the development of this relationship349 is to
incorporate assurances into both pre- and post-test counseling that
the physician will still provide the patient with care, regardless of her
decisions. Indeed, by integrating this message into patient counsel-
ing, the physician and patient are more likely to solidify a trusting
relationship.35
Whether an individual will consent to diagnostic genetic testing
also is influenced by her opportunity realistically to obtain health care
services that will address the discoveries found in such testing.351 In-
deed, as has been true in the HIV epidemic, merely testing positive,
without having available necessary care and services, is of limited
use.352 In fact, it would be quite cruel to encourage an individual to
be tested, only to learn that she has no means of obtaining treatment.
347. See Candace West & Richard M. Frankel, Miscommunication in Medicine, in "MISCOM-
MUNICATION" AND PROBLEMATIC TALK 166, 178 (Nikolas Coupland et al. eds., 1991) (noting
that "physicians use different linguistic registers . . . to enhance, limit, and exclude pa-
tients' participation over the course of medical encounters").
348. See KATz, supra note 15, at 102-03 (discussing "mutual trust" between physician and
patient); see also supra notes 177-181 and accompanying text (emphasizing the function of
trust in the medical decision-making process). As noted earlier, this may be particularly
difficult to achieve for a patient who is dependent on certain managed care programs,
Medicaid, or other public fumds for health care services. See supra notes 62-66, 193-196 and
accompanying text.
349. See KATZ, supra note 15, at xvi (offering "historical evidence that patients' participa-
tion in decision making is an idea alien to the ethos of medicine").
350. See Emanuel & Dubler, supra note 59, at 325 (discussing the benefit of a continued
relationship between patient and physician). A statutory prohibition against discrimina-
tion on the basis of "genetic predisposition or carrier status" also would serve to bolster this
trust. See, e.g., N.Y. ExEc. LAw § 296 (McKinney Supp. 1998).
351. See supra notes 62-66, 75, 193-196 and accompanying text.
352. Cf GOSTIN & LAZZARINI, supra note 48, at 72 (noting that "[e]ducational efforts
tend to fail unless individuals have the means with which to follow public health advice").
The only potential benefit to testing for HIV, without access to care, is the finding of some
studies that people are more likely to engage in risk-reduction behavior if they know them-
1999] 415
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
Although it is not possible for physicians, or their staffs, to con-
duct a detailed, individualized assessment of available care for each
patient, it is important, before testing, that they obtain at least a basic
understanding of the patient's available coverage (if any), and that
they ensure the patient also understands the scope of her coverage. It
may, in fact, be most important for the provider to encourage the
patient to contact her insurance company to learn what services may
be provided.3"
Existing barriers to physician-patient communication must be re-
moved to ensure that a patient's consent is truly informed. First, med-
ical language must be simplified to ensure that the pre-test and post-
test counseling is understood. 5 4 Making this change is likely to facili-
tate discussion between the patient and physician (or counselor) by
removing an important element of intimidation. Second, for those
individuals who do not speak English, translators must be available to
assist in pre- and post-test counseling. 35 5 Absent quality services in this
area, it is likely that large segments of immigrant populations will not
be able to give informed consent to a testing procedure.
5 6
As important, the physician must be able to acknowledge and
confront institutional barriers that may interfere with an individual's
willingness to engage in comfortable discussion regarding something
as significant as genetic testing.357 For example, the physician must
be able to take into consideration that an African American woman
who is dependent on government benefits is going to experience the
medical system differently from the way the physician experiences it
selves to be HIV-infected. See Kuller & Kingsley, supra note 249, at 62-68. The only benefit
of genetic testing, without more, is the hope that the testee "would initiate a chain of
events resulting in a significant reduction of a genetically increased cancer risk."
Patenaude, supra note 7, at 404.
353. See McKinnon et al., supra note 5, at 1218 (arguing that counselors should discuss
insurance related issues with testees). Even this act, however, may be fateful for the pa-
tient, especially if there is no prohibition on insurance companies denying coverage to
individuals based on genetic testing. See also Patenaude, supra note 7, at 408 ("Removing
fears of uninsurability ... would significantly alter the balance between risk and benefit.");
supra notes 28-29, 33-34, 79-80, 108-111 and 320-322.
354. See McKinnon et al., supra note 5, at 1218 (noting that genetic counseling should
be provided in a client-centered approach, providing information in "clear language" that
simplifies "complicated concepts"); supra notes 167-196 (discussing generally suggestions
for rendering consent truly informed).
355. See Gordon, supra note 186, at 1355 n.193 (stating that health care providers should
use non-family translators).
356. See id. at 1321-24, 1341 (discussing the effects of cultural differences on informed
consent).
357. See supra notes 3742, 145, 192-194, 199-207, infra notes 358-359 and accompanying
text (discussing the effects of alienation from the health care system due to gender, race,
or class).
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(as a doctor or as a patient)."' Regardless of whether she has had
negative experiences with health care institutions previously, it is pos-
sible that she will be aware of institutionalized discrimination against
racial minorities that has occurred in medical settings.159 The con-
cerns she may have regarding institutional abuse or nonfeasance are
quite tangible to her. They must be recognized and confronted, or
else her consent, if given, will be obtained through intimidation, not
information. 6 °
4. Enforcement.--Once a statute setting forth a protocol for in-
formed consent to genetic testing is established, its successful imple-
mentation will depend on two things: education and enforcement.
Each state health department and relevant professional organization
will have the responsibility of educating health care providers regard-
ing their duties under the informed consent statutory scheme. In-
deed, even absent passage of legislation, the growing availability of
genetic testing requires that these activities occur.
Just as education of professionals constitutes a positive induce-
ment to engage in appropriate pre-test counseling, enforcement
mechanisms provide a complementary obligation to comply with the
law. This statute should be enforceable through a private right of ac-
tion by an individual who believes she was not provided with statuto-
rily mandated pre- or post-test counseling.3 6 1 Similarly, the state
358. See Ehrenreich, supra note 192, at 492-95 (comparing the differences in health care
treatment between a 32-year-old middle class academic and a 32-year-old unemployed
mother of three); Dorothy E. Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REv. 1945,
1961-64 (1993) (illustrating how the perspective of African American women toward
health care may be shaped by this country's history of depriving them of reproductive
choice as means of punishment, as well as out of eugenic motives).
359. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Future of Reproductive Choice for Poor Women and Women of
Color, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 305, 310 n.32 (1992) (stating that for decades "[p]oor
women of color have been subjected to sterilization abuse"); Phil Bereano, Debate on Privacy
Rages Amid Efforts to Name Those Who Test HIV-Positive, SrATrLE TIMES, Oct. 12, 1997, at B9,
available in 1997 WL 3257971 (stating that memories of the Tuskegee Experiment rein-
force distrust of health officials in disempowerod communities); Marcia Smith, Cuts and
Class, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 27, 1998, at 54, available in LEXIS, News Library, News Group
File (reporting that in 1972, the federal government admitted to funding sterilization of
100,000 to 200,000 poor women).
360. See generally Ehrenreich, supra note 192, at 495-96 (focusing attention on "instances
of forced medical treatment during pregnancy"); Roberts, supra note 359, at 305 (discuss-
ing the background and ramifications of "policies aimed at restricting the fertility of poor
women of color").
361. See, e.g., N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW § 79-1(2) (a), 3(a) (McKinney Supp. 1998) (providing
penalties for any person who "perform[s] a genetic test on a biological sample taken from
an individual without ... prior written informed consent" or who discloses "records, find-
ings and results of any genetic test ... without the written informed consent of the per-
son"); N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 2783(4) (McKinney 1993) (allowing recovery for ordering
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attorney general should be permitted to bring an enforcement action
if necessary.
Under New York's genetic testing statute, one who violates the
statute may be subject to a "civil fine of not more than one thousand
dollars";362 however, one who willfully violates the statute "shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor punishable by a fine of not more than five
thousand dollars or by imprisonment for not more than ninety days or
by both such fine and imprisonment. "363 Not surprisingly, these pun-
ishments mirror the provisions contained in the state's HIV testing
statute.3
61
Discussions with New York State and City officials365 and a review
of pertinent case law366 reveal no reports of HIV-related testing with-
out the consent of the patient.367 Although there have been reports
related to breaches of confidentiality, the State Human Rights Com-
mission has initiated actions only if the person living with HrV/AIDS
has suffered from discrimination as a result of the disclosure.3 61 It is
not clear how the state would respond to an individual who wished to
pursue a claim merely for the breach.
This information is both encouraging and disturbing. The appar-
ent lack of unconsented to testing is positive; however, it is not possi-
ble to measure the extent of testing that may occur without a patient's
fully informed consent. Similarly, it is good to know that the state as-
sists claimants when they have suffered harm as a result of a breach in
HIV-related confidentiality. However, one must question the extent
to which the decision not to pursue "mere" breaches in confidentiality
serves to discourage the reporting of such claims and sends an unfor-
tunate message regarding the serious nature of such breaches.
an HIV test "based on a failure to provide information, explanations, or counseling prior
to the execution of a written informed consent, or based on a lack of informed consent").
362. N.Y. Crv. RIGHTS LAW § 79-1(5) (a).
363. Id. § 79-1(5) (b).
364. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2783(4) (imposing fines for violation of the statute).
365. Telephone Interviews with Representatives, AIDS Institute, New York State Depart-
ment of Health (Mar. 25, 1998); New York City Commission on Human Rights.
366. Search of WESTLAW, New York State and Federal Cases Database (Nov. 16, 1998)
(HIV /s Test! /s Consent) (retrieving thirteen cases, none of which described HIV-related
testing without the consent of the patient).
367. This does not include state-mandated HIV-testing of all newborns, and select other
exceptions, to the statutory requirement of informed consent. See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW
§ 2500-f (McKinney Supp. 1998) (allowing for the testing of newborns for HIV); § 2785-a
(McKinney Supp. 1998) (mandating HIV-related testing pursuant to a court order). By
definition, it does not include unconsented to testing of which the patient is never aware.
368. Telephone Interview with Representative, AIDS Office, New York State Division of
Human Rights (Mar. 25, 1998).
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Because the New York genetic testing statute was enacted only
recently,3 69 it is too soon to reach any conclusions regarding the effec-
tiveness of its enforcement mechanisms. One must hope that, with
the increasing visibility of the work of the Human Genome Project, 7 °
health care providers and patients will recognize the value of in-
formed consent to genetic testing, legislatures will discern the impor-
tance of enacting legislation such as that described in this Article, and
mechanisms to prevent and punish breaches in consent or confidenti-
ality will be available and effective. The New York enforcement provi-
sions, allowing for both a private right of action and a misdemeanor
prosecution,37 are a good place to start. Time will reveal whether
they are sufficient to protect patients' rights to informed decision-
making in this age of rapidly advancing technology.
5. Arguments Against a Model Statute.-There are those who
would argue that legislating in the realm of public health, particularly
in an area as new as genetic testing, is inappropriate.372 Some believe,
as a matter of principle, that controversies such as those explored in
this Article, are best resolved in the private sector by private actors. In
such cases, should an "unresolvable" conflict arise, the parties can
turn to a court of law, asking it to apply traditional legal concepts to
resolve the dispute. Using this approach, an appropriate body of law
and practice is expected to develop over time.373
Others believe that it is inappropriate to legislate in the realm of
genetic testing, counseling, and confidentiality because of concerns
that it would create, or reinforce, a form of "genetic exceptional-
ism." 374 This theory, echoing the criticism of HIV exceptionalism, as-
serts that the only reason genetic testing is "exceptional" is because we
369. N.Y. Crv. RIGrHTs LAw § 79-1 (McKinney Supp. 1998).
370. See McKinnon et al., supra note 5, at 1217 (discussing the work of the National
Society of Genetic Counselors in response to "[r]apid advances, such as those related to
the Human Genome Project").
371. See supra text accompanying notes 362-363.
372. See generally DwoRIuN, supra note 14 (arguing that it may be misguided to enact
such legislation).
373. See Biesecker, supra note 29, at 152 ("Consent to undergo genetic testing eventually
will be obtained by primary care providers in a manner similar to consent for other medi-
cal tests.").
374. Robert L. Wachbroit notes that, excepting reproduction because of the historical
use of eugenics in this area, "[t]he expansion of genetic counseling to other areas of
medicine... encourages a 'genetic exceptionalism,' as if the mere fact that genetic meth-
odologies were used requires providing the patient with special support and care. This
genetic exceptionalism is dubious at best." Wachbroit, supra note 1, at 139-40.
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treat it that way. 375 Proponents of this approach assert that if, instead,
we were to treat genetics as a routine health matter, we would be tak-
ing important steps to reducing stigma and discrimination.376
It is true that components of the model legislation proposed
herein may, one day, appear unnecessary or inappropriate. 77 In-
deed, should the factors that currently support the creation of legisla-
tion-lack of treatment, stigma, risk of discrimination in employment
and insurance-change, then it may be appropriate to amend the stat-
ute.3 78 For the foreseeable future, however, the potential for "social
harm" remains significant. Therefore, while legislation may pose
some of the dangers described herein, it would be irresponsible to
refuse the invitation to legislate-carefully- elements of informed
consent and confidentiality in the burgeoning realm of genetic
testing.37
9
375. See Thomas H. Murray, Genetic Exceptionalism and "Future Diaries:" Is Genetic Informa-
tion Different from Other Medical Information, in GENETIC SECRETS, supra note 3, at 60, 71
("The more we repeat that genetic information is fundamentally unlike other kinds of
medical information, the more support we implicitly provide for genetic determinism, for
the notion that genetics exerts special power over our lives."); Wachbroit, supra note 1, at
140 ("[T]o insist that counseling should be routinely provided whenever the medical test is
genetic leads to a mystique surrounding the idea of genes that encourages misunderstand-
ings about what genes are and distorts their significance.").
376. See Burris & Gostin, supra note 3, at 149-50 ("By 'protecting' those with genetic
'differences' from stigma and discrimination, we are actually reinforcing the belief in their
inferiority or otherness."). Others may object to the cost of establishing rigorous consent
mechanisms; there are, however, ways to moderate these expenses. See supra notes 344-345
and accompanying text (discussing costs and achieving economies of scale through use of
videotapes, CD-ROMS, and brochures).
377. See supra notes 14, 273-277 and accompanying text. For example, as a society, we
deal differently with HIV/AIDS than we did ten or fifteen years ago. This has led some to
call for changes to our approach to dealing with the epidemic. See Chandler Burr, The
AIDS Exception: Privacy vs. Public Health, ATLANTIC MONTHLY (June 1997). Others note
that because HIV/AIDS remains a condition that leads to significant stigma and discrimi-
nation and for which there is insufficient (accessibility to) treatment, it is too soon to make
such changes. See Scott Burris, Law and the Social Risk of Health Care: Lessons from H1V Test-
ing, 61 AI. L.R 831 (1998); Lynda Richardson, Wave of Laws Aimed at People With HIV, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 25, 1998, at Al. One should expect that this tension will be echoed in the
realm of genetic testing as society struggles to develop appropriate law and policy to pro-
tect individuals in the course of preserving public health.
378. See Patenaude, supra note 7, at 406 ("The social and ethical constructions which are
devised to guide clinicians and consumers of genetic testing in its use must be flexible in
incorporating changes in scientific information and accumulating data on social and psy-
chological impact of genetic testing.").
379. See Arthur C. Upton, Forward to GENETIC SECRETS, supra note 3, at xi, xiii (arguing
that the current investment in genetic technology demands that we develop policies to
ensure its wise use, and that we not simply ignore the "social, ethical, and legal ramifica-
tions" of these questions). As discussed throughout this Part of the Article, this legislation
also is designed to influence the way the medical community generally approaches coun-
seling, testing, and privacy. See supra notes 276-277 and accompanying text (suggesting
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CONCLUSION
Significant problems exist with the legal doctrine of informed
consent as it now stands: Neither the "reasonable physician" nor the
"reasonable patient" standard adequately protects the rights or recog-
nizes the needs of most patients; even the more appropriate "reason-
able patient" standard frequently is filtered through the physician's
perceptions of what risks a reasonable person in the patient's position
would want to know; informed consent is required chiefly in the con-
text of significantly invasive procedures, because this doctrine was de-
veloped to warn of medical risks, not social risks; and mere
nondisclosure of a nonoccurring risk without ensuing harm is not ac-
tionable."' These deficiencies are exacerbated by the growth in avail-
able genetic testing technology, the financial pressures inherent in
managed care reimbursement and public health programs, and his-
toric inequalities in access to appropriate health care services. 8 '
The model statute proposed in this Article has the potential to
remedy, or at least ameliorate, these problems. The statute itself cre-
ates a base of information that must be provided to the patient. While
this is, perhaps, somewhat paternalistic, the goal of the statute is quite
to the contrary: to support the patient's exercise of autonomy. His-
tory, particularly in the HIV/AIDS epidemic, has shown that when ad-
vances in medical testing technology are teamed with the potential for
discrimination and lack of available treatment, statutory provisions fo-
cusing on informed consent constitute an essential wall of protection
for the patient regarding informed medical decision making. 2
Moreover, while the statute cannot dictate the bounds of human
behavior, it seeks to support an environment in which physicians and
counselors are encouraged to discuss the range of concerns that may
trouble a patient. By so doing, the statute seeks to implement a "rea-
sonable person as defined by the circumstances" standard, in which
the patient has an obligation to express her concerns, but can do so
only if the health care provider both gives her the opportunity and
informs her of the range of potential consequences (positive and neg-
ative) that may occur as a result of consenting, or choosing not to
consent, to genetic testing. As such, the primary burden lies with the
health care provider and a secondary burden with the patient.
that the problems of exceptionalism are best overcome by increasing the requirements for
informed consent in all areas of medicine).
380. See supra Part II.B.2 (providing background on the development of informed con-
sent legal doctrine).
381. See supra notes 4, 59-66, 69-72, 198-200, 204, 209-211 and accompanying text.
382. See supra notes 228-277 and 335.
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This statute implicitly incorporates the critique of informed con-
sent doctrine levied by critical theorists, in that the physician is re-
quired to engage the patient regarding the patient's concerns. Her
anxieties may arise out of her experiences as an affluent individual
with health insurance and the full range of treatment available to her,
or they may arise out of her experiences as a low-income person de-
pendent on government benefits with a more limited range of op-
tions. Nevertheless, the physician, or counselor, has the responsibility
to elicit his patient's concerns and to respond to them.
383
Although the statutory provisions proposed herein are not re-
quired by the federal Constitution, they are fully consistent with ex-
isting holdings regarding medical decision making and bodily
autonomy. Regardless of whether the Supreme Court ultimately were
to determine that such rights are "fundamental" or more accurately
characterized as "liberty interests," the terms of the proposed model
statute are compatible with both standards.384
Legal doctrine is obligated to keep pace with medical technology
as it continues to develop in ways that were hardly conceivable just a
few years ago. Financial pressures notwithstanding, it is the moral ob-
ligation of our physicians to speak with us and to get to know us and
our needs, particularly with something as complex as genetic testing.
The statute proposed in this Article is hardly radical; indeed, its core is
taken from another complex medical condition-HIV/AIDS. We
have before us a wonderful opportunity to learn from our past, to
develop a cogent genetic testing statutory framework, and to ensure
that legal doctrine continues to respond to both physicians and pa-
tients in these swiftly changing times.
383. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing current informed consent doctrine and its inade-
quacy in protecting the needs and rights of most patients).
384. See supra Part II.A-B (tracing the constitutional, statutory, and case law history of
informed consent).
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